On the morning of the 24th the Germans commenced an attack across the front of the Battalion, and were caught by enfilade fire from Captain Stein’s Company, which inflicted heavy losses on them as they advanced. The troops employed by the enemy seemed to have been
well trained in the new method of attack, and men were dribbled forward to their assembly positions, where they deployed into waves for the attack, but when they came under our machine-gun, Lewis-gun, and rifle fire, they soon began to bunch in groups. It seemed as if the enemy’s troops had started with the intention of carrying out the operation at the double for the whole 3000 yards. In order even to attempt this, they must have undergone a considerable training to reach the standard of physical fitness necessary for such an attack. Round discs were used to maintain the correct direction, and the flanks of the attack were marked by flags. In other respects they appeared to have evolved no new ideas in minor tactics, and the absence of any covering fire during the advance was most noticeable. Light machine-guns followed up in rear of the assault, and only came into action to cover the retirement of the defeated “Sturm-Truppen.”
Mar. 25.
On the 25th patrols were again pushed out, and, although the enemy could be seen moving about on the Croiselles—Henin road, the day passed quietly. That night, in accordance with verbal instructions received over the telephone, the 1st Battalion withdrew to the Army line, commencing the evacuation of the front trenches at 11.30 P.M. Although the orders for this retirement were originally received at 2.20 P.M., they were subsequently cancelled, and it was not until 1.30 A.M. that the retirement was carried out after verbal orders over the telephone had been received. The only incident that
occurred during this withdrawal was the approach of an enemy patrol towards the rearguard platoon of the King’s company, which at once opened fire on them. The hostile patrol scattered, and the retirement was carried out without further molestation. Lord Gort kept two platoons from No. 4 Company in their position, to ensure that no troops of the Guards Division had been left east of the Arras—Bapaume road. He also telephoned to the officer commanding the Royal Scots Fusiliers, and satisfied himself that this regiment was conforming with his movements before he withdrew the rearguard.
The new sector occupied by the 1st Battalion was to the north-east of Boisieux-St.-Marc, and was held by Lieutenant Lloyd’s, Lieutenant Harvard’s, and Captain Stein’s Companies, each having two platoons in close support in shell slits. The 2nd Battalion Scots Guards was on the right, and the Royal Scots Fusiliers on the left.
Mar. 26.
One and a half hours before dawn the next day outpost patrols, consisting of picked shots, were pushed forward by each Company in the line, so that any attempt on the part of the enemy to occupy Boiry Becquerelle might be instantly reported. At 7.30 one patrol sent back the information that the Germans could be seen, advancing in large numbers in artillery formation, and covered by a screen of scouts. The enemy’s aircraft had been busy since the preceding day, in flying over this area, while the German artillery continued to shell the western end of Boiry Becquerelles and the Arras—Bapaume road with 5·9 howitzers. These combined efforts of the
enemy’s artillery and aircraft seemed to suggest that, in the opinion of the Germans, the Guards Division would be compelled, by the situation farther north, to withdraw. Orders for a farther withdrawal of Seymour’s Brigade were issued, and were cancelled that evening, as the enemy made no signs of any further attack.
March 27-29.