Liberia: Description, History, Problems

by Frederick Starr

I have the honor to be,
with great truth and regard
Sir,
Your Excellency’s
most obedient,
humble servant,
BRAITHWAIT WALLIS,
His Britannic Majesty’s Consul.

One of the cries of the present day internationalism is “effective occupation”. It is only as a country demonstrates itself able to protect its borders, and to maintain peace within its limits, that it is admitted to justly hold its territory; there are some strange features involved in the expression, but it has a just foundation and is at present generally accepted. It is true, if Liberia is to be recognized as an independent nation, she must guard her borders, must prevent her people from troubling their neighbors, must protect life and property within her area. There is a stipulation in the French treaty of 1907 in regard to this matter; if Liberia cannot maintain a frontier force to protect her boundary, the French claim the right to place their own forces on Liberian territory for that purpose; the English, in their demanded reforms, insist upon an adequate and well trained police force upon the frontier; the demands are not unjust and must be met. In fact, the frontier force is one of the urgent and crying needs of Liberia.

While President Barclay was in London, he was approached by Capt. Mackay Cadell, who had served in the South African War; Capt. Mackay Cadell desired to be put in charge of the frontier force which it was believed that Liberia would organize in response to the British demands; he was not actually engaged by the President, but put in his appearance in January, 1908, ready for business; his employment was opposed by many, but finally, largely in order not to offend British susceptibilities, he was engaged, given the rank of Major—some question has been raised as to exactly how he came to carry the title captain—and was authorized, with the help of two British assistants, to organize the frontier force; he was also given authority to employ ten or more sergeants and buglers from Sierra Leone; it was naturally assumed that the force in general would be composed of Liberian natives. Major Mackay Cadell promptly began active work; barracks were erected upon the edge of Monrovia, and soon 250 men were enrolled for service. Their uniforms, arms, and ammunition were bought from Great Britain—so that the whole enterprise was good for British trade; it is not clear, however, why the caps and other articles were stamped with the crown and other emblems of His British Majesty’s service. Matters were going nicely, but it began to be suspected that a considerable number of the new soldiers were British subjects, and it was asked whether some of them had not served upon the Sierra Leone frontier force. These suspicions and doubts led finally to a protest from the French Vice-Consul who claimed that the force being organized was actually “a British army of occupation” which the Liberian Government was permitting to be organized in Liberian territory; he demanded that an equal number of French officers and of French subjects be added to the force. The Liberian Government inquired of Major Mackay Cadell with reference to the matter; he denied that there were any British subjects on the force, and depending on his answer, the Liberian Government denied the fact to the French official. Meantime, Major Mackay Cadell was making himself variously useful to the Monrovia city government; he undertook without compensation, the command of the city police force as chief of police; in place of the loyal Kru police, he put in Mende soldiers from the barracks; he also performed the functions of street commissioner, tax collector, city treasurer, and other duties until, finally, the citizens decided to dispense with his free services; he declined, however, to resign, and presented a large bill as the condition upon which he would deliver up the city property entrusted to him. (We quote from Ellis.) On October 27th Major Mackay Cadell was further questioned in regard to the composition of his force, and a report was demanded; it was then found that at least 71 out of the little army of 250 were actually British subjects; more than this, no doubt many of the Mende at the post, who were classed as “Liberians”, really came from the portion of that tribe residing on the other side of the Sierra Leone boundary. While this report was rendered, Major Mackay Cadell showed constant objection to supervision by the President of the Republic and to any suggestion of control. The President and his Cabinet, after meeting and discussing the matter, agreed upon the dismissal of Major Mackay Cadell, but out of courtesy gave him the opportunity of resigning his position.

The French Vice-Consul continued to insist on his demands; understanding that Capt. Wallis had given his consent to the appointment of French officers and subjects, the President prepared to make such appointments. Just at this juncture Capt. Wallis returned from an absence, and at his own request, on November 13, had a meeting with the President and the members of the Cabinet, at which he presented to them what purported to be a communication from the British Government. Some mystery seems to be associated with this document, but it is understood that its effect was that, if Frenchmen were appointed to the direction of the frontier force, and French subjects were enlisted in it, Great Britain would unite with France to disrupt and divide the Republic. In December the legislature demanded that the services of Major Mackay Cadell should be dispensed with. He, however, hesitated to hand in his resignation. The legislature ordered a complete re-organization of the frontier force under a Liberian officer, with only two British subjects to be employed in the whole organization—the two assistant officers whom Major Mackay Cadell had employed. On February 1 the Major sent in his resignation. Acting on order of Consul-General Wallis, he turned over the arms and ammunition in his charge to the Elder Dempster Co., and announced the fact to the Liberian Government; at the same time Consul-General Wallis applied for an official guard to protect the property thus placed in private British hands: the Secretary of State, F. E. R. Johnson, expressed his surprise that a consul, without consultation with the proper Liberian authorities, should order property belonging to Liberia (although payment had not yet been made for it) to be turned over into private hands, and refused to accept the responsibility of placing a guard in charge. On February 11, 1909, Major Mackay Cadell sent a remarkable message to President Barclay, informing him that the native soldiers were in serious danger of mutiny on account of arrears in payments; at the same time he sent messages to the two houses of the legislature, requesting that the men be permitted to appear before them and state their grievances; he said that, if some redress were not given, the men could not be blamed for what might be done. Steps were at once taken for public defense; fortunately some 400 of the militia were in Monrovia for quarterly drill. After some seventy soldiers from the barracks had appeared upon the public streets, parading, threatening and menacing the seizure of the arms and ammunition, a force was sent to demand the surrender of the camp; at the same time, notice of this was sent to Consul-General Wallis. Major Mackay Cadell refused to surrender, making conditions which would involve several days’ delay; his immediate surrender, however, was demanded, and other militia forces were sent for. Notice of this new demand was sent to Consul-General Wallis with the request that he should order British subjects out of the camp; this he did; Major Mackay Cadell decided to capitulate; the camp was occupied. At a court of inquiry held to investigate the difficulty, the British sergeants said that Major Mackay Cadell himself had instigated the mutiny; that he had selected a certain number of men to insult the President, to arrest him, and take him to camp. A curious fact in connection with this whole extraordinary procedure is that, on the 4th of February, one week before the President of the Republic was informed of the danger of imminent mutiny, notice of it had been cabled to Great Britain. It was perhaps by accident that a British gunboat was in the harbor on the 10th, the day before the outbreak—the name of this gunboat, by the way, quite appropriately was the Mutin. In closing the account of this strange incident, quotations may be made from the official report of the American Commission which visited Liberia shortly afterwards:

