[205] This is shown still more clearly in the account of the withdrawal from this position.
[206] The three developments of the Greek second position may be summed up as follows:—
1. The Greek right was near the spring of Gargaphia, not on the Asopos ridge, while the left was near the Heroön of Androkrates.
2. After a forward movement of the whole line, the right took up position on the Asopos ridge, while the line extended along the course of that ridge, until the left was actually on the Asopos.
3. The left, when its position on the plain became untenable, took to the higher ground of the north extension of the Asopos ridge.
[207] It would seem as if this determination were not come to at the morning council. Their idea at that time appears to have been to move during the night, in case the enemy did not renew their attack. As the attack was renewed, the movement was deferred until the following night.
[208] The members of the American school at Athens who excavated parts of the site of Platæa some years ago were inclined to believe that at the time of the battle the town stood on the higher or southern end of the bastion which is now strewn with the traces of the successive towns which have occupied the site; and that it did not extend northward to the point where the bastion sinks more or less abruptly into the plain. They also believed that they discovered the foundations of the temple of Hera on this north extension of the bastion. I am disposed to think that their conjecture as to the position of the contemporary town is correct, though the question is not of sufficient importance with respect to this particular passage in Greek history to render it desirable or necessary to quote the mass of evidence on which the opinion is founded. The position of the temple of Hera as determined by them agrees with the brief mention of it in this passage of Herodotus.
[209] Herodotus, in words already quoted, says that it was the intention of the Greeks, on moving to the “Island,” to detach a part of the army to relieve the attendants who were blocked in the pass. This is certainly the Dryoskephalæ or the Platæa-Athens pass, probably the latter, which they were attempting to use as an alternative way, after the fearful disaster which had befallen the former provision train in the exit of the Dryoskephalæ pass. Herodotus shows, too, that this relief was urgently required, since the Greek army was running short of provisions; for, although the Platæa-Megara pass must have been open, it is of such a character as to render it impossible that the commissariat for a force of 100,000 men could be adequately maintained through its channel. It is therefore in the very highest degree probable that an attempt, at any rate, was made to carry out this part of the arrangement between the generals. Now, the Spartan force on the right of the Greek line would be, in so far as position was concerned, that portion of the Greek army on which this duty would naturally devolve. The mission of this force for the relief of the pass was one of extreme danger and difficulty, and it would be natural that the service should devolve on that part of the army which enjoyed the highest military reputation. It was, I venture to think, while carrying out this movement that the Spartans became involved in that series of events which led to the last catastrophe in the great tragedy.
[210] Thucydides (i. 20) denies that such a division or regiment existed in the Spartan army.
[211] Even in the Spartan army indiscipline was apt to make its appearance without the existence of such a substantial motive as in the present instance. Cf. the insubordination of the Spartan officers at the battle of Mantinea in 418 B.C. (Thuc. v. 72).