These prefatory amenities led on 10 December to a detailed Agreement, the Greek Government promising to move its troops out of the way and "not to oppose by force the construction of defensive works or the occupation of fortified points," but reserving to itself the right to protest {84} against such operations "energetically and seriously, not as a mere form"—a right which the Allies easily conceded[16]—and emphatically declaring that "should the Allied troops by their movements bring the war into Greek territory, the Greek troops would withdraw so as to leave the field free to the two parties to settle their differences."
The Entente Ministers expressed their satisfaction, and M. Skouloudis expressed the hope that their Governments, convinced at last of the Greek Government's sincerity, would not only drop coercion, but comply with its request for financial and commercial facilities. They promised that all difficulties would disappear as soon as the military authorities on the spot had given effect to the agreement; and the French Minister repeated his Government's declaration that it would be happy to accord Greece all financial and commercial facilities as soon as the situation cleared.[17]
[1] Journal Officiel, pp. 61, 70, 75-8.
[2] Sir George Arthur's Life of Lord Kitchener. Vol. III. p. 261.
[3] White Book, Nos. 47, 48, 49.
[4] Skouloudis's Apantesis, pp. 43-5.
[5] White Book, No. 52.
[6] White Book, No. 51.
[7] Sarrail, pp. 311-12; Life of Kitchener, Vol. III, p. 198.
[8] Those were the figures on 17 Nov.—Life of Kitchener, Vol. III, p. 199. I have only seen an answer to the second of the above questions: it is from M. Venizelos, and it is: "absent-mindedness": "Why did not the General Staff do this, since it was to Germany's interest that the Anglo-French should not land? Because, immersed in politics, it no longer took account of military matters!"—Orations, p. 140.