Cavalry in Future Wars

by Friedrich von Bernhardi

Results obtained in manœuvres, in my opinion, convey no correct experience in this matter.

Another point, however, must be specially brought out—namely, the necessity, not only of sending back information through the proper channels, but also of forwarding all important news direct to the principal Commander of the Cavalry or to the Army Headquarters. It is of the utmost importance that the Headquarters in each theatre of the War should receive information about the enemy simultaneously with their subordinates, so that they always remain in the position to dispose of their troops according to their own ideas, and do not find themselves bound by instructions previously issued by their subordinates. It is precisely this evil which made itself felt in 1870-1871. Very often the most important information never reached Headquarters at all, and hence no action could be taken upon it.

The fault lay chiefly in the fact that the subordinates, not being informed as to the connection of events, did not perceive the importance of the information, and therefore did not forward it on, and partly because the telegraph wires were overburdened by the private messages of distinguished persons who had nothing whatever to do with the conduct of operations.

The control of the wires for purely military purposes must, therefore, be maintained with rigid severity, and information to Headquarters or Army Commands must have precedence over all other business.

If collecting stations for information are not available, the question arises, Which groups should be Authorized to report direct to Headquarters? In my opinion this cannot be determined by the strength of the troops concerned, but must always depend on the strategic situation. Generally it may be laid down that the lie of the roads must decide.

Those detachments entrusted with the reconnaissance of a single line of road will report direct any important information gained within their own sphere if no stronger body should be moving along the same line, and this reporting body may, therefore, according to circumstances, be a patrol, a regiment, or a brigade. It is desirable from this point of view that all Cavalry officers down to patrol leaders should be kept so thoroughly informed as to the general situation that they may judge of the importance of the information obtained, and hence know where to send the information they have secured.

As the opposing Cavalries first, then the larger bodies of the Army, approach one another the situation changes. The reconnoitring squadrons clear the front and turn their attention to the enemy's flanks. The advanced squadrons are withdrawn, and the larger Cavalry bodies drawn off towards the wings of the Army, and seek shelter behind the Infantry columns, if they have been defeated in the Cavalry duel, or turn against flank and rear of the enemy's Army if they have been victorious. In front of the Armies reconnaissance now falls to the Divisional Cavalry. Here the strategical and tactical duties coincide. What the conduct of the Independent Cavalry will be must depend on whether it is still held in check by the enemy or not. If the latter have been finally beaten out of the field so that one has a free hand, then the strategic patrols will direct their attention to the enemy's rearward communications, and will seek to determine the approach of his reserves, but tactical reconnaissance will be directed against his flanks.

The principles governing our conduct remain the same, only the reconnoitring and advanced squadrons now act primarily as supports to the strategic patrols. If, however, a decision between the two Cavalries has not been finally arrived at, one will now endeavour to bring it about, and for this purpose unite all available forces, leaving meanwhile the reconnaissance to strong patrols, who in this period of the combat must never avoid those of the enemy, for now our object is to get information quickly, and the time for circumvention and evasion is at an end.

When the first battle has been decided, there follows either pursuit or retreat—operations in which the tactical reconnaissance cannot for one moment be omitted. Then by degrees, as the defeated side succeeds in disembarrassing itself of its pursuers, things revert to normal conditions again. The two Armies are separated by a certain area in depth, and a new series of operations commences, in which, as before, reconnaissance is required.

Matters are somewhat different as regards security. Here also in general a distinction must be drawn between safety obtained by bodies detached in advance and that derived from piquets, etc., immediately at hand. But too much importance cannot be laid upon the principle that, as above pointed out, reconnaissance alone cannot suffice to insure safety; the reconnoitring detachments must rather always be followed by a line of security troops, so that as a general type three lines of patrols result—viz., strategical patrols far in advance, tactical patrols, and security patrols, which latter, when the main body is halted, become the standing outposts.