In the fight of smaller bodies of all arms, a regiment will frequently be able to intervene in a most effective manner by a timely charge, from which considerable results may often be expected, especially during pursuit of a retreating and shaken enemy. In such cases the formation of lines for attack will frequently be superfluous, and a broad enveloping formation may be adopted.
The brigade of two regiments is numerically too weak of itself to carry out strategical missions, and to be able to engage in the independent actions they demand. The heavy drains on its strength which such missions generally entail will usually weaken the fighting power so much that the brigade will no longer be in a condition to engage an opponent of any strength who may have to be dealt with by mounted or dismounted action, or the two in combination.
At the same time, circumstances may lead to a brigade being forced to carry out an independent rôle. It will then have to reconnoitre with great care, so that it may only embark on a decisive encounter with a full knowledge of the situation. Otherwise, in view of its small offensive power, it will run a great risk of suffering defeat, especially when dismounted.
In the defence on foot, on the other hand, a brigade may be regarded as an important factor of strength, capable of successfully resisting an enemy of considerable superiority, as long as its flanks are protected and the led horses do not require too large an escort.
On approaching the enemy, the brigade must form column of troops from column of route in good time and the regiments must be deployed on the frontage and in the formations demanded by the situation. In such cases a reserve must always be detailed. The allotment of different rôles in the fight to the various regiments or groups will form the framework for the tactical deployment. In all attacks the brigade or its component parts must always adopt the formation in lines. Where there is blind ground to a flank, a forward échelon must be formed which will co-operate concentrically in the charge. In the attack on foot, too, it will often be advantageous to échelon detachments forward under due protection, in order to envelop the enemy's position.
In the combat of detachments of all arms, and especially in pursuit, considerable performances must be expected of a brigade. A timely charge or the employment of its fire power in an effective direction may bring about a decision.
The division of six regiments, under circumstances where its full strength can be employed in the charge, represents, even against troops using the rifle, a very considerable fighting power, which can, if judiciously handled and launched at the right moment, have a decisive effect, even in a battle of armies.
In independent missions it must be remembered that a complete regiment of four squadrons with 15 files per troop will represent 400 rifles at most. In war, however, this figure will never be reached. Wastage on the march and the provision of the necessary detachments and patrols, weaken squadrons very considerably. We must further remember that in every great battle a mounted reserve will always have to be detailed, while, in addition to this, detachments such as reconnoitring squadrons, escorts to transport, reporting centres, and signal stations, will generally fail to rejoin in time for the battle. Thus the division will seldom actually be able to reckon on more than 1,000 to 1,500 rifles in the firing-line.
Even counting on the co-operation of artillery and machine-guns, which the enemy will also have at his disposal, this represents no great offensive strength. It is therefore necessary to be quite clear in our minds that only weak detachments can be attacked with prospect of success.
A cavalry division is greatly handicapped by these circumstances in carrying out the rôle which may be assigned to it in the course of operations. The resistance of a body of equal strength where circumstances demand a dismounted attack can thus never be overcome.