[92] E.g. Delbrück attributes to Xerxes an army of from 65,000 to 75,000 combatants.
[93] Herodotus (vii. 60) reckons the land army at 1,700,000, and the total effective at 2,641,610 (vii. 185). He (vii. 186) says that this number must be doubled in order to arrive at the full total of the expedition.
[94] Herodotus probably arrived at these numbers from information picked up from various towns all round the Ægean, furnished by persons who had witnessed the passage of the army, or had heard of it from others who had been eye-witnesses. The enormous exaggerations of estimate made by eye-witnesses in estimating the numbers of a crowd of quite moderate dimensions, may easily account for the impossible numbers stated to and by Herodotus.
[95] Those who state a much smaller number than this do not take into account the Oriental reliance on numbers, an Eastern characteristic which the Persian, unless he is much traduced, fully shared.
I hesitate to express any conjecture as to the possible maximum of the land force on this occasion. No evidence on this point can be said to exist.
[96] The description of the route adopted renders it improbable that this body of troops included much more than the local levies of Western Asia. Sardes was the real place of rendezvous, though it is possible that some of the contingents did not join the main force until it arrived at Abydos.
[97] Calculations show that the only eclipses about this time visible at Sardes occurred on October 2, 480 (mentioned H. ix. 10), and February 16, 478.
[98] Herodotus says on the left. It is obvious that he has confused his point of view, and is speaking from that of a traveller voyaging in a ship up the coast.
[99] The physical difficulties of the interior of the Balkan peninsula, together with the practical question of commissariat, render it probable that Herodotus is mistaken as to the nature of this inland march, and of the troops which undertook it. The main body of the army must almost certainly have pursued the coast road, which was easy, supplied with depôts of stores, and in touch with the fleet. The divisions which went inland were probably large detachments sent to inspire awe in the breasts of the inland tribes, so as to discourage them from any attempt to cut the line of communications.
[100] Vide also p. 207.