Is it, then, to be assumed that the Athenian democrat had no honest claim to a share in the victory? This is a question which, on the extant evidence, is very difficult to answer.
One negative fact is quite certain. Marathon was not[69] a crowning victory for the new democracy. The opposite was rather the case.
MEDIZING TENDENCIES OF THE DEMOCRATS.
At the same time it is quite conceivable that, at the last moment, certain circumstances saved a large number of those in the plot from themselves, and so brought about its failure.
The Persians made a gross blunder in treating Eretria as they did, above all at that particular time. The news of what had happened there reached Athens before even the Persians landed at Marathon. The effect of the news would necessarily be to show the party supporting Hippias their error in supposing that the Persians intended, in case of success, to allow anything but their own feelings and their own interests to dictate their policy towards the conquered states. Such a disclosure must have given the resistance a solidarity which it would otherwise have lacked. Many of those originally in the plot must have been present in the army at Marathon. It is quite certain, apart from the necessities of the military levy, that Miltiades would not have left any considerable body of the malcontents in Athens. Yet there is no mention of any difficulties in the army itself when at Marathon; nor is there any “voluntary cowardice” in the battle. There the democrat seems to have fought just as well as his political opponent.
The fate of Eretria was a lesson which the Athenian democrat never forgot. Persia had undeceived him once and for all. The shock of awaking to the terrible nature of the danger in which he had involved his country by supposing his own interests to be identical with those of Persia was so rude that its effects were permanent.
But the Persians went to Marathon in the expectation that disaffection in Athens would do its work.
The position at Marathon offered several advantages.
(1) They could afford to bide their time there until they received word that the conspiracy in Athens was ripe for fulfilment, because the fact of the ground being suitable for cavalry would either deter the Greeks from attacking them, or would give them a great advantage in case they did so.
(2) If, as they no doubt hoped, and might well expect, the Greek army marched thither to meet them, the conspiracy in Athens might proceed unimpeded; and, when it was ripe, they might leave part of their army at Marathon, a long day’s march from Athens, to occupy the attention of the Athenians, while with the remainder they sailed round to occupy the capital.