Cavalry in Future Wars

by Friedrich von Bernhardi

It has already been pointed out in Chapter III. that they do not apply to a Corps made up of several Divisions, and the same holds good of Divisions of other than strictly normal composition. Everywhere, in cases such as referred to above, the subdivision into Lines ('Treffen') in the spirit of the Regulations would very soon lead to even worse disruption of the units than already happens with normal Divisions of three Brigades. The want of proportion between the number of the Lines and the columns from which they have to be formed would be more glaring then than nowadays, when the number of Brigades happen to be the same as the number of Lines; with the larger units the difficulty of uniform speed and control would be a factor.

Now, Section 346 helps us over all these difficulties by disembarrassing us of all stereotyped formations based upon numbers alone, and leaves the Commander free to choose in what proportion and in what order he will divide and move these masses.

Under modern conditions this latitude is indispensable, for the amount of force to be applied depends on what is known about the enemy; but the special shape the attack itself assumes, and more particularly its breadth of front, will be determined by the width of front the enemy opposes and the nature of the ground it has to move over; whilst as to depth, this must be decided by our estimate of the quality of the adversary's force, hence his shock power and the amount of his possible reserves.

The consideration of all these conditions may, in proportion to the numbers in hand, lead us to employ whole Brigades, Divisions, Corps, or portions of these units, arranged in the most varied succession to one another. Whether we should attack by 'Wings' or by 'Lines' must depend on the circumstances of the movement, the order in which the troops reach the field, and the nature of the country to be traversed; and generally the preference will have to be given to the 'Wing Attack,' for the reasons we have above developed.

This 'Wing Attack' will, therefore, always have to be employed when time is available to form up the troops systematically for action, or when the lines of approach of the units lead naturally to the adoption of the formation. 'Lines' only then, when it is absolutely necessary to deliver an attack from column of route as rapidly as possible, and hence the time is lacking for a more systematic formation. Such cases can, for instance, arise in the deployment at the issue of a defile, or in bringing up troops from Assembly formation through the intervals of a crowded battle-field, or under analogous conditions; but even in these cases a foreseeing command will endeavour to facilitate the execution of the 'Wing Attack' by the choice of some such formation as the 'double column,' which admits of deployment to either hand.

Thus we see that our Regulations at least give to the Leader the possibility of choosing the best and most suitable formations for the execution of his purpose, but the latter also must be sufficiently master of his art to know which to select.

Further, it is the duty of the Leader, in the case of mutual encounter between manœuvring bodies of the Arm, to choose the momentarily most favourable form of attack with reference to his own line of approach. It is not easy to lay down in general terms in what manner this can be best insured, for the circumstances of the operations themselves and the nature of the ground are capable of influencing the decision in too many ways. One can only lay down certain general principles which may form a basis in the appreciation of each situation as it happens to arise.

In the first place, one must select one's own base of attack in such a direction that the following blow will force the enemy to retire in what will be for him the most disadvantageous direction, and, conversely, for one's own purposes the best.

But, naturally, in making this choice the tactical advantages or otherwise of the ground must not be overlooked or left to the enemy, for the tactical victory is the necessary preliminary to further results. Further, we should always endeavour to secure the advantage of the 'outer lines' so as to act concentrically upon the enemy. In this position, if beaten, his lines of retreat cross one another, and to avoid this predicament he will be compelled to endeavour to manœuvre across our front, always a most dangerous undertaking.

On the other hand, if our attack fails, we have still the advantage of eccentric retreat, which compels the adversary to divide his forces, and thus opens to us the opportunity of further tactical success if we can concentrate our own men with sufficient rapidity, whilst at the worst we run no risk of seeing our own troops entangled with one another.