All my hopes were now centred in the success of the Hicks expedition. Fortunately at that time I knew nothing of the route they had chosen, nor of the demoralised condition of the force. For almost a year I had received no news direct from Khartum, and latterly, in order to keep up the spirits of the men, I had to have recourse to stratagem, by asserting that I had received news of great victories for the Government forces. These scraps of news I of course concocted myself, and wrote out in the form of messages, which when received were read out with great éclat before the assembled troops, and were greeted by the salute of guns and general rejoicings. As a matter of fact, about this time I did receive a little slip of paper from Ala ed Din Pasha, informing me that His Highness the Khedive had officially appointed me commandant of the troops in Darfur, and that it was the intention of the Government to send a strong force to chastise the rebels and re-establish authority. I despatched copies of this note to Fasher and Kebkebia, with orders that it should be read publicly and salutes fired. I gave the bearer of the letter a public reception, and loaded him with presents; he announced that when he left Khartum the expedition was being prepared, and described the force as certain to be victorious. Those who really knew, hesitated to credit the glowing accounts of the appearance of the troops; but at the same time their hearts were full of glad expectation.
A few days later, Khaled Wad Imam, whom I had sent to Kordofan to collect news, returned, and gave me a verbal message from Zogal, as the latter thought it inadvisable to write; he sent me his best regards, and confirmed the news just received as to the intention of the Government to despatch an expedition against the Mahdi. Khaled, however, told me privately that many refugees had reached El Obeid from Khartum, and had reported that several vultures had been seen hovering over the troops when they were out practising manœuvres; and that this was a most unlucky omen for their success. He then proceeded to give me a detailed account of the Mahdi and his doings, and after a time I had little doubt that at heart he had become one of his adherents; but I took good care not to let him see what I had discovered, and thanked him for his loyalty and good service; at the same time I gave secret instructions that he should be carefully watched. A few days afterwards a man was intercepted wandering off to Shakka, bearing a letter from Khaled to Madibbo, in which he told him to be prepared to meet him shortly, in order to aid him in his enterprise. I was also informed by my servants, who were friendly with Zogal's household, and to whom I gave money, in order to give the latter presents, that Khaled was really Zogal's secret and confidential agent, and was always at his house in the fort, where he made himself completely at his ease; that he had privately warned Zogal's wives to be ready to fly with him, as the people in Dara were soon to endure hard times; but that the women had refused to obey the summons, and had made a great commotion.
I now ordered Khaled to be seized and brought before me, he admitted he had received Zogal's orders to take his wives away to some safe refuge beyond my jurisdiction, and his two special ones he had ordered to be brought to him in Kordofan. It was on this account he had written to Madibbo.
It was now abundantly clear to me that Zogal, influenced by his relative's enormous successes, had definitely decided to join him, and had thus broken the solemn agreement between him and myself. I now sent for Zogal's brother, Fiki Nur, and some of his relatives, and in the presence of the Kadi, the commandant and officers, I openly explained the situation, telling them that their relative was now disloyal to Government and had broken his promise, and that therefore I considered they were all of his opinion and in consequence quite untrustworthy. Of course they denied it; but I had them all arrested, placed Khaled in chains, and had his and Zogal's property confiscated and removed to the Beit el Mal, while that of the other persons arrested was sequestrated.
Sending the Kadi to Zogal's house, I told him to inform the women that they should stay where they were, and I should have them cared for as before; his Bazingers, however, I incorporated with the Government forces. Amongst those arrested was Zogal's son-in-law, Idris, who, being of a different tribe, I proposed releasing; but he refused, and said he preferred to go to prison with his relatives. Before being marched off, he asked to be allowed to speak to me privately, and then told me that, according to the custom of the country, it would be most dishonourable for him not to go to prison with the rest of the family, but he wished to assure me of his absolute loyalty. He then informed me that Zogal, before his departure, had secretly assembled the three officers whom I imagined to be most loyal to me, and they had sworn to him that should he send them news that Mohammed Ahmed was really the Mahdi, they would all join him. I thanked him for this most important information, the truth of which I had little reason to doubt, and at his own request I allowed him to go to prison with the rest.
My difficulties were now increasing daily, one might almost say hourly. Zogal's disloyalty did not disturb me very much, as I had long suspected it; but I was greatly put about by the unsatisfactory news of the state of the expeditionary force. Zogal was, I knew, an astute man; had the news from Khartum been really disquieting to the Mahdi, I felt sure that he would have stayed at El Obeid, according to our arrangement, to watch events; but now he had intentionally broken faith with me. Could it be that he had been befooled by the Mahdi's doctrines and preaching? I wish I could have thought this possible, but I knew him too well. He was, so to speak, playing his cards, with the absolute conviction that he would win; and so he did.
Madibbo now collected a force of horsemen and Bazingers, and advanced to Karshu, a day's journey south of Dara, where he desolated the country and derided the Beni Helba for their timidity. Taking fifty horsemen and one hundred and fifty regulars, I marched out from Dara at night and surprised Madibbo at sunrise. He was completely unprepared for this sudden attack, and barely escaped with his life on a horse which he mounted barebacked; but his entire camp fell into my hands, and we captured his well-known copper drums. Unfortunately Mohammed Bey Tia, one of my best and most faithful officers, and who was ever to the front in pursuit, was shot dead by some Bazingers hidden behind the trees; I had also a few men killed and several wounded. But although we had scored a success, we could not be said to have inflicted a heavy defeat on our enemies; we had brushed them off as one drives flies off meat, only to let them settle again.
A few days after my return to Dara news arrived that the Mima Arabs had attacked the military post on the road to Fasher, the garrison of which had been reduced by Said Bey Guma to thirty men, all of whom had been killed. Said Bey informed me that he had despatched three hundred and fifty regulars and four hundred horsemen under Omar Wad Darho to chastise them and re-occupy the post; but the messenger who brought this letter, and who had the greatest difficulty in reaching me, reported that the Arabs were collected in considerable force, and were ready to attack the expedition on its arrival.
A few days later, the faithful Muslem Wad Kabbashi, Sheikh of Hilla Shieria, brought me the mournful news of the complete overthrow of Darho and his men. It appeared that Darho had advanced against the Mima at Woda, where they had been joined by the Khawabir, Birket, and Manasera Arabs. He had begun the attack with his horsemen, who, driven back, retired in headlong flight on the infantry square, followed by an overwhelming number of Arabs; the regulars, firing alike on friend and foe, were scattered by this living avalanche, and twelve only had escaped the slaughter, while of the four hundred horsemen, one hundred and eighty were saved; the gun, arms, and ammunition were all lost, and the road between Fasher and Dara was now completely cut.
It was of immediate necessity to communicate with Fasher; but I had the greatest difficulty in procuring messengers to take a letter to Said Bey Guma, ordering him—if he had not already done so—to at once make all preparations for defence, buy up all the available corn in the town, and, if possible, carry out my previous instructions to withdraw the Om Shanga garrison.