In Herodotus’ story of the great war the tale of Artemisium is perhaps the least satisfactory of all the detailed accounts of the various acts of the drama. It is not merely complicated by a chronological error of considerable magnitude, the effect of which is to render the most important part of the story, as it stands, incredible; but it is very seriously distorted, from a historical point of view, by the addition of material of a more than doubtful character, inserted with intent to heighten the effect of the services of Athens at this critical time. But the chronological error does not destroy the historical value of his narrative, though it impairs it. Had Herodotus told his tale after his usual manner, the error might not have crept into it. But just in this part of his history he has tried to treat events in a somewhat more business-like fashion than usual, and the attempt has not met with complete success. Nature had not made him an arithmetician; and even had it done so, his business-like method is sufficiently unbusinesslike to render his mistake obscure until the story has been analyzed.
How far he is personally responsible for the Athenian bias of his version, it is not possible to say at the present day. HERODOTUS’ ACCOUNT OF ARTEMISIUM. He was, no doubt, sufficiently philo-Athenian to wish to place the undoubtedly great services of Athens to the national cause at this time in the highest possible relief; and he was sufficiently ignorant of strategical considerations to render it probable that he could not detect in the version current at Athens those fictitious additions, whose falsity must have become apparent to any one who could appreciate the main lines of the strategy of this part of the war. Had he understood not merely that there was a connection between Thermopylæ and Artemisium, but that connection was of so intimate a nature as to render the maintenance of the pass absolutely dependent on the maintenance of the strait, he would have treated with suspicion those repeated assertions of an intention on the part of the commanders of the fleet to withdraw from their station, or would have reduced them to a position of far less prominence in the story, as being, what they no doubt were, mere indications of the spirit which animated the irresponsible mass of those who formed the crews of the Peloponnesian contingents.
And yet, in so far as can now be judged, his tale of Artemisium,—freed from a chronological error for the correction of which the author supplies the means, and with the essentially Athenian portions of it reduced to their proper relief in the story,—is a reliable history of this important period of the Great War.
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VIII.
The Parallel Journals of Thermopylæ and Artemisium Reconstructed.
| No of the day. | Events at Thermopylæ. | Events at Artemisium. | Approximate time of day. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 12 | Persian fleet leaves Therma. | Early morning. | |
| Persian fleet arrives at Sepiad strand. | Evening. | ||
| Capture of Greek scouting vessels by Persian advanced squadron. | Probably before midday. | ||
| Greek fleet at Artemisium. | |||
| Greek fleet receives news from Skiathos of the loss of the three vessels. | Evening, probably late. | ||
| 13 | Persian army reaches Malis. | First storm begins. | |
| Wreck of part of Persian fleet at Sepiad strand. | |||
| Greek fleet retires or is driven to inner strait (Chalkis?). | Probably early morning. | ||
| 14 | Persian army inactive before Thermopylæ. | Storm continues. | |
| Persian fleet at Sepiad strand. | |||
| Greek fleet in inner strait. | |||
| Report of Persian disaster reaches Greek fleet. | |||
| Greek fleet moves north [?] | |||
| 15 | Persian army inactive before Thermopylæ. | Storm continues. | |
| Fleets as on 14th day. | |||
| 16 | Persian army still inactive. | Persian fleet moves to and arrives at Aphetæ. | Arrived early in afternoon. |
| Greek fleet moves back to Artemisium. | |||
| Greek fleet captures 15 Persian vessels. | |||
| Greek commanders consult about retirement from Artemisium. | Probably evening. | ||
| 17 | Persian army still inactive. | Greek commanders on Themistocles’ persuasion determine to remain at Artemisium. | Morning [?] |
| Persians despatch squadron to circumnavigate Eubœa. | By daylight. | ||
| 18 | Persian army makes first attack on Thermopylæ. | Persians review their fleet. | |
| Skyllias carries news of the despatch of the 200 to the Greek fleet. | During the review. Arrived at Artemisium in the afternoon. | ||
| Greek fleet engages Persian fleet at Aphetæ. | Late in afternoon. | ||
| Second storm begins. | Early in evening. | ||
| Wreck of the 200 Persian vessels in the Hollows of Eubœa. | Early in the night. | ||
| Fifty-three Attic vessels at Chalkis. | |||
| 19 | Second attack on Thermopylæ. | Both fleets inactive. | Earlier part of day. |
| The 53 Attic vessels join the Greek fleet. | Earlier than the late afternoon. | ||
| Greek fleet receives news of the wreck of the 200. | About same time as above. | ||
| United Greek fleet attacks Cilician contingent of Persian fleet. | Late afternoon. | ||
| 20 | Third and successful attack on Thermopylæ. | Persian fleet takes offensive against Greek fleet. | |
| General engagement. | |||
| Greek commanders consult as to retirement. | |||
| News of disaster at Thermopylæ reaches Greek fleet. | |||
| Greek fleet retires from Artemisium. | Night. |
CHAPTER IX.
SALAMIS.
Thermopylæ taken, and Artemisium deserted, the way southwards, both by land and sea, was now open to the invading force. No doubt the general plan of future operations was discussed in the Persian council of war. It may be that, owing to the presence of the Spartan Demaratos, some faint echo of the discussion reached Greek ears. It may be, too, that Herodotus’ story of the interview of Demaratos and Achæmenes with Xerxes after the capture of Thermopylæ contains some hint of the general lines which it followed. According to his tale, the main question was whether a part of the fleet should create a diversion against Sparta in South Peloponnese, or whether such a division of the naval forces might be undesirable. Achæmenes was strongly in favour of keeping the fleet together and crushing the Greeks by mere weight of numbers; and Xerxes decided in favour of this plan. It is needless to say that the story cannot be taken au pied de la lettre. In its main lines it may be true; in one of its details it contains what is almost certainly an anachronism. That the desperate defence of the pass may have suggested to some members of the council of war the advisability of taking measures to distract the attention of Sparta from the general defence is extremely likely. Herodotus puts the suggestion in the mouth of Demaratos, who is also represented as proposing a way in which his plan could be carried out—by the occupation of Kythera, a large island off the mouth of the Laconian gulf. ROUTE FROM THERMOPYLÆ. “Chilon,” he said, “who was the wisest man among us, asserted that it would be better for Sparta were the island not above water but below it, because he always expected that something of the kind which I am describing to you would come from it, not with special reference to your expedition, but because he dreaded all invasions alike.” Demaratos then proposed to the king that he should make this island the base of operations against the Lacedæmonian territory.
So runs the tale in Herodotus.
The mention of Kythera in this connection, taken in conjunction with the evidence which this part of the history affords of its having been composed during the early years of the Peloponnesian war, suggests that Herodotus has probably attributed to Demaratos in 480 a strategical proposal which was much discussed in Athens at the time at which he wrote, T. iv. 53, ff. and which was actually carried out a few years later when Nikias in 424 occupied this island.