Cavalry in Future Wars

by Friedrich von Bernhardi

It will be apparent at once that there is here a double purpose to be fulfilled—viz., to ascertain the whereabouts and direction of movement of the elements of the enemy's main fighting force, the primary object of all reconnaissance; and, secondly, to find the enemy's preceding Cavalry screen, whose purpose it is, on the one hand, to prevent our object, and, on the other hand, to conceal their own main body. This cavalry we shall have to defeat, but we cannot afford to await this event, but must initiate our own reconnaissance before the decision, and endeavour to carry this through, even if the latter prove unfavourable to us.

Hence it follows that our patrols must be systematically divided from the first into strategical and tactical patrols, according as to whether they are intended to find the enemy's main army or to beat his Cavalry.

The former must not allow themselves to be held up by the enemy's Cavalry, but must endeavour to ride through the opposing screen—straight for the heads of the enemy's marching columns. They must, therefore, avoid all fighting, and act by cunning and stealth, and hence their conduct should be entrusted always to officers. They will be directed against the probable lines of the enemy's approach, as determined by the general strategic situation, and will further be given all possible information as to the known whereabouts of the enemy, together with the intentions of their own Superior Command, in order that they may be in a position to distinguish between important and unimportant details, and adapt their action accordingly.

That the position of heads of columns in time and place, their depths, the flanks of the enemy's positions, extent of his outposts, districts in which troops are quartered, the appearance of new uniforms, indicating the presence of regiments believed to be elsewhere, etc., should all be carefully determined, forms part of their normal instructions; but, in spite of that, it is very desirable to direct their attention very particularly to all such points as are at the moment of preponderating consequence. They must also be kept well informed as to the mission of their neighbouring patrols, so that under all circumstances the systematic subdivision of their several tasks can be maintained intact.

For these patrols one must choose the best mounted officers and men and horses, since long distances must be covered under difficult circumstances, and it would be well to allot to each a competent non-commissioned officer, who can carry through the task if his Commander is killed or taken prisoner. If possible, they should also be supplied with a concentrated horse-ration, so as to be as far as possible independent of the resources of the country. (See Part II., Section I.)

As to the strength of these patrols, it will be necessary to keep within very narrow limits, because if they are large it is difficult for them to escape observation; on the other hand, a certain degree of strength is necessary, because one cannot, of course, count on being able to send back one's information by single messengers. Since it is a prime condition of the problem that a district thoroughly commanded by the enemy must be ridden through, the safe return of a single messenger can never be guaranteed; hence the Commander will either be obliged to send his reports in duplicate or triplicate, or in the last resort fight his way through with them himself. Hence it will be advisable to compose each party of two or three patrols, each of three men, assigning a smart lance-corporal to each.

One officer, one non-commissioned officer, two lance-corporals, and five men must, therefore, be considered as a fairly normal type.

The Commander can then despatch two reports, and the third he must bring in himself, and must well consider how long it will be safe to continue his observation, and what it is of real importance for his superiors to know.

But he must never allow himself to be hurried into the despatch of unimportant information. He must always keep before his mind the essential strategical elements of the whole situation. It seems to me altogether wrong to send off such patrols with general instructions to keep in touch with the enemy, a common manœuvre practice. Since these latter generally last only a few days, there is not much difficulty in maintaining such a system, particularly when information is sent by single messengers. But in War everything is very different. One would very soon have got through all one's officers and still not be well informed. The patrols must, therefore, be told to return within a certain time limit, and their reliefs, who are to be fully instructed as far as the information available goes, must be despatched before this time limit is expired. Even then we shall soon exhaust the available supply of officers who will have been driven to the limit of their endurance in purely strategic missions, and in the end we shall have to fall back upon Non-commissioned Officers for tactical observation.

This tactical reconnaissance will, in the first place, devote its attention to the enemy's Cavalry. The patrols assigned to these duties will attack the enemy wherever they meet him, to find out what is going on, and as soon as possible establish a moral superiority over them.