Philosophical Studies

by G. E. Moore

What, in view of these two principles, can be the sense in which my five propositions are true?

(1) It seems to me possible that the only true interpretation which can be given to any of them is an interpretation of a kind which I can only indicate rather vaguely as follows: Namely, that all of them express only a kind of fact which we should naturally express by saying that, if certain conditions were fulfilled, I or some other person, should directly apprehend certain other sensibles. For instance the only true thing that can be meant by saying that I really see coins may be some such thing as that, if I were to move my body in certain ways, I should directly apprehend other sensibles, e.g. tactual ones, which I should not directly apprehend as a consequence of these movements, if these present visual experiences of mine were mere hallucinations or experiences of "images." Again, the only true thing that can be meant by saying that the upper sides of the coins are really approximately circular may be some such thing as that, if I were looking straight at them, I should directly apprehend circular sensibles. And similarly, the only true interpretation of (c) may be some such fact as that, if I were to turn the coins over, or break them up, I should have certain sensations, of a sort I can imagine very well; of (d) that if I were at an equal distance from the half-crown and the florin, the sensible, I should then see corresponding to the half-crown would be bigger than that corresponding to the florin, whereas it is now smaller; of (e) that, if, when my eyes were closed, they had been open instead, I should have seen certain sensibles.

It is obvious, indeed, that if any interpretation on these lines is the only true interpretation of our five propositions, none of those which I have vaguely suggested comes anywhere near to expressing it in its ultimate form. They cannot do so for the simple reason that, in them, the conditions under which I should experience certain other sensibles are themselves expressed in terms of physical objects, and not in terms of sensibles and our experience of them. The conditions are expressed in such terms as "if I were to move my body," "if I were to look straight at the coins," "if I were to turn the coins over," etc.; and all these are obviously propositions, which must themselves again be interpreted in terms of sensibles, if our original five propositions need to be so. It is obvious, therefore, that any ultimate interpretation of our five propositions, on these lines, would be immensely complicated; and I cannot come anywhere near to stating exactly what it would be. But it seems to me possible that some such interpretation could be found, and that it is the only true one.

The great recommendation of this view seems to me to be that it enables us to see, more clearly than any other view can, how our knowledge of physical propositions can be based on our experience of sensibles, in the way in which principle (β) asserts it to be. If, when I know that the coins are round, all that I know is some such thing as that if, after experiencing the sensibles I do now experience, I were to experience still others, I should finally experience a third set, we can understand, as clearly as we can understand how any knowledge can be obtained by induction at all, how such a knowledge could be based on our previous experience of sensibles, and how it could be verified by our subsequent experience.

On the other hand, apart from the difficulty of actually giving any interpretation on these lines, which will meet the requirements, the great objection to it seems to me to be this. It is obvious that, on this view, though we shall still be allowed to say that the coins existed before I saw them, are circular etc., all these expressions, if they are to be true, will have to be understood in a Pickwickian sense. When I know that the coins existed before I saw them, what I know will not be that anything whatever existed at that time, in the sense in which those elliptical patches of colour exist now. All that I know will be simply that, since the elliptical patches exist now, it is true, that, if certain unrealised conditions had been realised, I should have had certain sensations that I have not had; or, if certain conditions, which may or may not be realised in the future, were to be so, I should have certain experiences. Something like this will actually be the only true thing that can be meant by saying that the coins existed before I saw them. In other words, to say of a physical object that it existed at a given time will always consist merely in saying of some sensible, not that it existed at the time in question, but something quite different and immensely complicated. And thus, though, when I know that the coins exist, what I know will be merely some proposition about these sensibles which I am directly apprehending, yet this view will not contradict principle (a) by identifying the coins with the sensibles. For it will say that to assert a given thing of the coins is not equivalent to asserting the same thing of the sensibles, but only to asserting of them something quite different.

The fact that these assertions that the coins exist, are round, etc., will, on this view, only be true in this outrageously Pickwickian sense, seems to me to constitute the great objection to it. But it seems to me to be an objection only, so far as I can see, because I have a "strong propensity to believe" that, when I know that the coins existed before I saw them, what I know is that something existed at that time, in the very same sense in which those elliptical patches now exist. And, of course, this belief may be a mere prejudice. It may be that when I believe that I now have, in my body, blood and nerves and brain, what I believe is only true, if it does not assert, in the proper sense of the word "existence," the present existence of anything whatever, other than sensibles which I directly apprehend, but only makes assertions as to the kind of experiences a doctor would have, if he dissected me. But I cannot feel at all sure that my belief, that, when I know of the present Existence of these things (as I think I do), I am knowing of the present existence (in the proper sense) of things other than any sensibles which I or any one else am now directly apprehending, is a mere prejudice. And therefore I think it is worth while to consider what, if it is not, these things, of whose existence I know, can be.

(2) It is certain that if, when I know that that half-crown existed before I saw it, I am knowing that something existed at that time in other than a Pickwickian sense, I only know this something by description; and it seems pretty clear that the description by which I know it is as the thing which has a certain connection with this sensible which I am now directly apprehending. But what connection? We cannot simply say, as many people have said, that by "that half-crown" I mean the thing which caused my experience of this sensible; because events which happen between the half-crown and my eyes, and events in my eyes, and optic nerves, and brains are just as much causes of my experiences as the half-crown itself. But it may perhaps be the case that the half-crown has some particular kind of causal relation to my experience, which these other events have not got—a kind which may be expressed, perhaps, by saying that it is its "source." And hence, when I know that that half-crown is circular, I may perhaps be knowing that the source of this experience is circular.

But what sort of a thing can this "source" be?

One kind of view, which I think is very commonly held, is that it is something "spiritual" in its nature, or something whose nature is utterly unknown to us. And those who hold this view are apt to add, that it is not really "circular," in any sense at all; nor is the "source" of my half-crown experience, in any sense at all, "bigger" than that of my florin experience. But if this addition were seriously meant, it would, of course, amount to saying that propositions (b) and (d) are not true, in any sense at all; and I do not think that those who make it, really mean to say this. I think that what they mean is only that the only sense in which those "sources" are circular, and one bigger than the other, is one in which to say this merely amounts to saying that the sensibles, which they would cause us to experience, under certain conditions, would be circular, and one bigger than the other. In other words, in order to give a true interpretation to the propositions that the coins are circular and one bigger than the other, they say that we must interpret them in the same kind of way in which view (1) interpreted them; and the only difference between their view and view (1), is that, whereas that said that you must give a Pickwickian interpretation both to the assertion that the coins exist, and to the assertion that they are circular, they say that you must not give it to the former assertion, and must to the latter.