The Germans seem to have been genuinely under the delusion that by this time the long retreat had reduced the British Army, always "contemptible," to a mere spiritless mob, which it was no longer necessary to take into calculation in developing their plan of campaign. They little knew the British soldier. So far the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers had had no chance of showing its quality; it had just been marched off its feet from the start—in the wrong direction. But, in spite of all the men had gone through, they were ready at any moment to turn and fight like lions when they were allowed to.
Sept. 6.
And now at last the moment was close at hand. To their joyful surprise the officers of the Battalion found, on the morning of September 6, that the direction had been changed, and that an advance was to be made eastward against the German flank. At first it was thought that this meant the beginning of an offensive-defensive, the German attack having failed; but in reality, of course, the change was a much bigger one even than this. The French reserves were now available, and the Germans' greatest asset, superior numbers, was lost to them. And so a new phase of the campaign began to develop.
On the 6th Lieut.-Colonel Corry resumed the command of the Battalion, and Lieut.-Colonel G. Feilding took command of the Brigade.
CHAPTER IV
THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE (2ND BATTALION)
The German General Staff at this juncture realised that a retreating army is not necessarily a beaten one. For the last ten days, with their maps spread before them, they had had the satisfaction of moving the pins and flags representing their forces continually and rapidly nearer and nearer Paris. But if the French Army—the British Army, they thought, could be safely ignored—were to succeed in escaping south, it would remain a constant menace. It might even interfere with the Emperor's spectacular entry into Paris, every detail of which had been sketched out beforehand by the officials, whose business it was to stage-manage all the theatrical pageantry of their Imperial master's movements.
So a big coup was wanted—a smashing blow at the French. If the centre of the French line could be pierced by the combined efforts of Von Hausen's, the Duke of Würtemberg's, and the Crown Prince's armies, and if simultaneously Von Kluck's army, which had reached Senlis, and was only twenty-five miles from Paris, could execute a swift movement to the south-east, the Fifth French Army would be caught in a vice. This strategic plan really menaced the whole of the interior of France, and had it succeeded might have resulted in her downfall. In all these calculations of the German Staff it appears to have been assumed that the British Army was practically out of action, and that whatever remained of it had in all probability been sent to reinforce the weak spot at Bar-le-Duc.
To accomplish his decisive stroke, Von Kluck had to execute that most dangerous of all manoeuvres, a flank march with the object of rolling up the left of the French line. The German General Staff assumed that the left of the Fifth French Army was the left of the whole French line, and that nothing beyond a few cavalry patrols had to be reckoned with. Von Kluck was accordingly given orders to march his army to the left and attack the Fifth French Army under General Franchet d'Esperey. They knew nothing of the Sixth Army under General Maunoury, which had arrived with such dramatic suddenness in taxi-cabs from Paris.
The unknown and the despised elements proved Von Kluck's undoing. Before he had gone very far he found the completely ignored British Army on top of him, and the totally unexpected Sixth French Army on his right flank. Quickly realising his peril, he decided to retire. In the meantime, on the French side, General Foch, who was about in the centre of the French line, saw an opportunity, which he promptly seized, of driving a wedge between the armies of Von Hausen and Von Bülow. The situation was now entirely changed. The lately triumphant German forces were no longer even moderately secure, and decided on a general retirement all along the line.
It was on September 5 that Sir John French and General Joffre conferred together and decided to take the offensive. To the British Army was assigned the space between the Fifth and Sixth French Armies. This meant a change of front, and hence that welcome order to the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers to move due east instead of south.