The war must be prolonged to give the greatest signs of vitality possible, so that Spain may be compelled to grant our demands, otherwise she will consider us an effete race and curtail, rather than extend, our rights.
Malabar.
Shortly after this Emilio Aguinaldo, the recognized leader of the rebels, issued a Manifiesto in somewhat ambiguous terms which might imply a demand for independence. In this document he says:—
We aspire to the glory of obtaining the liberty, independence, and honour of the country.... We aspire to a Government representing all the live forces of the country, in which the most able, the most worthy in virtue and talent, may take part without distinction of birth, fortune, or race. We desire that no monk, or friar, shall sully the soil of any part of the Archipelago, nor that there shall exist any convent, etc., etc.
Every month brought to light fresh public exhortations, edicts, and proclamations from one side or the other, of which I have numerous printed copies before me now. About this time the famous Philippine painter, Juan Luna (vide p. [195]), was released after six monthsʼ imprisonment as a suspect. He left Manila en route for Madrid in the Spanish mail-steamer Covadonga in the first week of July and returned to Manila the next year (November 1898).
In the field there were no great victories to record, for the rebels confined themselves exclusively to harassing the Spanish forces and then retreating to the mountains. To all appearances trade in Manila and throughout the Islands was little affected by the war, and as a matter of fact, the total exports showed a fair average when compared with previous years. The sugar production was, however, slightly less than in 1896, owing to a scarcity of hands, because, in the ploughing season, the young labourers in Negros were drafted off to military service. Total imports somewhat increased, notwithstanding the imposition of a special 6 per cent. ad valorem tax.
But the probability of an early pacification of the Islands was remote. By the unscrupulous abuse of their functions the volunteers were obliging the well-intentioned natives to forsake their allegiance, and General Primo de Rivera was constrained to issue a decree, dated August 6, forbidding all persons in military service to plunder, or intimidate, or commit acts of violence on persons, or in their houses, or ravish women, under penalty of death. In the same month the General commissioned a Filipino, Don Pedro Alejandro Paterno, to negotiate terms of capitulation with the rebels. By dint of bribes and liberal expenditure of money (vide Paternoʼs own letter at p. [410]) Paterno induced the minor chiefs in arms to accept, in principle, the proposal of peace on the basis of reforms and money. Paterno was appointed by the Gov.-General sole mediator in the discussion of the terms to be made with Emilio Aguinaldo, and the Generalʼs private secretary, Don Niceto Mayoral, was granted special powers to arrange with Paterno the details of the proposed treaty. From Paternoʼs lips I have the following account of the negotiations:—
On August 4, 1897, he started on a series of difficult journeys into the rebel camps to negotiate severally with the chiefs, who, one after the other, stoutly refused to capitulate. On August 9 he interviewed Aguinaldo at Biac-na-bató, situated in the mountains, about a mile north of San Miguel de Mayumo (Bulacan). Aguinaldo withheld his decision until Paterno could report to him the definite opinions of his generals. Thereupon Paterno returned to the rebel chiefs, some of whom still tenaciously held out, whilst others were willing to capitulate, subject to Aguinaldoʼs approval. Paternoʼs mission was daily becoming more perilous, for the irreconcilable leaders regarded him as an evil genius sent to sow discord in the camp. After many delays the principal warriors assembled at Biac-na-bató on October 31 and held a great meeting, which Paterno, who is a fluent speaker, attended and harangued his audience in eloquent phrases, but to no purpose. His position was now a somewhat critical one. Several of the chiefs assumed such a defiant attitude that but for the clement nature of Aguinaldo, Paterno might never have returned to tell the tale. They clamorously insisted on their resolution to fight. Then Paterno adroitly brought matters to a crisis in a bold peroration which changed the whole scene. “Capitulate,” he exclaimed, “or get hence and vanquish the enemy! Is victory to be gained in this hiding-place?” Piqued by this fearless challenge, General Natividad immediately sallied forth with his troops and encountered the Spaniards for the last time. His dead body was brought into the camp, and, in the shades of night, with sombre lights flickering around them, in the presence of Natividadʼs bleeding corpse, again Paterno exhorted them to reflect on the prospects in the field and the offer of capitulation. Impressed by the lugubrious scene, Aguinaldo yielded, and the next day peace negotiations were opened. But other difficulties intervened. Aguinaldo having heard that a subordinate chief was conspiring to force his hand to capitulate, abruptly cast aside the papers, declaring that he would never brook coercion. The deadlock lasted a whole day, but at length Aguinaldo signed conditions, which Paterno conveyed to General Primo de Rivera at San Fernando (Pampanga). The willingness to capitulate was by no means unanimous. Paterno was forewarned that on his route a party of 500 Irreconcilables were waiting to intercept and murder him, so to evade them he had to hide in a wood. Fifteen minutesʼ delay would have cost him his life. Even a Spanish colonel for some occult reason sought to frustrate the peace negotiations by falsely reporting to General Primo de Rivera that Paterno was inciting the rebels to warfare. But the General believed in Paternoʼs good faith, although he declared the terms proposed unacceptable, and in like manner three other amended proposals were rejected, until finally the fifth document was accepted as tantamount to a Protocol of Peace to serve as a basis for the treaty. Here ends Paternoʼs verbal declaration.
The Protocol was signed in duplicate by Emilio Aguinaldo of the one part, and Pedro A. Paterno, as Peacemaker, of the other part. One copy was archived in the office of the Gobierno General in Manila,[12] and the other was remitted to the Home Government with a despatch from the Gov.-General.