With the British Legion: A Story of the Carlist Wars

by G. A. Henty

Colonel Wylde had joined Espartero a day or two after the capture of Pena-Cerrada, and he at once sent Arthur south to join the force with which Oraa was preparing to besiege Morella. Here he found three other English officers, commissioners of the British government, who were to report the doings of the army, and above all to urge that the Convention regarding the treatment of prisoners should be observed. Morella was a town of great natural strength. It lay in the very heart of the mountains, was built on rising ground, and defended by twenty guns. This town and Canta-Vieja, some twelve miles distant, formed the head-quarters of Cabrera, whose force amounted to a little over ten thousand men. Oraa had his head-quarters at Teruel, and believed that the Carlist troops would not venture to defend Morella.

Cabrera's troops differed materially from those against whom Espartero was fighting. The latter were peasants, animated by a desperate determination to defend what they considered their rights and privileges; the others were rough, idle fellows, fugitives from justice, men who preferred a life of adventure and a chance of plunder to work, but the iron discipline maintained by their leader welded them into a whole, and inspired them with vigour and bravery. Cabrera was in his way as remarkable a military genius as Espartero; but while one carried on war mercifully, the other tarnished his reputation by countless acts of cruelty and cold-blooded murder.

The force was arranged in three divisions, and the advance was planned so that all should arrive at the same time in the neighbourhood of Morella. On the 24th of July Oraa left Teruel, and was joined on the 28th by General Baltho's division, and on the following day by San Miguel. On the 8th of August he was immediately in front of Morella. The united force amounted to sixteen thousand infantry and twelve thousand cavalry. Matters began badly. Oraa was well aware that his supply of provisions was a scanty one, and yet he allowed the waste of a store of grain that would have supplied the army for some time. The wheat had been cut, but was lying in the fields, and instead of having it collected and placed under cover, he permitted the troops to take the corn to sleep on and feed their horses. Much of it was used as fuel, and all that was not consumed was spoiled, and yet there were mills on the ground and also ovens. But even from the commencement of the march, the commissariat arrangements for the troops were anything but lavish.

When the force left Teruel they were supplied with four days' bread and seven days' rice. No meat was issued to them for six days, and then they only received half a pound a man; and yet during the march the troops were ascending to high ground, the rain fell in torrents, and the temperature was much lower than that to which they were accustomed. By the 13th of August the allowance fell to six ounces of rice and two ounces of bread; and on the 17th, the last day of the siege, the troops were almost without food. The cavalry horses and other animals, numbering at least three thousand, had already been two days without forage, and had had no barley since they started, twenty-four days before. The other divisions were no better off. Even these scanty supplies had been maintained with the greatest difficulty. Five battalions had to be employed in keeping the road open. The siege artillery should have been brought up in two days, but seven were found necessary. The army being assembled moved round to the other side of Morella, having to fight hard to gain the position.

San Miguel's division did not bring up their guns till the 9th of August, the operation being conducted so carelessly that the road was left open for the Carlists, who kept up a constant fire and killed one hundred and fifty men. On the 10th the siege began. The troops took up their position, and drove a portion of the Carlist levies back on Morella. Next day, however, San Miguel was ordered to make an attack upon a position occupied by the Carlists, which interfered with the movements of a body of troops about to proceed down to escort a convoy of provisions. Cabrera reinforced the threatened point. San Miguel attacked boldly, and carried three positions one after another; at the fourth, however, he was so strongly opposed that Oraa ordered him to retreat, as he did not consider the position of sufficient importance to justify further fighting. The attack, however, was so far successful that the force sent to escort the convoy managed to make its way down.

On the 12th the heavy artillery was taken to the places fixed upon for the establishment of the batteries. The guns were placed about five hundred yards away from the walls, the mortars twice that distance. The next day was devoted to erecting the batteries, and these opened fire at daybreak on the 14th of August. The shooting was far from accurate, and the enemy's return was steady. The spot selected to be breached was a gate between and flanked by two towers, known as the gate of San Miguel. Directly Cabrera saw the point about to be attacked, he began to construct a strong retrenchment behind it, with a parapet and ditch, defended by chevaux-de-frise; and the following day, when the breach began to be formed, he heaped up on it a great quantity of combustibles. Although the breach was very imperfect, Oraa issued orders for an assault on the evening of the l5th. To the English officers with the besiegers it looked like an act of madness, but Oraa felt that success must be instant, or the siege must be given up on account of the impossibility of feeding the troops.

The attacking columns were formed in rear of the batteries, where they remained for three hours, and then advanced, with bands playing, to within a hundred and fifty yards of the breach. The broken nature of the ground threw them into confusion. It was midnight before they arrived at the breach, and up to this time dead silence had reigned in Morella. By the music, if by no other means, the garrison were kept perfectly informed of the motion and progress of their enemies, but Cabrera had issued strict orders that they should remain silent until the troops had reached the foot of the breach.

The moment they arrived there a brilliant flame darted up from the breach, and a tremendous fire of bullets, hand-grenades, and stones burst upon them. The red glare rose higher and higher, and the men, enfeebled by hunger and fatigue, stood appalled. Many, however, rushed forward with desperate bravery, only to fall under the storm of missiles; and at last they fell back, finding it absolutely impossible to surmount the obstacles posted there. Never were men sent upon a more hopeless task.

That evening the earnestly-looked-for convoy arrived. It had had to fight the whole distance up. Half the waggons had been lost and over eighty men. The next day passed quietly, and then it was decided to make another assault at daybreak on the 17th, although no attempt had been made to enlarge the breach or render it more practicable.

Fifteen hundred men advanced at daybreak in two columns, provided with ladders and sand-bags with which to climb the bottom of the breach, where the wall had not been destroyed. As they advanced they were received with a heavy fire of artillery and musketry; the fire again blazed upon the breach. The left column, on reaching the foot of the wall and climbing the ladders, found them too short, and fell back in great disorder. The right column in front of the breach found it impossible to ascend unassisted, and the space was too confined to admit of the formation of any number of troops. At only one place, and this very narrow and steep, was it possible to climb, and many officers and men who tried to make their way up died in the attempt.