On the 9th the orders were not received until the Battalion was in its assembly position.

The following officers took part in these operations:

Lieut.-Colonel the Viscount Lascelles, D.S.O.Commanding Officer.
Capt. E. G. A. Fitzgerald, D.S.O.Adjutant.
Lieut. R. C. G. de ReuterIntelligence Officer.
Capt. E. R. M. Fryer, M.C.No. 1 Company.
Lieut. K. A. Campbell, D.S.O. "  "
2nd Lieut. G. R. Gunther, M.C. "  "
Capt. A. H. S. Adair, M.C.No. 2 Company.
Lieut. S. G. Fairbairn, M.C. "  "
Lieut. C. B. Hollins "  "
Lieut. F. Anson, M.C.No. 3 Company.
2nd Lieut. H. J. Gibbon, M.C. "  "
Capt. E. J. Bunbury, M.C.No. 4 Company.
2nd Lieut. A. E. F. F. Strangways-Rogers "  "
2nd Lieut. H. I'B. Smith "  "
2nd Lieut. R. P. Papillon "  "
Capt. J. H. Graff, U.S.A.M.O.R.C.Medical Officer.
Capt. the Rev. S. Phillimore, M.C.Chaplain.

Oct. 9.

In the early part of the attack one of our guns appears to have been badly laid, with the result that it continued to shoot short, causing several casualties among the leading companies of the Battalion. This was particularly irritating, since only a short time before these companies had been mistaken for the enemy, and had been fired at by one of our own aeroplanes. The first objective was taken by 6.30, and no Germans were encountered, the only casualties being caused by our barrage.

The Battalion started off with No. 1 Company under Captain Fryer on the right, No. 2 under Captain Adair on the left, No. 3 under Lieutenant Anson in support, and No. 4 under Captain Bunbury in reserve. As there seemed every possibility of the Germans retiring rapidly, the scheme of attack was ambitious, with a large extent of ground to be covered. The first objective was a trench running from Niergnies to Seranvillers; the second objective the road running from Cambrai to La Targette; and after that there were four "bounds," ending up with the Cambrai—Beauvois road. There was no sign of the enemy, not even any hostile shelling at first, and no difficulty was experienced in securing the objectives. In the second bound, Wambaix Copse, which might possibly have been held by the enemy, was also taken without opposition. At 10.30 the capture of Estourmel was effected, and still the enemy had shown no sign of fighting. Lord Lascelles decided that the dinners should be eaten now, and as the 1st Guards Brigade had not come up there was plenty of time for the men to dine before resuming the advance. It was not until the Battalion reached the Cambrai—Beauvois road and Igniel-dit-les-Frisettes that the enemy's resistance stiffened, and it suffered casualties. Captain Adair with No. 2 Company occupied Igniel, but reported that casualties were occurring from machine-gun fire on his right, and from the enemy's heavy guns at long range. This village was in a clump of trees on the crest of a hill on the farther side of the Cambrai—Beauvois road, and was approached by a sunken road, on each side of which the ground rose in a gentle slope, and formed an ideal position for machine-guns. Captain Adair advanced up the sunken road, and as soon as his company appeared on the hill it was subjected to a harassing machine-gun fire. He at first ordered his men to dig themselves in, but later he decided to move up into Igniel-dit-les-Frisettes. When No. 2 Company moved into the trees and buildings, it was so heavily shelled that Lord Lascelles, who had come up to see how the situation was developing, told him his men would be safer out in the open. There seems little doubt that the German ammunition was already deteriorating, for when their shells burst the pieces did not scatter so well as before. But for this the casualties would certainly have been very heavy, and in all probability it would have been found necessary to retire from the hill altogether. At 4.30 P.M. Lord Lascelles received instructions to support a cavalry patrol of the Oxfordshire Hussars, which had been sent out through the 1st Battalion Coldstream on the left. He was surprised at this message, for he knew that no cavalry patrol could possibly go out in the face of this machine-gun fire, and when the officer commanding the patrol appeared at the Battalion Headquarters to say that it had been unable to go forward at all, he was able to disregard the order, and send in a report asking for confirmation of his action. In the evening orders were received to establish an outpost line with two companies over the Cambrai—Beauvois road, with two companies in support near Estourmel. That night a warning order was received for a farther advance the next morning, and the Battalion Headquarters moved up to Grand Chanfemel.

Oct. 10.

The next morning the 1st Battalion Scots Guards passed through the outpost line, and continued the advance by bounds, while the Battalion moved forward in support. No. 3 Company on the right, under Lieutenant Anson, and No. 4, under Captain Bunbury, formed the support, with the other two companies in reserve. In the afternoon the Scots Guards were held up west of St. Hilaire, and were ordered to establish an outpost line for the night. Nos. 3 and 4 Companies were placed under the orders of the Officer Commanding the 1st Battalion Scots Guards, while two companies of the 1st Battalion Coldstream were sent up to take their place.

On the 11th the 1st Guards Brigade passed through the outpost line, and continued the advance, while the Battalion went into very comfortable billets in St. Hilaire, where the German baths were used. On the 13th the 2nd Guards Brigade passed through with the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers on the right, the 1st Battalion Coldstream on the left, and the 1st Battalion Scots Guards in reserve. These Battalions were ordered to be at immediate notice to move in case the 3rd Guards Brigade, which was crossing the Selle River, should require assistance, but the warning orders were later cancelled; and that night the Battalion relieved the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards in the front line along the Selle River. Second Lieutenant Gunther with a patrol of eight men crossed the river, and surprised a German whom he gagged and brought back. He reported that the enemy seemed in a sleepy and disorganised state, and Lord Lascelles accordingly asked for permission to push a company across the river that night, but was told instead to establish a bridgehead on the following night north of St. Python.

The erection of a bridgehead so near to so many houses was a matter of some difficulty, since it was obvious that the crossing could not be held if the enemy occupied houses within 300 yards of it. Lord Lascelles therefore ordered Lieutenant H. I'B. Smith to occupy the nearest house to the bridgehead and Lieutenant F. Donnison to search the four or five houses near it and make sure they were empty. Second Lieutenant Smith had no difficulty in occupying the house, but found that the walls on the enemy's side were so full of large holes that the house was untenable. Lieutenant Donnison moved forward to reconnoitre but ran into the Germans in some force in the streets beyond, and was forced by machine-gun fire and bombs to fall back on Lieutenant Smith's party, leaving behind two men who were too badly wounded to move.