No more brilliant act had been performed during the war. The government in vain endeavoured to belittle it, but the people were not to be deceived, and by them Flinter's victory was regarded at its true value. They pronounced so strongly in favour of him that the government was reluctantly obliged to yield, made him a Marshal de Campo, and placed him in charge of the provinces of La Mancha and Toledo. The action had a great effect upon the course of the war in Estremadura. It completely disorganized the Carlists among the mountains of Toledo, set free an important province, and robbed the enemy of a base for the operations which they had arranged should take place there during the approaching season.

Arthur had ridden out with the general to the attack of the party who had occupied the bridge, and took part in the night march and in the concluding victory, and the general in his report spoke very highly of his courage and services, and, moreover, gave him full credit for the discovery of the plot and capture of the plotters. The government complained both to Sir George Villiers and Colonel Wylde of the share he had taken in the operations, but both replied that British officers were perfectly at liberty to take part in operations that would strengthen the Royal cause, and that the government were only too glad of the assistance of British seamen and marines in the operations in the north.

The government then endeavoured to sow dissension between Espartero and Cordova. The latter had now left the army and returned to Madrid, where he had entered the Cortes. But Cordova remained firm, and refused to be brought into these intrigues. They further endeavoured to annoy Espartero by displacing the chief of his staff, in whom he had implicit trust, without consulting him.

Arthur had, after the defeat of the Carlists by General Flinter, returned to Madrid and gone to join Espartero, who on the 28th of January arrived at Villa Nueva de Mena and found the enemy strongly posted and entrenched on the right bank of the river Cadagua. On the morning of the 30th he attacked them in three columns under a heavy fire, and after hard fighting succeeded in driving them from four villages they had occupied.

They fell back to a still stronger position in the rear, but from this they were also driven, and by one o'clock they were in disorderly retreat; but owing to the difficult country no pursuit was attempted that day. The next morning Espartero moved with eight battalions to Berron, Iriarte going to the right with four battalions. After marching half a league he found the enemy strongly entrenched, but they retreated, on his approach, to the fortified convent of Santa Isabel, where they had the support of two Biscayan regiments and four battalions of Navarrese, and occupied the formidable heights in heavy masses. As soon as Iriarte's column became engaged with the Carlist left, Espartero attacked the position of Santa Isabel, and, in spite of a very heavy fire with which he was met, carried it with a rush and advanced against the heights, on which the chief force of the enemy was posted.

Here an obstinate resistance was made; but before dark the Carlists had been dislodged at the point of the bayonet, and were in full retreat into the mountains. The Christinos remained near Berron to protect the evacuation of Balmaseda. This place was at such a distance from the base that it was considered impracticable to hold it, as its supply of provisions could only be kept up by means of large escorts and at considerable loss of life. It was therefore decided to blow up the fort and withdraw the garrison, strengthening, however, the fort at Villa Nueva de Mena, which now became the most advanced post of the Christinos. This was left in charge of General Latré, Espartero returning to Logrono.

In the meantime, however, matters were going badly elsewhere. The fortresses of Morella and Benicarlo had just fallen into Cabrera's hands, and Oraa, who was opposing him, was calling loudly for reinforcements. Basilio Garcia was plundering Castile. Espartero, now sickened by the abuse which had been poured upon him by the orders of the government at Madrid, determined to match himself against them, and issued a proclamation giving an account of the state of the army, the sufferings of the soldiers--who were without pay, and often without food--and the contempt with which the government, while wringing money in every manner from the country, turned a deaf ear to all his requests and left the army to starve. This proclamation had an immense effect throughout the country. The people had been so sedulously taught to believe that everything was going on well, that the troops were well fed and regularly paid, that this exposition by the general whom all trusted and believed came like a thunder-clap, and eventually brought about the downfall of the ministry.

From this moment they felt that Espartero was their master, and, although still putting many difficulties in his way, did not venture openly to oppose him. Espartero's next movement of any consequence was in connection with a Carlist expedition under Negri, which had been despatched with the intention of wasting the hitherto unmolested provinces of Galicia and the Asturias. It was extremely important that this expedition should be crushed; because if the Carlists were permitted to lay waste these provinces, which were both rich and well-affected to the Christino cause, there would be so great a falling off in the contributions that it would be difficult in the extreme to maintain the armies in the field. Espartero set out with nine battalions and fourteen guns, but without cavalry, while General Latré, who was to follow him by a separate route, had also nine battalions. He was in total ignorance of the movements of Negri, who entered Castile on the 15th of March at Soucillo, but he discovered on the 24th that he had gone into the Asturias. Latré came up with him on the 21st, and, although inferior in force, had the advantage. Espartero marched on Leon to prevent their entering Galicia or uniting with Don Basilio. Under a good leader the men had confidence. The Christinos were capable of very long marches, and on this occasion they travelled two hundred miles in nine days, and a short time afterwards marched ninety-two leagues in fourteen days.

While they were doing this good service, Iriarte, with a division twice as strong as that of Negri, was resting quietly at Alcobendas with the apparent intention only of avoiding the enemy. Had the Carlists remained in the Asturias after their defeat by Latré, they would have found great difficulty in escaping from the united action of that general and Espartero; but on hearing of Espartero's movement on Leon they counter-marched, and on the 27th of March were at Belorado, with Latré's division--now under Iriarte--a day's march in their rear. Espartero had also returned by forced marches to Palencia, and reckoned on finding himself, after two or three short marches, in front of the enemy, with Iriarte only a short distance in the rear; but on the night of the 30th of March he received a despatch saying that another Carlist expedition had passed into Castile. This, like much of the information he obtained, turned out to be untrue, but it compelled him to march in that direction, leaving the pursuit of Negri to Iriarte.

CHAPTER XII