Nov. 30.
The officers had just finished breakfast on the 30th, and were about to inspect their companies, when the news arrived that the Germans had broken through the line near Gonnelieu. It was said that the enemy had been seen marching in fours through Gouzeaucourt. Immediately orders were given for the Battalion to be ready to start at a moment’s notice. Although the men had expected a quiet day, and were quite unprepared, so perfect were the organisation and discipline that in half an hour’s time the Battalion was ready to move off.
Lord Gort’s orders were to concentrate on Metz, and accordingly the Battalion moved off in that direction. The road was full of transport moving in the opposite direction, and with it ran a stream of men looking strangely unlike British soldiers, with no rifles or equipment—wounded and unwounded with incoherent stories, officers half-undressed, gunners with breechblocks in their hands, all with a hunted look. Some high-explosive shells came streaming over, and pitched not far from the road. Lord Henry Seymour with his commanding officers rode on ahead to try and glean some information, while the four battalions of his Brigade marched through Metz, past the beetroot factory and on to the open ground beyond, where they lay down and waited.
Attack on Gonnelieu
About 2.30 P.M. the whole Brigade, in artillery formation, moved off in the direction of Gouzeaucourt, and in the meantime the attack of De
Crespigny’s Brigade had been completely successful and required no reinforcements. The direction of the march was consequently slightly changed. The 4th Battalion crossed the Trescault—Gouzeaucourt road, where, thanks to Lieutenant Ingleby, the cookers arrived, and the men were provided with hot food. That night General Walker, commanding the 16th Brigade of the Sixth Division, held a conference at the 4th Battalion Headquarters. His object was to ensure that the 4th Battalion understood his scheme of attack, for if his brigade failed it would have to carry out his plan. The hurried manner in which the attack was planned, and the obviously scanty information on which the plan was based, seemed to indicate that it was not likely to succeed. At 1 A.M. a warning order was issued to the effect that Seymour’s Brigade would assault Gonnelieu, if the attack of the 16th Brigade failed. Lord Gort thereupon wrote out his orders with the very meagre information at his disposal.
To have to select a definite objective after dark made things very difficult, since the final disposition depended upon the attack of the 16th Brigade, and whatever happened an indefinite front line would be the result. If the 16th Brigade succeeded, Seymour’s Brigade would simply relieve it, but if it failed the attack would have to be attempted a second time. These considerations alone made it necessary to work out alternative schemes. Lord Henry Seymour fortunately prepared a detailed plan for the worst event, and fully realised that his Brigade
was to be employed in a manner generally accepted as impossible, except in a great emergency, involving the advance of infantry, unsupported by artillery, across the open against an enemy occupying trenches, and houses bristling with machine-guns.
The following officers took part in the attack on Gonnelieu:
| Lieut.-Colonel Viscount Gort, D.S.O., M.C. , M.C. | Commanding Officer. |
| Major W. S. Pilcher, D.S.O. | 2nd in Command. |
| Capt. C. R. Gerard | Adjutant. |
| Capt. M. Chapman | Intelligence Officer. |
| Capt. H. H. Sloane-Stanley | No. 1 Company. |
| Lieut. C. E. Irby | ” ” |
| 2nd Lieut. J. M. Chitty | ” ” |
| 2nd Lieut. B. J. Hubbard, M.C. | No. 2 Company. |
| 2nd Lieut. R. C. Denman | ” ” |
| 2nd Lieut. D. E. A. Horne | ” ” |
| Capt. J. B. M. Burke, M.C. | No. 3 Company. |
| Lieut. the Hon. A. H. L. Hardinge | ” ” |
| Lieut. L. R. Abel-Smith | ” ” |
| Capt. G. H. T. Paton, M.C. | No. 4 Company. |
| Lieut. B. C. Layton | ” ” |
| 2nd Lieut. J. J. M. Veitch | ” ” |