With Roberts to Pretoria: A Tale of The South African War

by G. A. Henty

Had Lord Kitchener witnessed the battles of the Modder and Magersfontein, it is morally certain that he would not have attacked Cronje in his lair. But hitherto he had been engaged only with barbarous tribes, who, although magnificently brave, were either altogether without firearms, or were armed only with muskets of obsolete pattern. He was unable to form an idea of the tremendous effect of such rifles as those in the hands of the Boers, a race of marksmen. Nothing could have been gained by such an attack, even if successful, as the Boers must sooner or later have surrendered. Escape was impossible, and the troops could be trusted to give a good account of any force advancing to aid Cronje. Doubtless he was to some extent influenced by the burning desire on the part of his men and officers—who, with the exception of those of the Highland Brigade, had not as yet been engaged with the Boers—to get at the enemy.

However, on the following morning Knox's, Stevenson's, Smith-Dorrien's, and the Highland Brigades all advanced against the position. When within a thousand yards, a semicircle of fire flashed out from the waggons, as it had done from the bushes on the Modder. The effect was terrible, and men went down by the score before the hail of bullets, and the troops were forced, as the Guards had been on the Modder, to throw themselves down before it. It would have been well if, as on that occasion, the impossibility of success had been recognized, and the troops had been ordered to remain in the same position throughout the day, contenting themselves with returning the Boer fire. But no such order was given, and companies got up and made short rushes, each regiment burning to be the first to enter the Boer camp. Some little relief was afforded by four batteries of artillery, which kept up an incessant shell fire, distracting the Boers' attention, preventing their taking aim, and shaking their nerve.

At twelve o'clock one of French's horse-artillery batteries came up and joined the others at the work. Splendid were the efforts made by many of the regiments to get to close quarters. The Canadians and Cornwalls—Smith-Dorrien's Brigade—on the one side swept almost up to the river bank, and the Welsh, Yorkshire, and Essex regiments did as well on the opposite side of the semicircle, both forcing the Boers to contract their lines, and limiting the space occupied by them.

The Highlanders did magnificently, burning to retrieve their defeat at Magersfontein, and showed that they had entirely recovered from the effects of that disaster. Their conduct was all the more worthy of admiration, inasmuch as they had marched over thirty miles, and only arrived on the scene just as the advance began. From the south side of the river a heavy rifle fire was maintained by the troops on that bank; and it is probable that some, at least, among the casualties on our side were inflicted by their bullets, which passed over the Boer camp. All day the fight continued, and all that had been effected was to contract the Boer position along the river bank from three miles to barely two. When evening fell, our troops were still in the positions they had won during the day. But the cost was out of all proportion to the advantage gained. They had suffered eleven hundred casualties. The Seaforths headed the list with one hundred and twenty, the Black Watch came next with ninety-six; ninety Yorkshires, the same number of West Riding Regiment, eighty among the Canadians, seventy-six Argyle and Sutherlands, fifty-six of the Cornwalls, forty-six of the Shropshires, and thirty-one of the Oxfordshires, showed how every regiment had taken its share in the fighting.

On the following day Cronje asked for twenty-four hours' armistice to enable him to bury his dead. Lord Kitchener assented, but as the morning wore on Lord Roberts arrived with Tucker's Division from Jacobsdal, and with three more field-batteries, and five naval guns. The Commander-in-Chief disapproved altogether of the armistice, which was evidently a mere pretext to gain time; and he accordingly sent word to Cronje that the armistice was at an end, but that any women and children in the laager might come out, and would receive good treatment. This offer was declined by Cronje. His refusal was the signal for the guns to open, and all day a hail of fire was poured into the Boer laager. Smith-Dorrien's Brigade was left on the ground that it had won, near the river-bank to the west; while one of Tucker's Brigades, commanded by Chermside, occupied the same position to the east. The remainder of the troops were drawn off and posted so as to prevent any portion of the beleaguered host from making their escape.

De Wet, with the force that had attacked and finally captured the train of waggons at Waterval Drift, had come round and surprised and captured a party of thirty men and four officers of Kitchener's Horse, who were posted on a kopje two miles away from the laager. The loss of this position was serious, because it opened the road to any Boer force marching to relieve Cronje. That such a force was approaching was known. Cronje had, when he found the passage at Koodoosrand blocked, flashed signals asking for aid, and not only would the local forces answer the appeal, but these would be largely reinforced by Orange Free State commandos coming with all haste from Natal by rail. Accordingly, five regiments of cavalry with four batteries were sent against the kopje, the force being divided into two parties of equal strength, and passing one on each side of the hill. A force of Boers they encountered were easily defeated, while the artillery drove off the defenders of the kopje, of whom some fifty were killed and as many taken prisoners.

Two days later another party approached. They attacked a kopje held by the Yorkshires but failed to capture it, and then tried to carry another hill held by the Buffs and were again defeated. In all eighty were taken prisoners. Every night Boers crept out from their laager and gave themselves up as prisoners, and by the end of the week we had six hundred captives. All this time the guns had thundered almost without cessation. From a balloon overhead signals were made as to the point at which the fire should be directed. Nothing could withstand this hail of iron. Scores of waggons were smashed up, oxen and horses killed by the hundred, but few Boers were visible. Holes and tunnels had been driven into the side of the numerous dongas that intersected the laager. Here the women and children were sheltered, and here the men crouched in readiness to sally out and defend the laager if again attacked, and whenever our outposts were pushed forward, the fire from their trenches was as heavy as ever.

At the extremity of the base of the semicircle Smith-Dorrien and Chermside's men had been steadily pushing forward trenches. On the night of Monday, February 26th, it was determined that the former should make an advance. The Canadians were to lead it, the Gordons to be in support, and the Shropshires to move to the left to protect the force from any attempt of the Boers to take them in flank. Two companies of the Canadians led the advance. The moon had not yet risen, and to keep their position each man grasped the sleeve of the man next to him. The rear rank carried spades and had their rifles slung behind them. The 7th Company of the Royal Engineers followed them carrying sacks full of earth. The distance to be traversed was eight hundred yards.

Never did men undertake more nervous work, for at any moment they might be swept by a storm of bullets such as had smitten the Highlanders at Magersfontein. Not a sound was heard until they were within fifty yards of the Boer trenches, and then the front rank struck against a wire on which empty meat-cans were stretched. A rifle-shot was fired as the clang rose, and the Canadians at once threw themselves on their faces. Scarcely had they done so when a roar of fire from a line six hundred yards long broke out. To move forward was impossible; the moon was on the point of rising, and its light would enable the Boers to pick them off unerringly. Accordingly the companies out on the plain were ordered to fall back in very open order, and this was effected with a comparatively small number of casualties.