I
EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY AND ESSENTIALS OF LEADERSHIP
CHAPTER I
THE MODERN CONDITIONS OF WAR, AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE EMPLOYMENT AND USEFULNESS OF CAVALRY
The Art of War has undergone a momentous change; indeed, it has been revolutionized since the Franco-German War. Every condition that affects the conduct of warlike operations seems changed in almost every particular. Arms of precision have reached a degree of perfection which compels us to take into account possibilities which did not exist a few years ago, and for which the experience of the past can offer no scale of comparison. The all but universal introduction of Compulsory Service, and the consequent reduction in length of time spent by the soldier with the colours, have changed the character of almost all European Armies.
All the most typical factors in the standing Armies of former days disappear more or less on the issue of the order to mobilize. New groupings of units are formed from the first outbreak of hostilities, and the fact that these bodies are put together only on mobilization, together with the reduction in the period of service which has been very generally accepted, tend to depreciate the average value of the troops, whilst at the same time the 'masses' have risen to unimaginable dimensions. This 'folie des nombres,' against which certain French Authorities have warned us, is a very stern reality.
Experience has shown that the mere preparation for War, penetrating year by year more deeply into the very heart of nations, must in future unchain, from the first moment that the Armies of the Continent come into collision, all the horrors of a racial conflict, in which, from the first, the interests of every individual are involved.
The enormous development of railway communication has changed all conditions of strategical operations. Whilst the power of the railway to move masses since 1871 has increased, owing to the development both in the number and condition of the great trunk lines, the Armies themselves have become dependent on the railways in an ever-increasing degree. Further developments in Steam and Electricity will probably make these rearward communications both more necessary and at the same time more susceptible to injury. Thus all strategical conditions appear modified. Masses necessitate, even in the richest theatre of War, the return to the magazine system; hence the lines of communication are acquiring increased importance, and simultaneously great vulnerability.
On the other hand, the increased power of the weapons in use offers greater advantages to the local defence. The prospects of success in the direct frontal attack of strong positions have diminished enormously. The assailant, therefore, no longer able to succeed by frontal attack, is compelled to endeavour to work round the enemy's flanks, and thus exercise pressure upon his communications. His endeavour must be, as Frederick the Great would have said, 'to compel his opponent to fight outside of his chosen position.'
This increased importance of the communications, which in already exhausted districts will make itself particularly felt, will compel the defenders to take greater measures for their protection.
All these conditions taken together must of necessity increase the importance of strategy in the Wars of the future to an extent which, in my opinion, no sufficient conception has as yet been made. This final conclusion at least we must recognise, however much we may struggle against it (partly as a consequence of our somewhat one-sided experiences in 1870, and partly through the increased difficulty of all operations due to the increased masses and the more concentrated susceptibility of the railway communication): that the decisive factors in the next War must be 'superiority in the strategic direction of the troops, together with the increased efficiency they have attained and their endurance.'[1]