To Herat and Cabul: A Story of the First Afghan War

by G. A. Henty

THE ADVANCE ON CABUL

The garrison of Jellalabad found themselves pressed for provisions at the end of March, and on the 1st of April made a gallant sortie, and swept into the town a flock of five hundred sheep and goats. On the 5th Macgregor's spies brought in news from Akbar's camp that it was reported there that Pollock had been beaten with great loss in the Khyber Pass, and on the following morning Akbar's guns fired a royal salute in honour of the supposed victory. Sale, now confident of the fighting powers of his men, determined to make a great effort to break up the blockade; as if Pollock had really been defeated it would be some time before relief could come to them, and they could not hope again to make such a capture as that which they had effected on the 1st. A council of war was held, and action was decided upon, as success would not only free them from all apprehensions of being starved out, but would effect a diversion in favour of Pollock.

The force was but a small one for the enterprise which they moved out to undertake. The centre column, consisting of the 13th Regiment, mustering five hundred bayonets, was under the command of Colonel Dennie; the right, consisting of some three hundred and fifty men of the two native regiments and a detachment of sappers, was commanded by Captain Havelock; the left column was about the same strength, under Lieutenant-colonel Monteith; the light field battery and a small cavalry force were to support them. They advanced from the city at daylight on the 7th. Akbar Khan drew up his force, six thousand strong, before his camp, his right resting on a fort, and his left on the Cabul river. Havelock's column commenced the fight by attacking the enemy's left, while Dennie advanced to the assault of the fort, which was vigorously defended. Dennie himself fell mortally wounded by an Afghan ball, but his men captured the place in gallant style. A general attack now took place on Akbar's camp. The artillery advanced at a gallop, and poured their fire into the Afghan centre, the 13th and Colonel Monteith's column pierced their right, while Havelock drove back their left from the support afforded by the river.

The Afghans fought sturdily, their musketry keeping up a heavy fire, and large bodies of horse again and again threatened Havelock's column, while three guns from a hidden battery opened fire. The struggle, however, was a short one. Their cannon were taken, every position held by them was captured, and by seven o'clock they were in full retreat. Two cavalry standards were taken, four guns lost by the Cabul and Gundamuck forces were recaptured, a vast quantity of ordnance stores destroyed, and the whole of the enemy's tents burnt. The loss of the Afghans had been heavy, and several chiefs were among the fallen. The loss of the victors was small indeed. Colonel Dennie and ten Sepoys were killed, three officers and some fifty men wounded. A day or two later Pollock's force reached Jellalabad, and the joy of both parties was great.

Indeed, no stronger contrast can be found than that between the leading and conduct of the force at Cabul and that at Jellalabad. The one showed the British leader and the British soldier at their worst, the other the British commander and men at their best. It may be confidently affirmed that had Sale been in the place of Elphinstone, with full power of action, the fight in the passes would never have taken place, and within three days of the murder of Burnes the Afghan host would have been a mob of fugitives, and Cabul would have been in our hands. The British soldier is always best in the attack. He is ready and eager to fight against any odds, but when kept in a state of inaction, under a commander in whom he has lost all confidence, he speedily deteriorates. Happily there are few examples in our military history such as those of Cabul and Walcheren, where the British soldier has been placed in such a position.

While Pollock was forcing the Khyber Pass the reign of Shah Soojah came to a sudden end. After the departure of the British no hostility was shown towards him by the Afghans, and he continued at the Bala Hissar in the position of nominal sovereign of Afghanistan the Nawab having willingly resigned the difficult and dangerous post and accepted that of wuzeer. He himself had his troubles. Most restless and dangerous of these Afghan leaders was Aneen-oollah-Khan, who had played fast and loose with the British while secretly working against them. He demanded the surrender to him of the hostages. The Nawab steadily refused, and as threats of force were used against him, raised a body of three thousand men for their protection. These, however, were corrupted by Aneen, but the Nawab remained faithful to his trust. On the 4th of April Shah Soojah left the Bala Hissar with his retinue to go down to join Akbar Khan. An ambush was laid for him by one of the sons of the Nawab. These poured in a volley, and Shah Soojah fell dead, shot through the head. The Nawab was filled with horror at the deed, and swore an oath never again to see his son beneath his roof or suffer him to be named in his presence.

While Jellalabad was being besieged, the situation at Candahar had been precarious. Ghuznee had been captured by the tribesmen after a gallant defence, and its garrison had been massacred. Kelat-i-Ghilzye was besieged, and without hope of succour. Candahar was surrounded by the insurgent Dooranees, but these had been twice defeated by General Nott. During one of these expeditions the city was in imminent danger, for the enemy, gradually retiring, drew the sortie-party a considerable distance from the walls, and then at night slipped away and attacked the place. One of the gates was destroyed by fire, and for many hours the issue of the contest was doubtful. At last, however, the assailants were beaten off with very heavy loss. A force marching up to the relief of the town, under General England, being very badly handled, were opposed on their way up from Quettah, and fell back and remained there until Nott sent a peremptory order for them to advance again.

He himself marched to meet them, and on the united force arriving at Candahar, the town was placed beyond all risk of capture. Nott was preparing to march on Cabul, while Pollock advanced on Jellalabad; but, to the stupefaction and disappointment of all, an order arrived from Calcutta for the abandonment of Candahar and the return of the force to India. There had been a change of governors. Lord Ellenborough had succeeded Lord Auckland, and immediately set to work to overthrow the whole policy of his predecessor. Similar orders were sent to Pollock. The latter, however, mindful of the honour of his country, and the safety of the hostages and ladies, replied that, being almost without carriage, it would be impossible for him to retire at once, thus gaining time, which he utilized by entering into negotiations with Akbar Khan for the release of their prisoners.

Both generals wisely kept the order they had received a secret from the troops, who would have been profoundly disheartened. However, no secret had been made as to the orders issued in Calcutta, and the news soon spread all over India, and reached Pollock's camp, that the army was to be withdrawn. Pollock did his best to throw doubts upon the truth of the reports by marking out a new camp two miles in advance, and arranging with the natives to bring in supplies there, so as to give grounds for a belief that, so far from leaving the town, he was preparing for an advance. In the meantime he had written an urgent letter pointing out the evils and difficulties of an immediate withdrawal, and the immense advantage that would arise by striking a heavy blow before retiring, and so to some extent retrieving the reputation of the British army.

The letter had its influence, and the governor wrote: