Yakub has the principal flag,—an immense piece of black cloth, which is hoisted exactly opposite the Khalifa's zariba, and about four hundred yards from it. To the right and left are ranged those of the different Emirs, while on the north side flies the green flag of the Khalifa Ali Wad Helu, on either side of which are the flags of his Emirs. On the left flank, the horse and camel-men are drawn up, while on the right flank are ranged the riflemen, consisting partly of Jehadia, and partly of men belonging to the various Emirs, who are only specially provided with arms for the time being. Immediately after sunrise, the Khalifa comes out of the zariba, and, mounted on his horse, stands surrounded by his mulazemin and body-guard, whilst the entire army passes in review before him, the troops being generally provided with new jibbas and turbans in honour of the feast. Sometimes the Khalifa mounts on a camel; and, on one occasion, he drove in the carriage of one of the former Governors-General which had been captured in Khartum, and which was kept stored away in the Beit el Mal. Two horses were specially trained to draw this vehicle, which the Khalifa ordered to be driven at a foot pace, as he feared being upset; but, latterly, he has given up this plan, and generally rides on horseback direct from the mosque along the road leading due west towards the black flag, and, on reaching it, he solemnly contemplates it for a few moments, and then rides to the zariba, at the south front of which a small shelter, consisting of trunks of trees lashed together and covered with palm-mats, has been erected. Here he dismounts and reclines on an angareb, surrounded by his Kadis, whilst the troops file past. Occasionally, he starts from his own house, and, taking a southern road, marches out of the town, then turns west and rides along the front alignment of his troops, after which the usual march past takes place. At these reviews the horsemen are generally clad in coats of mail, of European or Asiatic origin, whilst on their heads they wear heavy iron helmets and curious cotton caps of various colours and the most grotesque shapes, round which a small turban is wound. The horses are clothed in large padded patchwork quilts, somewhat resembling those worn by the knights of old at tournaments; and one might almost imagine one was gazing at one of those old mediæval displays. These reviews terminate at the end of the third day; and the troops brought from beyond Omdurman are permitted to return to their respective garrisons.
I propose now to briefly consider the Khalifa's political intentions and ideas.
As I have already stated, when the Mahdi first declared himself, he nominated three Khalifas, viz., Abdullahi, Ali Wad Helu, and Mohammed Sherif, who were to succeed him in this order, if they survived. On his death, Abdullahi succeeded as arranged; but, from the moment he took over the reins of government, he did everything in his power to increase his personal ascendancy, and make it hereditary in the family. The mutinous Ashraf, who prided themselves on their relationship to the Mahdi, afforded him a welcome pretext for compassing their downfall; and he did not hesitate to possess himself of the Black troops belonging to both his rival Khalifas. An obscure member of a western tribe, he was a complete stranger in the country; and he knew that he could not reckon on the Jaalin, Danagla, inhabitants of the Gezira, and other Nile valley tribes to support his authority. He therefore sent secret emissaries to the western Arabs to induce them to make a pilgrimage to the Mahdi's tomb, and emigrate to the Nile valley. His agents drew a tempting picture of the magnificent country to which they had been invited, telling them that they were the Lord's chosen people, and that they should go out to possess the land, the inhabitants of which were rich in cattle and slaves, which should be theirs. Tempted by these glowing accounts, many of these tribes emigrated of their own free-will to Omdurman; but as this contingent was not sufficient, the Khalifa instructed his Emirs in Darfur and Kordofan to enforce his orders; and, in consequence of this, an immense emigration took place, and continues, on a reduced scale, down to the present day. By this means the Khalifa has surrounded himself with hordes of strangers who have ousted the rightful owners of the soil, and have made themselves absolute masters of the situation. All offices and important situations are filled by them, and by his own relatives, the majority belonging to the Taaisha section. Almost the only one of the old Emirs left is Osman Digna; and the reason for this is that the eastern Arab tribes he governs speak a language which is unknown to the western Arabs. Besides many of these tribes are gradually coming under Egyptian and Italian influence, and the few that are left are merely attached to Osman Digna because he is one of them. Thus the Taaisha tribe has acquired all the power and authority in the land; and they fill their pockets with the waning revenues of the impoverished Sudan.
