If the Cavalry is not in a condition to prove equal to these duties, we shall find ourselves confronted with a situation of the gravest danger. Hence it becomes unconditionally necessary to apply the reforming hand where important deficiencies and practical insufficiencies can be recognised. In order to apply the lever of reform at once to the best advantage, we must be quite clear in our own minds in which part of the conduct of War the importance of the Cavalry will principally be felt. Only from the recognition of the demands which will there be made upon it can we conclude in what direction its further evolution can be initiated.
We must, therefore, get a clear conception of the probable demands to be made upon the Arm in each individual phase of a future War, test them with a view to their relative importance towards the result as a whole, and then endeavour to recognise on which factors the success in each individual phase principally depends.
In the first place stands naturally the demands which will be made on the Cavalry during the early periods after the declaration of hostilities—that is, during mobilization and concentration. These require all the more attention because, as we have seen, it is particularly these introductory stages of future War which will be of particular importance, and because it is precisely in these very points that opinion is as yet not united.
Then we must follow the employment of the Arm in the further course of operations, and endeavour to determine in what direction the most important results are to be obtained.[Back to Contents]
CHAPTER II
DUTIES AT THE BEGINNING AND DURING THE COURSE OF THE WAR
The importance which attaches to the first tactical decisions, the fact that their success is mainly determined by the uninterrupted execution of the railway deployment, the safe arrival of the troops and war material in the appointed zones of concentration, the consideration that the continuance of the operation after the first battle—retreat or pursuit—is mainly conditioned by the uninterrupted action of the rearward communications, make it indubitable that it is of the utmost importance to disturb the corresponding operations of the enemy, and thus place one's own Army from the very beginning in a position of material and strategic advantage.
Since the Cavalry is not only able to cover great distances with overwhelming rapidity, but also, owing to its special character as a standing branch of the Army, is always ready to march and operate, whilst the other portions of the Army are still occupied with their mobilization, the opinion has been freely expressed that it would be advantageous to utilize this period required for the mobilization and railway transport of the other Arms for Cavalry raids, either into the zone of concentration, or against the communications of the enemy. Russia has for this very purpose concentrated upon the German and Austrian frontiers enormous Cavalry forces, supported by light infantry. France also keeps a numerous Cavalry practically on a war footing on the frontiers of Lorraine.
On the outbreak of War these masses are ready at the shortest notice to ride over our frontiers, to break up our railways, to seize our horses and depots, to destroy our magazines, and to carry terror and consternation into our zone of assembly.
It cannot be denied that in such manner by no means inconsiderable damage could be caused, and hence one must earnestly consider, first, what chances of success such enterprises offer, and next, whether the relative magnitude of the probable results are proportionate to the probable losses they must necessarily entail.