A momentous decision now had to be made. Lee had reached the field at 3 p. m., and had witnessed the retreat of the disorganized Union troops through the streets of Gettysburg. Through his glasses he had watched their attempt to reestablish their lines on Cemetery Hill. Sensing his advantage and a great opportunity, he sent orders to Ewell by a staff officer to “press those people” and secure the hill (Cemetery Hill) if possible. However, two of Ewell’s divisions, those of Rodes and Early, had been heavily engaged throughout the afternoon and were not well in hand. Johnson’s division could not reach the field until late in the evening, and the reconnaissance service of Stuart’s cavalry was not yet available. General Ewell, uninformed of the Union strength in the rear of the hills south of Gettysburg, decided to await the arrival of Johnson’s division. Cemetery Hill was not attacked, and Johnson, coming up late in the evening, stopped at the base of Culp’s Hill. Thus passed Lee’s opportunity of July 1.
Scene north of Gettysburg from Oak Ridge. The Federal position may be seen near the edge of the open fields in the middle distance.
When the Union troops retreated from the battleground north and west of the town on the evening of July 1, they hastily occupied defense positions on Cemetery Hill, Culp’s Hill, and a part of Cemetery Ridge. Upon the arrival of Slocum by the Baltimore Pike and Sickles by way of the Emmitsburg Road, the Union right flank at Culp’s Hill and Spangler’s Spring and the important position at Little Round Top on the left were consolidated. Thus was developed a strong defensive battle line in the shape of a fish hook, about 3 miles long, with the advantage of high ground and of interior lines. Opposite, in a semicircle about 6 miles long, extending down Seminary Ridge and into the streets of Gettysburg, stood the Confederates who, during the night, had closed in from the north and west.
The greater part of the citizenry of Gettysburg, despite the prospect of battle in their own yards, chose to remain in their homes. Both army commanders respected noncombatant rights to a marked degree. Thus, in contrast with the fields of carnage all about the village, life and property of the civilian population remained unharmed, while the doors of churches, schools, and homes were opened for the care of the wounded.
General Meade, at Taneytown, had learned early in the afternoon of July 1 that a battle was developing and that Reynolds had been killed. A large part of his army was within 5 miles of Gettysburg. Meade then sent General Hancock to study and report on the situation. Hancock reached the field just as the Union troops were falling back to Cemetery Hill. He helped to rally the troops and left at 6 o’clock to report to Meade that in his opinion the battle should be fought at Gettysburg. Meade acted on this recommendation and immediately ordered the concentration of the Union forces at that place. Meade himself arrived near midnight on July 1.
Spangler’s Spring, the right of the Federal battle line of July 2 and 3. This view, made in 1870, shows the wartime appearance of the spring. (Tipton photograph.)
View of Culp’s Hill, taken about 1890, showing earthworks on the crest of the hill. Gettysburg, one-half mile northwest, may be seen through the vista. (Tipton photograph.)