THE “SOROS” AT MARATHON.
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| (2) | A lower road, practically coincident with the modern carriage road from Marathon to Athens. It is much easier than the upper one. The country it traverses is easy. There are no steep gradients. It passes through a long stretch of thin pine forest. It leaves the plain by the narrow passage between the little marsh and Mount Agrieliki. The important feature of this road is that it is, and must always have been, easily traversable by cavalry. I mention this, because some emphatic statements to the contrary have been made in some modern treatises on the subject of the battle. The only two landmarks on or near the field which can be said to be in any way decisive as to the history of the battle are both artificial in origin. They are— |
- A lower road, practically coincident with the modern carriage road from Marathon to Athens. It is much easier than the upper one. The country it traverses is easy. There are no steep gradients. It passes through a long stretch of thin pine forest. It leaves the plain by the narrow passage between the little marsh and Mount Agrieliki.
- The important feature of this road is that it is, and must always have been, easily traversable by cavalry. I mention this, because some emphatic statements to the contrary have been made in some modern treatises on the subject of the battle.
- The only two landmarks on or near the field which can be said to be in any way decisive as to the history of the battle are both artificial in origin.
- They are—
| (1) | The precinct of Herakles, already mentioned. The site was determined by Lolling in 1876.[66] |
- The precinct of Herakles, already mentioned. The site was determined by Lolling in 1876.[66]
| (2) | The soros, or mound, raised over the Athenian dead. The absence of any mention of this by Herodotus is of itself significant evidence that he had never visited the ground. It stands, as will be seen from the map, about half a mile from the shore, and about a mile and a quarter south of the Charadra. Pausanias (i. 32. 3–5,7) mentions it in his description of the neighbourhood. That description bears all the traces of being founded on autopsy. Of the grave of the Athenians he says, “There is a grave of the Athenians in the plain, and on it are columns with the names of the dead upon them, according to their tribes.” He also mentions the important negative fact that he could not find any tomb or mound marking the burial-place of the Medes. The soros, in its present state, is an earthen mound with rather steep sides, between twenty and thirty feet high. The fact of its being a tomb has been proved by recent excavation. |
- The soros, or mound, raised over the Athenian dead.
- The absence of any mention of this by Herodotus is of itself significant evidence that he had never visited the ground.
- It stands, as will be seen from the map, about half a mile from the shore, and about a mile and a quarter south of the Charadra.
- Pausanias (i. 32. 3–5,7) mentions it in his description of the neighbourhood. That description bears all the traces of being founded on autopsy.
- Of the grave of the Athenians he says, “There is a grave of the Athenians in the plain, and on it are columns with the names of the dead upon them, according to their tribes.”
- He also mentions the important negative fact that he could not find any tomb or mound marking the burial-place of the Medes.
- The soros, in its present state, is an earthen mound with rather steep sides, between twenty and thirty feet high. The fact of its being a tomb has been proved by recent excavation.
Why the Persians landed at Marathon has always been a matter of dispute. The reason given by Herodotus, namely its suitability for cavalry, is not convincing, because the plain of Athens itself, not to speak of the Thriasian plain, is more suitable for cavalry operations. Moreover, the Persians made no use of this arm during the battle.
The plan of the Persian campaign, as far as Athens was concerned, was based on calculations dependent on circumstances other than purely military, to which it is necessary to turn, in order to account for the adoption of a design for which no adequate reason of a purely strategic nature can be suggested.