The next morning the troops were put in motion; for a time they marched without difficulty, as the jungle had been cut for them, but after that their movements were slow. Several Pathan deserters came in as they advanced, and gave information as to the route and position. After a march of some miles a halt was made. The troops ate some of the food carried in their haversacks, and an allowance of grog was served out. The direction of the line of march, which had hitherto been direct upon the heights of Russool, where the Sikh camp was plainly visible, was now changed, and sweeping round they reached a long bare hill in front of the village of Chillianwalla, turning out some Sikhs who were stationed in a small intrenchment there. Lord Gough's intention was to encamp for the night at this spot, where plenty of water was obtainable, so that the troops could rest and prepare for the fight in the morning, when the whole day would be available for the operations.
The ground was marked out for the different regiments to occupy, and the men were in the act of falling out, when a large body of men were seen some distance in the front, and several guns opened fire. The Sikhs had left their intrenchments, and were drawn up in the jungle. Battery after battery opened fire, and the British artillery at once responded, while the troops fell into their ranks again. Lord Gough issued orders for the battle to begin. He has been blamed by many for so doing, but it is difficult to see how it could have been avoided. The Sikh army was at hand in full force; it was out of the question to retreat, equally out of the question to remain passive under the fire of the enemy. Inaction or retreat would equally have been interpreted as evidence of fear, and would have vastly encouraged the enemy. The troops, although tired by their march through the jungle under the sun, had not had a long day's work. That the dispositions for battle were hurried, incomplete, and faulty is undeniable, but that it should have taken place was under the circumstances inevitable.
The din of the cannonade was prodigious, echoed as it was by the surrounding hills. The Sikh batteries were almost invisible, and the British artillerymen directed their fire solely at the flashes and smoke rising from the jungle. The position of the infantry was equally hidden, and it was only by the sparkle of the sun on bayonet and spearhead that any indication of its line was obtainable. But having determined upon attacking, it was necessary that some plan of operation should be decided upon, some specific object of attack assigned to each of the commanding officers of divisions and brigades. No such orders were given, and without any instructions whatever beyond the order to advance and capture the enemy's guns, the British force, numbering some eighteen thousand, of whom but a small proportion were white troops—there being but four regiments of English infantry and three of cavalry—moved forward to attack a force estimated at forty thousand, with sixty-two guns, entirely hidden in a jungle, and in an exceedingly broken and difficult ground.
The two infantry divisions of Major-general Gilbert and Brigadier-general Colin Campbell advanced boldly to the attack, and plunging into the jungle were at once engaged in a hand-to-hand struggle with the Sikhs. The cavalry on the right flank, consisting of the 9th Royal Lancers, the 14th Dragoons, and two regiments of native cavalry, were ordered to advance. They were commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Pope, an officer of the native cavalry. He was unfortunately in such infirm health that he could not mount his horse without assistance, and had no experience whatever of the command of a brigade of cavalry. The result was that owing partly to the difficulty of keeping a straight line in the jungle, the force not only overlapped the troops of horse-artillery placed between them and Gilbert's division, but got in front of Gilbert's infantry. The guns were therefore unable to afford them any assistance.
Moving forwards at a walk, the cavalry found themselves opposed both by infantry and cavalry. Colonel Pope was wounded severely in the head. The troops, being without orders, faced about in different directions as fresh opponents appeared, and presently came to a halt. The Sikh cavalry boldly skirmished up to them, and then, under the belief that the order had been given to retreat, the cavalry turned and galloped back, hotly pursued by the Sikhs. In their retreat they rode right over the batteries of horse-artillery, disorganizing the gunners and carrying off the horses in their rush; while the Sikhs, of whom there were but a handful, following hard in the rear of the flying troopers, cut down the artillerymen, captured six guns, and continued their pursuit until close to Lord Gough and the head-quarter staff. Then a couple of guns, judiciously placed, opened upon them, and they fell back, checked by the appearance of a couple of squadrons of the Lancers, which had been rallied by their officers.