“But if Major Cadell got on very well with his troops, he got on very badly with the Liberian people and the Liberian Government. He was a man of indomitable energy, but guileless of tact. His actions on various occasions affronted the Liberian officials. Through indifference to the law, or by design, he enlisted a considerable number of British subjects among the troops, about one-fourth of his men being natives of Sierra Leone. When called to account for it, he at first denied and afterwards admitted that some of the men might have been born in Sierra Leone, but that he supposed them to be residents of Liberia, and therefore, Liberians. Being called upon to dismiss the British subjects, he neglected to do so. About the beginning of the present year he began to complain that his men were not paid, and demanded further supplies from the Government, though he was very dilatory in presenting accounts for the money already entrusted to him. The dissatisfaction with Major Cadell’s conduct in matters of the camp led to the passage of a law by the Liberian Legislature in January, 1909, re-organizing the force and dismissing its commander. The President, who had upheld Major Cadell, offered him an opportunity to resign, but on one pretext or another, he delayed doing so, and when he sent in his resignation, the Government could not accept it until his accounts had been adjusted. He remained, in the meantime, in charge of the command, and on February 11, 1909, wrote a threatening letter to the President, in which he stated that, if the demands of the troops for the payment of money due them were not met within twenty-four hours, he could not be responsible for the maintenance of peace or for the safety of the President. This remarkable letter naturally created much excitement in Monrovia, but the situation was handled with extreme adroitness by the Liberian Government which demanded that Major Cadell withdraw the British subjects composing his force, and that he turn over the camp to the Liberian authorities who would deal with the Liberian subjects. This order was reluctantly obeyed on the recommendation of the British Consul-General, and it was then discovered that seventy-one of the enlisted men were British subjects. Two or three weeks afterwards, after settling up his accounts, whereby it was revealed that he had involved the Government in a considerable unauthorized debt, he sailed for England and was soon followed by his brother officers.”

Again:

“On February 4, the British in Monrovia cabled to the Foreign Office that the lives of foreign residents in Liberia were in danger, and urged that a gunboat be sent for their protection. . . . On February 10 the British gunboat Mutin appeared and anchored off Monrovia. On February 11 and 12 England precipitated the rupture of the Government. But for the prompt and judicious action of the Liberian Executive, aided by the American Minister Resident, the following would presently have been the situation: A British gunboat in the harbor, a British officer in command of the frontier force, and a large number of British subjects among the enlisted men, a British official in charge of the Liberian customs, a British officer in command of the Liberian gunboat Lark, a British regiment in the streets of Monrovia.”

The fine hand of Consul-General Wallis of course is evident throughout these events. How seriously he was implicated is suggested in the following passage from the report of the Commission: “It is most unfortunate that the Commission has been unable to secure an account of these events from the principal British actors in them. When we reached Monrovia, Major Cadell had left Liberia. The British Consul-General was away on leave of absence. We were the more disappointed in not meeting the latter, as, before our departure, we had been shown in the State Department at Washington a despatch of the Ambassador in London, stating that the British Foreign Office there had instructed its representative in Monrovia to give the American Commission the fullest information about Liberian affairs. The acting Consul-General had no knowledge of the facts, and covered his obvious embarrassment, when asked to explain some of them, by the plea that he had no inside information.”

It has been said that the British Government admits that Consul-General Wallis went beyond his authority. It is, however, significant that he was not reduced in position; he left Liberia, of course—his usefulness there having more than ended; but he was transferred to Dakar, Senegal, the finest consular post in all West Africa.

As for Major Mackay Cadell, he now poses as Liberia’s real and great friend; he has, however, changed his name, and is now known as Major R. Mackay-Mackay. He is associated with the Cavalla River Co., Limited. This appears to be a strange mixture of a commercial, educational, and philanthropical character; always, however, primarily exploitative. Before going to Liberia in connection with his duties with this company, Major R. Mackay-Mackay traveled in the United States; arrived in Liberia, he gives the impression that the State Department of the United States is behind his enterprise, and that Booker T. Washington is deeply interested in its success. He throws the responsibility for all the past upon those “higher up”; it seems that personally he always loved Liberia and was her friend. When he passed through Monrovia on his way down to the Cavalla, he simply showered advice and benevolence along his path. An interview with him was published in The Guide. He says: “Liberia can not go on living on loans as in the past. Why should she be dependent on gold from outside when she has a hundredfold within her own borders, at the very door? Standing at the street corners, discussing politics, or waiting for dollar-bills to grow and fall from the trees around, will not advance the welfare of the Republic, nor attract the genuine sympathy and co-operation from the outside world. Work! work! work! that is what Liberia needs; and there are those who are prepared to create the opportunity, provided all make up their minds to work as they should. Is manual labor considered a disgrace in other countries? Why should it be in Liberia?”