The Bazingers on the flanks were well provided with buglers, in order to give timely warning of an alarm. The rear guard I made stronger than the flank guards because the Arabs generally attack from the rear, and I considered that in case of a flank attack I should have ample time to reinforce from the main body in case of necessity. The rear guard had, of course, the most troublesome duty to perform, as they had to look after any camels that broke down, and keep a careful lookout for men who fell out or attempted to desert; I therefore gave orders that it should be relieved daily by the flank guards in rotation from the left: thus the left flank guard would become rear guard, the relieved rear guard would become the right flank guard, and the latter would become the left flank guard. I also relieved the three hundred Bazingers and sixty regulars daily from the main body.
In this manner I hoped to reach Shakka without any serious loss; and on arriving there it was my intention to build a fort where I should mount the gun, and, leaving a small garrison there, make expeditions in light marching order to the various disturbed districts, where my Arab spearmen, if fortunate, would have ample opportunities of capturing any quantity of Rizighat cattle.
On arrival at Deain, we found quantities of corn stored in the new village just built by Madibbo; the guard he had left behind made a slight resistance, but were soon put to flight, and we encamped on the site of our old zariba. We found that Ali Wad Fadlalla's grave had been opened, and a skull and some bones lying close by were evidently his. We had covered the grave with a heap of thorns, and it was evident the Arabs had committed this sacrilege; they had taken off the shroud in which the body had been wrapped, and the hyenas had devoured all but the skull and bones.
I distributed the corn found in Madibbo's village amongst the men, and they had now sufficient supplies to last them some days. It was my intention to march direct on Shakka; but as there was some doubt about the water on the roads and the whereabouts of Madibbo, I sent two Rizighat spies—who were on bad terms with the remainder of the tribe, and had immigrated to Dara—to obtain the information I required. The day after they left, our camp was reconnoitred by Arab horsemen, but they kept at a respectful distance. Three days later the men returned, reporting that there was sufficient water on the road, and that Madibbo had driven all his cattle south of Shakka, where his force was probably collected; but they said they could procure no more definite information. We therefore marched off; the men and Arabs all in the best possible spirits, laughing, joking, and discussing amongst themselves how they intended distributing the plunder they expected to get, and how they proposed dividing amongst themselves the wives and households of Madibbo and his Sheikhs, on exactly the same plan as that adopted by the Mahdi. I had little fear as to the eventual result of our operations, but at the same time I was anxious to get to Shakka before being attacked.
As I was suffering from a heavy bout of fever, I handed over the command of the troops temporarily to Sharaf ed Din, but ordered him to remain close to me. The following day, having left the village of Kindiri on our flank, and having made a short halt, there was an alarm that horsemen were advancing to attack us. Immediately every one was in his place, and, in spite of my fever, I joined the rear guard, whence the alarm had come; and from this position I could see numbers of horsemen—there might have been some hundreds, but owing to the intervening trees it was impossible to estimate accurately. Signalling to the flank guards to join me, I advanced with the cavalry and Arab horsemen, and a skirmish ensued amongst the trees, in which the enemy were driven back with some loss, and we captured six horses; our own losses were seven horses killed, two men missing, and several wounded. Having pursued for some distance, we returned, and as it was still early, the march was continued till nightfall, when we encamped at a place called Om Waragat.
Still suffering from fever, I told Sharaf ed Din to make exactly similar dispositions (see plan); and starting off the following morning, after a march of two hours we reached some more or less open but boggy moorland, at the southeast end of which were visible a few huts such as are erected by the Rizighat slaves who work in the fields. The vanguard had already cleared the soft ground; I had gone forward with it to examine the huts, whilst the men in the square were occupied in trying to help out the animals whose feet had sunk into the mire, when suddenly from the rear guard the alarm was sounded twice, followed almost immediately by some rifle-shots. Ordering the vanguard to hold the huts, I immediately galloped towards the left flank of the square, and, sounding for the reserve of ninety regulars, I proceeded towards the rear guard; but it was too late. The Bazingers and regulars of the rear guard, having fired a volley, had no time to reload before the enemy was on them; and, overpowered by thousands of half-naked Arabs, they were being forced back on to the rear face of the square, the men composing which, fearing to fire on friend and foe alike, did nothing to stop the rush, and already several of the enemy had penetrated. Without a moment's hesitation, I ordered my bugler to sound "lie down" for those in the square, and, firing on the Arabs who had broken in, as well as on those still pushing on from behind, I checked the rush, and caused them to split up into two parties, who, trending off right and left, made for the flank guards already engaged with other parties of Arabs who were attacking them in front.
The confusion was now indescribable; within the square the Arabs who had already penetrated, although suffering heavily from the fire from my small party, were creating frightful havoc amongst the almost defenceless Bazingers, who, armed only with muzzle-loaders, could do nothing, whilst the regulars—so sudden had been the rush—had not even time to draw their bayonets; eventually, however, those who had entered were all killed. The flank guards, taken in front and rear, suffered even more heavily than the square, and, breaking up entirely, they fled in all directions, hundreds being killed by the Rizighat horsemen concealed in the forest.
The action had lasted only twenty minutes, but in that short space of time our losses were terrible. Fortunately, on the dispersion of the flanking parties the enemy had pursued them hotly. My fire, it is true, had driven them away from the square, but at what sacrifice! Amongst the regulars who had obeyed my signal to lie down, the losses had not been so severe; but the untrained Bazingers had suffered terribly, and many of our camels had also been killed.