Oct. 14.
Early next morning the Division marched out of Roulers, and not long afterwards the Germans arrived; in fact, it was said that the rear-guard was hardly clear of the town before the Uhlans were in it. No. 3 and No. 4 Companies, under Captain Lord Richard Wellesley and Major Colby, formed the advance-guard.
Rain fell heavily all the way, and the roads were in a terrible state, but the men's spirits were raised by the news that they were nearly in touch with the Expeditionary Force. These forced marches had told on the troops, and though in the Grenadiers not a man fell out, in some of the battalions men were left behind—never to be seen again. Others, determined not to fall into the enemy's hands, limped doggedly on in a pitiable plight, some having even taken off their boots and tied their puttees round their feet.
They reached Ypres at 2 P.M. on the 14th, and the King's, No. 3, and No. 4 Companies were detailed to find the outposts on the Menin and Messines roads. As the companies moved out to take up their positions they encountered several parties of Uhlans, which caused a good deal of excitement among the men, as they were the first of the enemy's troops actually seen. Some ammunition was expended without much result. But No. 4 Company at any rate accounted for four of these advanced cavalry.
In the evening a report was received that a German force of all arms, estimated to be an Army Corps, was advancing on Ypres from the direction of Comines. Their road was blocked by a platoon of the King's Company, and most of the men were delighted at the prospect of a fight, although those who knew the composition of a German Army Corps were not quite so enthusiastic. Two platoons of No. 2 Company under Lieutenant T. E. R. Symons were despatched to Voormezeele, about a mile in front of the outpost line, to block the road and report at once any movements by the enemy.
These were the first trenches dug on the Ypres battle-ground. The men at that time imagined that they had only to scrape out temporary shelters which would be sufficient protection for a night or two. They little thought that they were laying the foundation of an intricate network of trenches which would be constantly used for the next four years.
The first battle of Ypres which was now about to begin may be said to fall into four clearly marked stages:
A. Up to October 19: the operations of the Second and Third Corps from the La Bassée Canal in the south to Armentières and Ploegsteert Wood, in which they forced their way forward in the face of always increasing opposition; the Second Corps establishing itself on the high ground south-west of Lille ("the Aubers Ridge"), although it was being held up on its right by the strong German position of La Bassée; the Third Corps continuing the line northward astride of the Lys. On their left the enemy's cavalry threatened the passages of the Lys from Warneton downward, but could not cross the river. Its operations connected up those of the Second and Third Corps with those of the Seventh Division and Third Cavalry Division, with which General Rawlinson, after advancing eastward to assist in the retirement of the Belgian Army from Antwerp, had fallen back to a position a few miles east of Ypres.
By the evening of October 19 the line of the Second Corps ran approximately from east of Givenchy—Violaines—Lorgies—west of Illies—Herlies to Le Pilly, while between it and the Third Corps was General Conneau's French Cavalry Corps, somewhat to the left rear of the Second Corps. The Third Corps had reached the line Radinghem—Ennetières—Prémesques—Frélinghien—Le Gheer. The British cavalry continued the line down the Lys to the Ypres—Comines Canal, and was in touch with the right of General Rawlinson's command, which, after attempting to advance on Menin on the morning of October 19, had been forced to fall back to the position Zandvoorde—Kruiseik—Zonnebeke by the appearance on its left of large forces of Germans, before which the French cavalry (connecting General Rawlinson's force with the Belgians) was falling back.
The situation, as it then stood, seems to have offered Sir John French two alternatives for the employment of Sir Douglas Haig's Corps, which had then completed its concentration in the area St. Omer—Hazebrouck: he might utilise it to reinforce Generals Smith-Dorrien and Pulteney, who were holding a long front, and whose troops had had over a week of difficult, if on the whole successful, fighting, and lacked the numbers needed for any further advance. Reinforcements thrown in on this quarter might have saved Lille, and enabled the French, in co-operation with whom the British were acting, to outflank the Germans opposed to them in the neighbourhood of Loos and Arras. Ever since the battle on the Aisne had reached a deadlock in the middle of September, it had been the object of the Allied forces to outflank the German right, while the Germans had by continually reinforcing and prolonging their threatened flank succeeded in thwarting this effort. It is this double prolongation of the opposing lines, first by one combatant, then by the other, which is called "the Race to the Sea," and of which the first battle of Ypres was the culminating point.