[16] Manuel Godoy, of obscure family, was originally a common soldier in the Guards. He became field-marshal, Duke of Alcudía, Grandee of Spain, Councillor of State, and Cavalier of the Golden Fleece. For his intervention in the Peace of Basilea he received the title of Principe de la Paz. Baldomero Espartero was a successful general, who brought the first Carlist war to a close and concluded the Treaty of Vergara (1839), for which (in 1840) he was granted the titles of Duque de la Victoria and Principe de Vergara.
[17] This steamer came into Manila flying the French ensign, and painted to resemble one of the Russian Volunteer Fleet, to avoid capture on the way.
[18] The precise terms of the treaty or agreement made between the representative of the Philippine Government and the rebel chiefs are hitherto enveloped in mystery; but even though all the personal testimony referred to in this chapter were impugned, there is convincing circumstantial evidence that Emilio Aguinaldo and his followers received a very considerable amount of money from the Philippine Treasury conditionally. In the Suit No. 6 of 1899 in the Supreme Court of Hong-Kong, T. Sandico and others versus R. Wildman (all the original filed documents of which I have examined), sworn evidence was given to show that $200,000 Mexican of the sum received by Aguinaldo was deposited in his name in the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China. It is not feasible to suppose that this sum was paid to or accepted by Aguinaldo unconditionally.
The Tagálog Rebellion of 1896–98
Second Period
American Intervention
The prelude to the American occupation of Manila was the demand made on Spain by the Government of the United States of America to evacuate the Island of Cuba.
Generations of Spanish misrule in that Island had produced a recurrence of the many attempts to throw off the sovereignty of Spain. In February, 1895, the flag of insurrection was again unfurled, and at Baira a proclamation, claiming independence, was issued at the instance of one of Cubaʼs most intelligent patriots—Marti. This civil leader, however, died a natural death a few months afterwards, but the chief command of the insurgents in the field was continued by the mulatto Antonio Maceo. The rebellion was assuming a serious aspect when General Martinez Campos, who had been instrumental in duping the Cubans in 1878 by the Treaty of Zanjón, was again sent out as Captain-General of the Island. But the Cubans refused to be caught a second time in the same trap. Martinez Camposʼ theme of “political action combined with military force” held no weight. During his mild régime the insurrection increased rapidly, and in one encounter he himself was very near falling a prisoner. In eight months he was relieved of his post, and General Weyler, Marquis de Teneriffe, who had a reputation for severity, succeeded him in command. He was a man of the Duke of Alba type—the ideal of the traditional Spanish Colonial party who recognized no colonistsʼ rights, and regarded concessions of liberty to the colonies as maternal dispensations to be hoped for only, but never demanded. Antonio Cánovas, the ultra-Conservative Prime Minister, had declared that so long as an armed rebel remained in the field he would not grant reforms, so the prospect of a settlement of the disputes between the Government and the governed was hopeless during that administration. The duration of the civil war had seriously prejudiced American trade interests; the pursuance of a conflict under the conditions imposed by General Weyler, who caused all non-combatant Islanders to be “concentrated” in places where they were left to starve, aroused the just indignation of America and Europe alike. The hand of the assassin brought the Cánovas Ministry to an end on August 8, 1897; General Weyler was recalled six weeks later, and the United States Government, which had so repeatedly protested against the indefinite and wanton waste of lives and fortune in Cuba, dictated to Spain a limit to its continuance. After a Conservative interregnum of six weeks under the leadership of General Marcelo Azárraga, Práxedes Sagasta came into power at the head of a Liberal ministry and with a Cuban autonomy bill in his portfolio. The newly-appointed Gov.-General, Ramon Blanco, Marquis de Peña Plata, ex-Gov.-General of the Philippines (vide p. [377])—a more noble and compassionate man than his predecessor—unsuccessfully essayed the policy of coercing the rebels in arms whilst cajoling peaceful autonomists and separatists with the long-talked-of self-government. Nevertheless, the separatist movement had in no way abated when the Autonomy Bill was promulgated, and an insular Cuban Government was formed on January 1, 1898. In the meantime the incident of the blowing-up of the American warship Maine, the cause of which has not yet been made clear to the satisfaction of the world, had further incensed the war party in the United States.[1] Autonomy had come too late; examined in detail it was but another form of Spanish dominion, open to almost similar abuses; it was not the will of the people, and it failed to bring peace. The thousands “concentrated” under Weylerʼs rule still formed a moribund mass of squalid misery which Spain was still unable or unwilling to relieve. Americaʼs offer to alleviate their wretchedness materially was received with suspicion, hemmed in with conditions, and not openly rejected for the want of physical power to do so. Three months of insular government and over 200,000 Spanish troops had effected practically nothing; the prospect of peace was hopeless, and the United States of America formally called upon Spain to evacuate the Island. Spain argued the point; America insisted on the course dictated, and sent an ultimatum to Madrid on April 20, 1898, to be accepted or otherwise within three days. The ministers Polo de Bernabé and General Woodford withdrew from Washington and Madrid respectively, and war broke out between the United States and Spain on Saturday, April 23, 1898.
In anticipation of hostilities an American fleet had concentrated at Hong-Kong. On April 23 Major-General Black, the officer administering the Colony, issued a proclamation of neutrality, and Commodore Dewey withdrew his fleet from British waters to Mirs Bay,[2] at that time within Chinese jurisdiction.
It was known in Manila that the hostile squadron was on the way to the Philippine capital. Submarine mines were laid, or said to have been laid, for some old cable was purchased for the purpose from the telegraph-ship Sherard Osborn when the submarine cable was removed from Bolinao and carried on to Manila. Admiral Patricio Montojo went with four ships to await the arrival of the enemy off Subig (Zambales) on the west coast of Luzon. Subig is a fine natural harbour, but with precipitous shores just as Nature has made it. For years the “project” had existed to carry a State railway there from Manila, and make Subig the principal Government Naval Station and Arsenal instead of Cavite. But personal interests and the sloth of the Government combined to frustrate the plan. Under the pressing circumstances the military authorities pretended to be doing something there, and sent up a commission. Admiral Montojo expected to find batteries of artillery mounted and 14 torpedoes in readiness, but absolutely nothing had been done, so he at once returned to Manila Bay, and prepared to meet the adversary off Cavite. In Cavite there were two batteries, with three guns between them, but at the last moment two defective guns were put ashore there from the Don Juan de Austria and two similar pieces from the Castilla.