The loss had been heavy. Half a dozen white officers were wounded, and seventeen Sikhs had been killed or wounded, out of a total of fifty who had gone into action. The total casualties mounted up to seventy.
[Chapter 18]: A Night Surprise.
With the exception of replenishing the supplies of ammunition, cleaning rifles, and burying the dead, nothing further was done that afternoon. In the evening a consultation was held, in the fort, among the principal officers. The situation was a difficult one. An immense amount of ammunition had been expended, and it was decided that it was out of the question to draw upon the supplies that had been sent up for the garrison. There were still two strongly-entrenched positions, and strong opposition was anticipated to the clearing of the main road. Every round would, therefore, be required for this work. This seemed to preclude the idea of taking the other two stockades.
The choice therefore remained of making the assault upon these, and then returning through Pekki; or of leaving them and going back by the main road, the route laid down in their instructions. Neither of these plans was satisfactory, for each left half the programme undone.
It was suggested that a night attack might be attempted. In that case, not a shot must be fired, and the attack must be made by the bayonet alone. The moon rose early, and it was almost high at eight o'clock.
Of course, it was extremely risky to venture upon such a plan, with superstitious black troops. The object of assault, however, could be located the next day, and the danger of losing their way would thereby be reduced to a minimum. Further, it was decided that no dependence, whatever, be placed on any native guide. Finally, it would be eminently undesirable to leave Coomassie again in a state of siege.
It was clear that only one of the stockades could be carried in this manner, as the other would be placed on its guard. It was therefore decided that the one on the Accra-Coomassie road was the most suitable; first because it joined the main road to Cape Coast, and secondly because the capture of the stockade would isolate the remaining one on the Ejesu road, which the Ashantis would probably abandon, as both the adjacent camps had fallen into our hands.
As the result of this decision Captain Loch was sent out, at twelve o'clock on the following day, to reconnoitre the position. His men, by creeping through the tall grass and clambering among the tall trees, succeeded in reaching a large cotton tree within seventy yards of the enemy's entrenchment. Climbing this, they obtained a good view of the enemy's stockade and camp behind it.
At that moment a roar of voices was heard, and hostile scouts poured out from the camp. The object of the expedition, however, had been attained; and the soldiers retired rapidly, without casualties.
At five in the afternoon the officers assembled at Colonel Burroughs's quarters. Here the details of the work were explained to them. They were to fall in at eight o'clock, and deliver the attack between nine and ten. The Maxims were to follow in rear of the infantry, and no other guns were to be taken.