Cavalry / A Popular Edition of "Cavalry in War and Peace"

by Friedrich von Bernhardi

There is, therefore, for our cavalry a want of any sort of tradition for that rôle which it will be expected to carry out in the next war, and this want will be the more felt as it will in the future be expected to deal with a number of technical methods of communication which are, as a whole, still almost unknown, and as to the actual war value of which no judgment can yet be formed. Up to now, also, cavalry training as carried out since the war of 1870-71 has been unable to create a sound foundation for preparation for war. Left far behind in the march of military progress, in tactics as well as reconnaissance, it has been led so far from the right way that it would have been unable to stand the test of serious war. Nor have we yet fully extricated ourselves from these trammels of the past.

For the moment, therefore, our cavalry finds itself in a state of transition. The demands which modern war will make upon it have not yet penetrated into its flesh and blood, that is to say, their extent and range have not yet been clearly grasped by the arm, nor have we yet by any means succeeded in breaking loose from the fetters of the past. Views based on antiquated assumptions are often apt to survive and to influence training as well as leading.

This is particularly the case as regards reconnaissance. In tactics, too, the cut-and-dried methods of bygone days are clearly not yet forgotten, while for enterprises against the enemy's communications there is a want both of practical training and theoretical instruction.

This state of affairs must be regarded as a great evil, as at the outbreak of a war there will no longer be time to collect experiences. From the very first day onward the greatest demands will be made upon the cavalry, not only as regards intentions, but performances. On the achievements of the cavalry in the early days of the war will depend to a considerable extent the success of the first great decisive encounter.

We must therefore be prepared to meet these great demands when war breaks out. Only a clear recognition of the necessities and the possibilities of manœuvre and training can secure us this preparation. There remains, then, nothing for us—with no practical war experience to go on—but to create the groundwork of our methods of training from theoretical and speculative reflection. With all the means of intellect and foresight, we must endeavour to discern the probable course of the war of the future and regulate the methods of training accordingly.

Peace exercises based upon such clearly defined principles must serve as a further guide to what is possible and practical. They cannot, it is true, afford realistic results, as they lack the effect of weapons, the hostile country, the thousand causes of friction, and the moral factors of serious war. They can, however, be regarded as practical guides in many directions and will help us to evolve methods unattainable by pure theory: for instance, in increasing the capabilities of the troops, improving the practical arrangements for communication, the transmission service, the patrol system, and the like. Only these peace experiences must not be overrated, but subjected to continual criticism by the light of what would be practical in war.

It thus remains our chief duty to get a clear and just idea of the rôle that cavalry will play in a future war, in order to clear the mind fully on this point, and so be able further to build upon the foundations of sound reasoning.

The new Cavalry Drill Regulations,[3] in which I had the honour and pleasure of collaborating, have undertaken the creation of these fundamental principles of the independent rôle of cavalry. Their teachings, however, have as yet by no means penetrated into the ranks. The new Drill Regulations have endeavoured to give new rules for the tactical employment of cavalry, which have not yet sufficiently established their value, even on the manœuvre-ground. As yet the troops are only endeavouring to get accustomed to them.

It is also obvious that practical drill instructions, at least for tactics, can only give general principles, and cannot be too definite, lest they should thereby tend to limit the independence of leaders in the thousand varied happenings of war.

It is quite another matter for him who is not called on to make regulations, but whose task is rather to clear the understanding, to stimulate independent thought, and to encourage the troops themselves to form correct judgments. Thus will be moulded the efficiency which will enable the soldier to act in the presence of the enemy according to the Regulations, with full freedom of thought, not after the letter, but the spirit, and even perhaps, in many cases, the intention of them.