(1) That the news of the fall of Eretria reached the Athenians before they started for Marathon.
(2) That Philippides was despatched after this news arrived, but (inasmuch as there is no mention of the landing of the Persians in Attica) before the news of their landing had reached Athens.
The appeal to Sparta, and the Spartan answer, show that there must have existed some agreement between the two states, to the effect that Sparta would come to the aid of Athens in case of invasion. If, then, the Persians had reckoned that the presence of Hippias with their army would be sufficient to ward off Spartan interference, they had reckoned on the stable policy of a government whose policy was in those years most markedly unstable and uncertain.
But, though expressing themselves willing to come to the aid of Athens, the Spartans alleged that they could not, without breaking the law, start before the full moon; in other words, that their coming would be delayed at least a week.[73]
On what day of the month the Athenians received the news of the landing at Marathon, Herodotus does not say; but, inasmuch as the battle must have taken place about the 16th,[74] and the armies were face to face with one another for several days before the engagement took place, the news can hardly have arrived later than the 10th day of the month.
On receipt of it, the Athenians started for Marathon. It would be a long day’s march, and a hard journey over the rugged upper road. On arriving there they encamped in the sacred precinct of Herakles.
H. vi 108.
An examination of the map will show how well the position was chosen. It lay high up the rocky valley of Avlona, so near the point where the two forks of the upper road to Athens from the Marathonian plain join one another, that it commanded them both. Moreover, the army in this position would threaten the flank of any body of troops who tried to march on Athens by the lower road, which left the plain between the foot of Mount Agrieliki, (to use its modern name), and the little marsh.
Herodotus’ account of the system of command existent at this time in the Athenian army service is confused, and contains at least one serious anachronism. It leaves the reader in a state of uncertainty as to whether the polemarch Kallimachos or the “general” Miltiades was the actual commander-in-chief.*