The astonishment of the troops, when the first shell fell among them, was great. Every one jumped to his feet, and seized his rifle; and the guns of the Royal Horse Artillery were brought at once into action. It was four o'clock in the afternoon when the Afghans opened fire. Had they waited for a few hours, brought up another gun or two, and made a night attack immediately after opening fire, it is morally certain that the imprudence of camping in such a position would have been punished by a disaster, which might have vied with that of Isandula. Huddled together in a small village surrounded by scrub; and impeded, as the troops would have been, by the baggage animals and native followers, rushing in terror in all directions, our men would have been taken at an immense disadvantage.

Fortunate was it that the enemy opened fire before the darkness set in. The troops were at once ordered to fall back a mile and a half, and to pitch on fresh ground. There was much confusion in the retreat, as the road in the rear was crowded with the baggage animals. The spot chosen for the camp was a rough one; for the ground was covered with scrub, and a scattered growth of hill oak and thorny bushes, and was broken by the remains of some ancient terraces but, as the jungle and broken ground extended for three and a half miles, there was nothing for it but to take up the best position possible, under the circumstances. The troops bivouacked on the ridge of a ravine, with steep banks; which formed a line of defense in front of the camp, while the view in every other direction was obscured by trees.

The regiments passed a wretched night on the rough ground. Most of them were unable to find their baggage, which was wandering in the scrub in the dark; and the greater part of the troops lay down on the bare ground, and went supperless to sleep, after their fatiguing march of twenty-one miles.

In the morning, both men and cattle were greatly exhausted by their long marches and almost sleepless nights; and General Roberts determined to wait, for a day or two, to reconnoiter the formidable position of the enemy before undertaking its attack. The camp was shifted to a more secure site, the brushwood and trees were cleared away, the tents pitched, and the troops were again comfortable.

A reconnaissance was made by Colonel Perkins--commanding the Royal Engineers--with two companies of the Pioneers. He ascertained that a deep ravine lay between the ridge on which they were encamped and the Khotal itself, and that it was impossible to direct an attack on that side.

Major Collett also, with two companies of the 23rd, proceeded to reconnoiter the route known as the Spingawi--or Cow--Pass. This, instead of going straight up the hill in front, wound round its foot to the right of the valley. Ascending the mountain at a point some three or four miles to the east of the Peiwar-Khotal, the reconnaissance reached the summit of a ridge about five miles distant from the camp, and overlooking the Spingawi-Khotal. It was ascertained that the road up the pass seemed easy and practicable, for all arms; that the top of the pass appeared to be on the same ridge as the Peiwar-Khotal; and that a force, working from it towards the Peiwar, would pass over a series of dominating positions. It did not appear to Major Collett that the enemy held the Peiwar-Khotal in force; although there was a gun on a commanding knoll on the south, and there seemed to be one at the top of the pass. The road from the village of Peiwar to the top of the Spingawi Pass seemed perfectly easy, for troops of all arms.

The next two days were spent in clearing the camp and, so far as possible, improving its military position; but it was still surrounded by thick oak jungle, which would have afforded cover for an enemy making a sudden attack.

A further reconnaissance was made of the Spingawi Pass and, as the examination confirmed Major Collett's report, it was determined to attack by it. Orders were issued, on the 1st of December, for a march that night. The regiments which were to form the main attack, by the Spingawi plateau route, were the 29th Punjaub Infantry and the 5th Ghoorkas--commanded by Colonel Gordon--in advance; these were to be followed by the mountain battery, a wing of the 72nd Highlanders, a company of the Rangers, the 2nd Punjaubees, and the 23rd Pioneers, under Brigadier General Thelwall. Four guns, on elephants, were to proceed with the column. The 5th Punjaub Infantry, the 8th Regiment, two guns Royal Horse Artillery, three guns Royal Artillery, and the 5th Bengal Cavalry--the whole under the command of Brigadier General Cobbe--were to make an attack on the Peiwar-Khotal direct.

The rest of the force was to remain to guard the camp and--in order to convince the enemy that a front attack upon the Peiwar-Khotal was intended--a party of pioneers, with an engineer officer and a covering party of the 8th Regiment, were to construct a battery near the village of Turrai. Frequent reconnoitering parties had also been sent out in this direction and, so well was the secret of the general's intention to attack by the Spingawi Khotal kept, that everyone in camp who had not been let into the secret was confident that the Peiwar-Khotal would be stormed, on the morrow.

The enemy--although those in camp were ignorant of the fact--were reinforced, on the 1st, by four regiments of infantry, with a mountain battery and, on their side, were meditating an attack upon the British camp. The regiments which had freshly arrived were, however, fatigued by their long march; and the assault on our camp was postponed until the next day, and the chance of its coming off was, therefore, lost for ever.