The great Persian War and its preliminaries

by G. B. Grundy

It is superfluous to say that it is impossible at the present day to account with certainty for the manifest incongruity between the two utterances. POLICY OF DELPHI. At the same time, taking them as they stand, there is one hypothesis as to their origin which accords with the circumstances of the time. It is an hypothesis, moreover, which tends to explain the cause for that strong expression of personal opinion as to the part played by Athens in the salvation of Greece, which Herodotus puts forward in the chapter immediately preceding his record of their language, and in direct reference to them.

The first oracle seems to have been an expression of the policy which Delphi was disposed to advocate in view of the coming invasion. This policy can only have been founded on the genuine belief that Athens was the sole object aimed at by the Persians, and could remain so, if the rest of the Greek States would abstain from interference. The best solution of the situation seemed to be the voluntary removal of the Athenians to a land outside Hellas. If this was not the policy of Delphi, her advice to the Cretans, and, above all, to Argos, is quite inexplicable.

But whatever Delphi thought, there was a very general opinion throughout Greece, and especially in Peloponnesus, that the coming invasion did not aim merely at the punishment of Athens, but at the reduction of Greece to the position of a satrapy of the Persian Empire. It was known, too, at this time that the invading force was, perhaps, relatively stronger on sea than on land. It is not difficult, therefore, to imagine the blank dismay with which the Peloponnesian States must have heard of the wording of the first of the two oracles addressed to Athens, and no time can have been lost in setting their representatives at Delphi to undo the baneful effect which the pronouncement must have on the Athenian decision. Peloponnesus intended, no doubt, to defend itself at the Isthmus; but the Spartans had a perfectly clear comprehension of the necessary part which the Greek fleet, of which the Athenians must furnish the most important contingent, must play in the defence.

It is unnecessary to suppose that the pressure was exerted on the oracle at the immediate initiative of persons who were present on the spot when the Athenian delegates were given the first answer.

Herodotus is not strict on questions of chronology; possibly his sources of information did not allow him to be so; and the interval between the two oracles may have been quite considerable relative to the rapid march of events. Meanwhile pressure had been brought to bear on the authorities at Delphi from Peloponnesus, a part of the world whose representations they could not afford to neglect. So the tone of the first response was modified in the Peloponnesian interest. The Athenian was still counselled to desert Attica, but not to seek safety away from Greece; and the fleet is clearly pointed to as the means of salvation.

It was not Salamis which Delphi foresaw. It may be doubted even whether she had any belief in the policy advocated. The Isthmus and the Peloponnesians demanded the Athenian fleet; and Delphi could not afford to quarrel with her best friends.

The new oracle, whose meaning was obscured by the fact that the previous one had been uttered, came near to being misinterpreted by those to whom it was sent. They evidently saw from the first that it was, in a sense, a reversal of its predecessor; but as to its positive meaning they were in much doubt.

In the account of the debate upon it Herodotus introduces, practically for the first time, to the stage of history, with a suddenness and simplicity of expression which is almost dramatic, the name of Themistocles. H. vii. 143. “There was a certain man of the Athenians, who had recently come to the front (in the State), whose name was Themistocles;”—“And Elijah the Tishbite, who was of the inhabitants of Gilead, said unto Ahab.” In both cases the dramatic effect of the story of the lives of the men whose biography is thus opened is heightened by the lack of anything resembling an introduction.

That a debate did take place on the meaning of the oracle is probably the case; and the tradition which Herodotus followed doubtless represents in the main the lines of argument adopted by either side. The reference to Salamis and to the lines thereon in the response of Delphi might seem to be evidence in favour of their genuineness; but it is quite manifest that, if the oracle was spoken at anything like the time at which Herodotus represents it to have been uttered, it is inconceivable that the idea of fighting at Salamis can at that time have entered into the head of Themistocles, much less into the minds of those who directed affairs at Delphi. Themistocles’ great reputation in the years which followed the war was very largely due to the part he played with respect to the strategy and tactics of Salamis; and there was every inducement for the oracle to put in after the event a claim to the first suggestion of the famous plan. But, if any judgment can be formed as to the approximate date at which this particular oracle was issued, it can only be said that Salamis lay at that time in a future impenetrable to human reckoning.

As the question of the exact bearing of these oracles has been discussed at some length, it may be convenient to sum up in a few sentences the hypotheses which have been suggested as to their origin and tendency.