Had the cavalry, when they first came in contact with the enemy, received the orders to charge, the result would probably have been altogether different. Indeed the colonel of one of the cavalry regiments requested permission from Pope to charge, but it was refused. The men who fled thus precipitately had shown an almost reckless valour at Ramnuggar, and would, under other circumstances, have distinguished themselves equally here; but cavalry at a walk are the most defenceless of troops, and broken up as they were by the jungle, unable to see what was going on on either side, exposed to a fire from hidden foes, and feeling that they were badly handled, it is not surprising that when they came to a halt they were liable to turn and go about with alacrity at the first sound of retreating hoofs at any portion of the line.
While this was happening a battery of horse-artillery, with some squadrons of cavalry from three of the regiments engaged, had most gallantly repulsed the attack of a large body of the enemy's horse on our extreme left. Godby's brigade of infantry, which had been deprived of a chance of taking part in the battle of Sadoolapore, were the first of the infantry to come in contact with the enemy. Its advance was assisted by a well-directed fire of a horse-artillery battery which prepared the way. It plunged into the jungle with a cheer, and dashing forward through every obstacle and driving its defenders before it, came upon an open space, the opposite side of which was thickly lined by the enemy. Our troops dashed across this under a tremendous fire of musket and artillery, fired a volley, and hurled themselves upon the Sikhs, who broke and fled. Pursuit was impossible; the jungle was so thick that none could see ten yards ahead. Orders were given to collect the wounded—an imperative duty, for the Sikhs murdered every man left behind.
Suddenly, as they were engaged in the work, a tremendous fire opened upon them from the rear. A large body of Sikhs had worked their way through the jungle and cut them off, while a strong body of their cavalry issued into the open space and charged down upon them. As quick as thought the horse-artillery swept their guns round, loaded with grape, and poured in their fire, creating terrible havoc among the Sikh horse, and sending them flying back into the jungle. The infantry faced about and retired steadily, but were pressed by a crowd of the enemy. Then General Gilbert, who was with the brigade, gave the word, and the second battalion of the Bengal Europeans turned and went at them with a cheer. The Sikhs fought desperately each for himself, but they were swept backward and bayoneted in great numbers. Three of their guns were taken and spiked, and another captured by one of the native regiments of the brigade.
The left brigade of Gilbert's division was even more severely treated. The fighting was desperate; the 29th captured and spiked several guns in the Sikh intrenchment, but could carry off only five of them for want of horses. As it still pushed forward the brigade was swept with grape and musketry. The 56th Native Infantry suffered terribly, losing its colonel, seven other officers, and three hundred and twenty-two men killed and wounded. The 30th Native Infantry suffered as heavily, losing eleven officers and two hundred and eighty-five men killed and wounded. Both the native regiments lost their colours. The brigade was at length unable to withstand the attack directed against it, and fell back.
Pennycuick's brigade of Colin Campbell's division were as roughly handled; they had, through some blunder or other, advanced unsupported by artillery, and orders were given by their commander that they were not to fire but to charge the enemy's guns. The 24th, the European regiment of the brigade, the strongest battalion of the force, advanced in magnificent order under a terrific fire of musketry and artillery, drove all opposition before them, and captured the guns opposed to them. They had commenced spiking them, when some of the Bunnoo regiments, lying concealed in the brushwood on rising ground behind the guns, opened a tremendous fire of musketry. The troops were thrown into some confusion by this sudden attack, and fell back, and as they did so they were literally mown down by the enemy's fire. General Pennycuick fell dead; his son, a young ensign, stood across his father's body and defended it until he fell dead beside it. Colonel Brooks was also killed. Eleven other officers fell, and ten were wounded either among the guns or in the retreat that followed. The Sikh cavalry pressed hard on the retiring soldiers, while their musketry and artillery swept their ranks, and upwards of five hundred men were killed and wounded. The regiment was in fact almost annihilated. The position this brigade attacked was afterwards found to have been the strongest along the Sikh line. The two native regiments of the brigade had advanced in line with the 24th, but suffered far less severely in the retreat, the efforts of the Sikhs being concentrated against the white regiment.