View of the Peach Orchard and the Emmitsburg Road in 1890. The Wentz farm buildings appear at the left. (Tipton photograph.)
Devil’s Den, a formation of large granite boulders, used as defense positions by Confederate sharpshooters.
Time now was the important element. Whatever could be done must be done quickly. Hood’s and McLaws’ divisions, who had fought bravely and lost heavily at Round Top and the Wheatfield, were not in condition for another severe test. Early and Johnson on the left had likewise endured long, unrelenting battle with powerful Union forces in positions of advantage. The men of Heth’s and Pender’s divisions had not been heavily engaged since the first day’s encounter west of Gettysburg. These were the men, along with Pickett’s division, whom Lee would have to count on to bear the brunt of his final great effort at Gettysburg.
LEE AND MEADE SET THE STAGE.
Late in the forenoon of July 3, General Meade had completed his plan of defense in rear of the Union center by the concentration of all available infantry units. General Hunt, sensing the danger, placed a solid line of batteries in position on the crest of the ridge and brought others to the rear for emergency use. As a final act of preparation, Meade inspected his front at the stone wall, then rode southward to Little Round Top. Here, with General Warren, he could see the long lines of Confederate batteries and the massing of troops, a sure indication of attack. Meade rode back to his headquarters.
Lee, on his part, had observed in the forenoon the enemy in the process of concentration on Cemetery Ridge. Having reached his decision to strike the Union center, he had already begun the movement of batteries from the rear to points of advantage. By noon, 138 guns were in line from the Peach Orchard northward to the Seminary buildings, many of them only 800 yards from the Union center. To Colonel Alexander fell the lot of directing the artillery fire and informing the infantry of the best opportunity to advance.
Massed to the west of Emmitsburg Road, on low ground which screened their position from the Union lines, lay Gen. George Pickett’s three brigades commanded by Kemper, Armistead, and Garnett. Pickett’s men had arrived the previous evening from Chambersburg, where they had guarded Lee’s wagons on July 1 and 2. As the only fresh body of troops on the field, they were now to spearhead the charge. On Pickett’s left, the attacking front was fast being organized. Joseph Pettigrew, a brigadier, was preparing to lead the division of the wounded Major General Heth and Maj. Gen. Isaac Trimble took the command of Pender. More than 10,000 troops of these two divisions—including such units as the 26th North Carolina whose losses on the first day were so heavy that the dead marked their advance “with the accuracy of a line at a dress parade”—now awaited the order to attack. Many hours earlier, the Bliss farm buildings, which lay in their front, had been burned. Their objective on the ridge was in clear view. The brigades of Wilcox and Lang were to move forward on the right of Pickett in order to protect his flank as he neared the enemy position.
The Round Tops as they appear from Longstreet’s battle line one mile away.