Years ago, the Emirs of Dongola and Berber had been instructed by the Khalifa to weaken the local population as much as possible; and, in consequence, fire-arms and weapons of all descriptions were taken from them, and they were reduced to a condition of complete harmlessness. Moreover, in the actions of Toski and Tokar numbers of Jaalin and Danagla were killed, whilst large contingents of them had been sent to Darfur and Gallabat in the hope that they may be eventually exterminated. In this manner the Khalifa has secured their countries, and rendered any attempt to oppose his authority almost impossible. The same may be said of the inhabitants of the Gezira, who have also been drafted off into various remote parts of the country, or have been forced to come to Omdurman with their families, where they have endured the greatest hardships and privations. Moreover, they were called upon to give up more than half their cultivated lands, which were distributed amongst the western Arabs; and all their best fields are now possessed by the Khalifa's own relatives and favourites. The former owners are often obliged to till the soil for their new masters, who have annexed their servants, slaves, and cattle. Thus the cultivable area of the Gezira, which, in former times, was the most populous and prosperous part of the Sudan, has been reduced by at least a half; and such commotion prevailed in the districts that the Khalifa was himself obliged to intervene on behalf of the inhabitants, who were ill-treated, tyrannised over, and oppressed to an incredible extent.
As I have before stated, his own tribes are preferred on all occasions. Not only do they hold all the best positions and posts, but the greater part of the money and spoil which passes into the Beit el Mal from the provincial treasuries at Darfur, Gallabat, and Reggaf finds its way into their hands. For their special benefit he has imposed a horse tax, which must be paid in kind; and in this manner he has provided the majority of the Taaisha with chargers. His own section, the Jubarat, of course gets the lion's share of everything.
He never hesitates to make use of every description of intrigue in order to strengthen his own side and weaken the other. For example, on the defeat and death of Nejumi, whose flags belonged to those of Khalifa Sherif, and from whom Abdullahi had withdrawn all power of command over other Emirs, the remnant of the defeated force was placed under the direction of the Emir Yunes, and, in order to replace those who had been killed, he appointed fresh Jaalin and Emirs as well as men from Omdurman. These he first placed under the command of their compatriot Bedawi Wad el Ereik; but, instead of sending them to Dongola, they were despatched to Gedaref, and as an unavoidable delay occurred in their departure, he made out that this was a proof of disobedience, and condemned Bedawi, with six of his Emirs, to be banished to Reggaf; and in their place he nominated other Emirs, whom he placed under the direct command of his cousin Hamed Wad Ali.
It is human nature to seek the protection of the most powerful; and now, instead of being desirous to serve under their own Emirs, the greater number of the so-called opposition party vie with one another in their efforts to be placed under the direct command of the Khalifa or of Yakub; even the adherents of Ali Wad Helu come under this category. As an instance of this, I will quote the case of Hamed Wad Gar en Nebbi, who was the principal cause of the destruction of the Batahin. He belonged to the Hassanab tribe, which was commanded by Ali Wad Helu. Recognising how matters stood, he wished to place himself and his tribe under Yakub's command; but he was short-sighted enough to tell Khalifa Ali's relatives of his plans. He even went so far as to state in public that on the death of Abdullahi he would be succeeded by his brother Yakub or his son Osman, and that, as they had all the power in their hands, Khalifa Ali could expect nothing, and was, moreover, a weak man without energy. Several of the bystanders retorted that the Mahdi had nominated Khalifa Ali to be Abdullahi's successor, to which he replied that times had changed, that Abdullahi was all-powerful, and that the Mahdi's commands were never attended to or taken into consideration. When this interview came to the ears of Khalifa Ali, he charged Gar en Nebbi before the Kadi; and it was proved beyond a doubt that the latter had actually made these statements. He was consequently convicted of being "irreligious," having doubted the maintenance of the Mahdi's doctrines and instructions. Abdullahi could not therefore publicly interfere. Had he done so, he would have revealed his own intentions, which were in reality well known, and would have corroborated Gar en Nebbi's assertions. The judges sentenced him to death; and although Abdullahi did all in his power to induce Ali Wad Helu to grant a reprieve, the latter insisted that the sentence should be carried out; and Gar en Nebbi was publicly executed in the market-place as an unbeliever and a disturber of public tranquillity. All the tribes under the command of Yakub, as well as the Khalifa's immediate followers, received instructions to show general dissatisfaction with the execution by openly absenting themselves from it.
