His opening chapter deals with the conception of the conduct of War in the sense of to-day, and he proceeds to analyze the functions of the Cavalry as modified by the changes which have occurred.
In lively detail he explains the difficulties which in future will confront all Cavalry operations, and the sacrifices that will be exacted from this Arm.
Serious study and untiring perseverance must be claimed from the individual in order to equip himself mentally and physically for the task of overcoming these obstacles, while Bernhardi shows in convincing argument the brilliant opportunities of success.
Although the opportunity of tactical action on the battle-field may have somewhat suffered, Bernhardi sees in the strategical handling of the Arm its chief possibilities, and here he includes reconnaissance and operations against the enemy's rearward communications and pursuit of a defeated Army.
He considers cohesion and mobility to be essential to insure superior striking power by shock and fire action at the decisive point, and emphasizes this principle again and again as the means of attaining a high fighting efficiency.
In the chapters on Tactical Leading in Mounted Combats and Tactical Conduct of Dismounted Action, General von Bernhardi deals with the merits of shock and fire action, and the enhanced importance of the latter as an accessory to, though never as a substitute for, shock, and he defines the respective dispositions for dismounted action when serving an offensive or defensive purpose.
At the same time, he avers that success must depend upon the ability of the leader to realize the situation, on his qualities of decision, and on his capacity to maintain a correct balance between the application respectively of shock and fire action.
The qualifications which General von Bernhardi expects in the Cavalry leader and those under him go to prove the scientific character of the profession, which demands a standard of extreme efficiency.
Successful Cavalry leading will only be possible when the machinery of the instrument employed is technically perfected down to the minutest detail, and this can only be attained by a very elaborate and thorough training.
The book should commend itself particularly to those critics who, drawing conclusions from the South African War, contend that the united offensive action of man and horse, culminating in the charge, can no longer avail, and that the future lies with the mounted riflemen, trained only to dismounted action. General von Bernhardi makes it clear that the theatre of War in South Africa does not assist us with any complete object-lessons from which to evolve a change of tactical principles, inasmuch as the conditions were entirely abnormal, and in European Warfare are unlikely to recur.