Sir John French, in his despatch of that date, said:
I considered, however, that the possession of Menin constituted a very important point of passage, and would much facilitate the advance of the rest of the Army, so I directed the General Officer commanding the Fourth Corps to advance the Seventh Division upon Menin and endeavour to seize that crossing on the morning of the 18th.
It was no easy task that was allotted to Sir Henry Rawlinson, for he had nothing to fall back upon. The cavalry under Byng was hardly strong enough to do more than feel for the enemy, and there was therefore only the French Territorial Division at Ypres as a reserve. There was nearly twenty miles of front for the Seventh Division to operate on, and no one knew when the First Corps would arrive.
The advance of the Seventh Division began in the morning. The 1st Battalion Grenadiers deployed for an attack on Gheluwe and Kruiseik, with No. 2 and No. 3 Companies in the firing-line, and the King's and No. 4 in support. The men were extended to eight paces, and each company had a frontage of half a platoon; the Battalion was thus in sixteen lines, with 200 yards between each line, during the preliminary advance under artillery fire.
When about half the Battalion was on the move, the order to advance was countermanded, for news had arrived that a large force of all arms was advancing from the direction of Courtrai. Lawford's Brigade, which had reached Kleythoek, was strongly attacked on its left flank and compelled to fall back with heavy losses. The advance on Menin had been found impracticable; Sir Henry Rawlinson suddenly realised that with a single infantry division it was sheer madness to attack an enemy force which, according to our airmen's reports, was far stronger than Sir John French had anticipated. Being the pivot on which the whole Division had to turn, Ruggles-Brise's Brigade had not gone far when the countermanding order came, but the left of the Division had to retire some distance before it was in line facing the right way.
Ruggles-Brise's Brigade retired to its former position, which consisted of a semicircular line running from Zandvoorde through Kruiseik to the cross-roads on the Ypres—Menin road. To the 1st Battalion Grenadiers was allotted a frontage of nearly a mile, from and including the village of Kruiseik to the cross-roads, on the left being the Yorkshire Regiment from Watts's Brigade and on the right the Border Regiment. No. 2 and No. 3 Companies were in the firing line, and No. 4 and the King's Company in support.
A circular salient is not easy to hold, and after the greater part of the day had been spent in improving the trenches and putting out barbed wire under intermittent and ineffective shell-fire, orders were received to withdraw the line. This withdrawal was necessitated by the Divisional order to send back two battalions as Divisional Reserve. This left only the Grenadiers and Border Regiment to occupy the whole line. After consulting General Ruggles-Brise, Lieut.-Colonel Earle decided to withdraw Nos. 2 and 3 Companies and convert the support trenches into the firing line. This meant altering the trenches a good deal, as those used for the supports were too wide and shallow. The whole situation had, however, changed, and the Division was now on the defensive.
Oct. 20.
Improvements in the line generally were made next day. Besides being deepened, the trenches were made narrower by driving wash-poles into the bottom about three feet apart, closing up the intervals with doors, shutters, straw hurdles, etc., and then filling up the space behind with earth. This work was practically finished, when it had to be stopped because a reconnaissance was sent out in front with a battery of R.H.A. (13-pounders) to support it, and no sooner had the battery opened fire than it was itself attacked by much heavier artillery from the direction of Wervicq.
For an hour a constant stream of shrapnel and high explosive poured over our trenches. There was one short lull, when our R.H.A. Battery ran short of ammunition, and the Germans, thinking they had knocked the battery out, also ceased fire. On realising their mistake, they began again with renewed energy. High-explosive shells were bursting all down the trenches, back and front, but luckily none landed actually in them; and though a cottage by the side of the road caught fire, the removal of the wood and straw lying near the trench averted all danger. Very grateful the Grenadiers were for the close touch which F Battery under Major Head managed to keep with them during these anxious days' fighting. It was a perfect example of how artillery and infantry should co-operate.