Whenever it is a question between himself and his opponents, the Khalifa invariably relies upon his arms, which are far more than sufficient to overcome with ease any attempt to dispute his authority, whether it be in Omdurman itself or in any other part of the country. Within the Sudan, therefore, he is all-powerful; but he is not in a position to offer determined resistance to outside enemies. His leaders are neither capable nor sufficiently instructed to ensure victory. His men are not now loyal enough to fight with that determination which early fanaticism had inspired. They have little or no faith in the cause for which they are supposed to be fighting; and there is little doubt that the Khalifa's forces could not resist the advance of a foreign power bent on re-occupying the Sudan.
The table on the next page shows approximately the forces at present at the Khalifa's disposal. Of the forty thousand rifles shown in the table, there are not more than twenty-two thousand Remingtons in good condition. The remainder consist of single and double barrel smoothbores, and other guns of a variety of pattern. Several of the Remington barrels, however, have been cut short with the object of lessening the weight, and with entire disregard to the altered trajectory thus occasioned. Of the sixty-four thousand swords and spear men, at least twenty-five per cent are either too old or too young to be considered effective for a campaign. The seventy-five guns comprise six Krupps of large calibre, and for which there is only a very small amount of ammunition, eight machine guns of various patterns, and sixty-one brass muzzle-loading guns of various shapes and sizes, the ammunition for which is manufactured principally in Omdurman, and is of a very inferior quality, the range being little over six or seven hundred yards.
| Armed Strength. | ||||||
| Position and Garrisons. | Emirs. | Swords. | Guns. | Rifles and | ||
| Jehadia. | Cavalry. | Spearmen. | Smooth Bores. | |||
| Omdurman (mulazemin) | Osman Sheikh ed Din | 11,000 | 11,000 | |||
| " | Yakub | 4,000 | 3,500 | 45,000 | 46 | 4,000 |
| " (in store) | 6,000 | |||||
| Reggaf | Arabi Wad Dafalla | 1,800 | 4,500 | 3 | 1,800 | |
| Western Sudan: | ||||||
| El Fasher } | ||||||
| El Obeid } | Mahmud, etc. | 6,000 | 350 | 2,500 | 4 | 6,000 |
| Shakka, etc. } | ||||||
| Berber | Zeki Osman | 1,600 | 500 | 1,300 | 6 | 1,600 |
| Abu Hamed | Nur en Nau | 400 | 100 | 700 | 4 | 400 |
| Eastern Sudan: | ||||||
| Adarama | Osman Digna | 450 | 350 | 1,000 | 450 | |
| Gedaref | Ahmed Fedil | 4,500 | 600 | 1,000 | 4 | 4,500 |
| El Fasher | 1,000 | 200 | 500 | 1,000 | ||
| Asubri | Hamed Wad Ali | 900 | 400 | 1,400 | 900 | |
| Gallabat | En Nur | 50 | 200 | 50 | ||
| Dongola | Yunes ed Degheim | 2.400 | 500 | 5.000 | 8 | 2,400 |
| Suarda | Hammuda | 250 | 100 | 1,000 | 250 | |
| Total | 34,350 | 6,600 | 64,000 | 75 | 40,350 | |