Lord Methuen resolved upon making a frontal attack in full force on this stronghold, so as to drive the Boers out and clear the road to the Diamond City, now suffering acutely the miseries of a siege.
Before making the attack, he resolved to shell the Boer position with all his artillery and the great naval gun which had been dragged up to a ridge overlooking the kopje occupied by the enemy, at ranges varying between six thousand and eight thousand yards. The bombardment while it lasted was a severe one. An eye-witness of the scene says: 'The shells tore through the air with precisely the noise of an express train rushing at highest speed, and when they burst they seemed to envelop an acre of ground in heavy brown smoke, which lifted and floated over the kopje as if it were a mass of pulverised earth. The noise of each discharge was like the bark of a monster bulldog, and the bursting of each shell sounded like the cough of a giant.' It is believed that the lyddite shells fell among the Boers several times during the afternoon, but it is doubtful if the damage done was sufficient to cause them to shift their position. The naval gun remained on the ridge all night, and defined the extreme left of the next day's battle-ground. This ground extended from the railway where the gun stood, across the veldt to the river and along its northern bank for two miles, or about four miles from the railway to near the Kimberley road. It was covered—ridges and level veldt alike—with bushes, or shapely little trees from four to seven feet high, of round, full form, and pretty dense foliage. In such a veldt as this the Boers had two miles of trenches in front of their strongly fortified heights, well packed with riflemen. And not only so; but to make the approach more difficult, lines of barbed-wire fencing were run across the veldt parallel with the trenches.
To attack such a strong position required the very best troops of the British army, if the assault were to be a success, and Wauchope's Highland Brigade was selected for the work. Lord Methuen conceived it to be his duty to take it at all hazards, seeing that his orders were to relieve Kimberley, and the longer he remained inactive on the Modder River, the probability was the enemy would become stronger in front. As soon therefore as the last of his reinforcements arrived from De-Aar, he resolved to attack the Magersfontein kopje. For this purpose, as we have said, the heights were bombarded from 4.50 P.M. to 6.40 P.M. on the 10th December, in the expectation that—judging from the moral effect produced by his guns in the three previous actions, and the anticipated effect of lyddite, to be used for the first time—there would not only be great destruction of life in the trenches, but a considerable demoralising effect on the enemy's nerves. Whether this was so is doubtful. A longer bombardment, as the result proved, would in all probability have led to a more successful issue of the enterprise, and with less loss to our arms.
On the eve of battle
General Wauchope having received his orders, all were in readiness for the attack, which it was resolved should be made in the darkness of the early morning.
Fireside romancers have pictured Wauchope on the evening before the battle as full of despondency and prepossessed with a sense of imminent disaster. Needless to say, these are purely imaginary fancies. He was not the man either to shirk danger or dread a deadly engagement.
What afterwards happened is best described in the words of Lord Methuen's despatch. 'The night march,' he says, 'was ordered for 12.30 A.M., the bearings and distance having been ascertained at great personal risk by Major Benson, Royal Artillery, my Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General. The distance is two and a half miles, and daybreak was due at 3.25 A.M. About half an hour after the Highland Brigade marched off it came on to pour, a heavy thunderstorm accompanying the rain. The downpour lasted until daybreak. The brigade was led with perfect accuracy to the point of assault by Major Benson. The advance was slow, even for a night march. Major Benson, with a compass in each hand, having frequently to halt on account of the lightning and rifles affecting the compasses. I may remark that two rifles went off by accident before the march commenced, and it is pretty clear that flashes from a lantern gave the enemy timely notice of the march.
'Before moving off, Major-General Wauchope explained all he intended to do, and the particular part each battalion of his brigade was to play in the scheme. The brigade was to march in mass of quarter columns, the four battalions keeping touch and, if necessary, ropes were to be used for the left guides; these ropes were taken, but I believe used by only two battalions. What happened was as follows:—Not finding any signs of the enemy on the right flank just before daybreak, which took place at 4 A.M., as the brigade was approaching the foot of the kopje, Major-General Wauchope gave the order for the Black Watch to extend, but to direct its advance on the spur in front, the Seaforth Highlanders to prolong to the left, the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders to prolong to the right, the Highland Light Infantry in reserve. Five minutes earlier (the kopje looming in the distance) Major Benson had asked Major-General Wauchope if he did not consider it to be time to deploy. Lieut.-Colonel Hughes-Hallett states that the extension could have taken place two hundred yards sooner, but the leading battalion got thrown into confusion in the dark by a very thick bit of bush about twenty or thirty yards long. The Seaforth Highlanders went round this bush to the right, and had just got into its original position behind the Black Watch when the order to extend was given by Major-General Wauchope to the Black Watch. The Seaforth Highlanders and two companies of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were also moving out, and were in the act of extending, when suddenly a heavy fire was poured in by the enemy, most of the bullets going over the men.
Magersfontein
'Lieut.-Colonel Hughes-Hallett at once ordered the Seaforths to fix bayonets and charge the position. The officers commanding the other battalions acted in a similar manner. At this moment some one gave the word "Retire." Part of the Black Watch then rushed back through the ranks of the Seaforths. Lieut.-Colonel Hallett ordered his men to halt and lie down, and not to retire. It was now becoming quite light, and some of the Black Watch were a little in front, to the left of the Seaforths. The artillery, advancing to the support of the attack, had opened fire from the time it was light enough to see. No orders having been received by the Seaforths, the commanding officer advanced the leading units to try and reach the trenches, which were about four hundred yards off; but the officers and half the men fell before a very heavy fire, which opened as soon as the men moved. About ten minutes later the Seaforths tried another rush, with the same result. Colonel Hughes-Hallett then considered it best to remain where he was till orders came.