Jackson, it was at first reported, had been reinforced to the number of 35,000 men.[[23]] A few days later his army had swelled to 60,000 with 70 guns, and he was rebuilding the bridge at Port Republic in order to follow Frémont. On June 13 he was believed to be moving through Charlottesville against one or other of McDowell’s divisions. “He was either going against Shields at Luray, or King at Catlett’s, or Doubleday at Fredericksburg, or going to Richmond.” On the 16th it was absolutely certain that he was within striking distance of Front Royal. On the 18th he had gone to Richmond, but Ewell was still in the Valley with 40,000 men. On the 19th Banks had no doubt but that another immediate movement down the Valley was intended “with 80,000 or more.” On the 20th Jackson was said to be moving on Warrenton, east of the Blue Ridge. On the 22nd “reliable persons” at Harper’s Ferry had learned that he was about to attack Banks at Middletown; and on the same day Ewell, who was actually near Frederickshall, was discovered to be moving on Moorefield! On the 25th Frémont had been informed that large reinforcements had reached Jackson from Tennessee; and Banks was on the watch for a movement from the west. Frémont heard that Ewell designed to attack Winchester in rear, and the threat from so dangerous a quarter made Lincoln anxious.

“We have no definite information,” wrote Stanton to McClellan, “as to the numbers or position of Jackson’s force. Within the last two days the evidence is strong that for some purpose the enemy is circulating rumours of Jackson’s advance in various directions, with a view to conceal the real point of attack. Neither McDowell nor Banks nor Frémont appear to have any accurate knowledge of the subject.”

This was on June 25, the day the Valley army halted at Ashland; but the climax was reached on the 28th. For forty-eight hours Jackson had been fighting McClellan, yet Banks, although “quite confident that he was not within thirty miles, believed that he was preparing for an attack on Middletown.” To reach Middletown Jackson would have had to march one hundred and fifty miles!

Under the influence of these rumours the movements of the Federal troops were erratic in the extreme.

Frémont, who had originally been ordered to remain at Harrisonburg, had fallen back on Banks at Middletown, although ordered to Front Royal, was most reluctant to move so far south. Shields was first ordered to stand fast at Luray, where he would be reinforced by Ricketts, and was then ordered to fall back on Front Royal. Reinforcements were ordered to Romney, to Harper’s Ferry, and to Winchester; and McDowell, who kept his head throughout, struggled in vain to reunite his scattered divisions. Divining the true drift of the Confederate strategy, he realised that to protect Washington, and to rescue McClellan, the surest method was for his own army corps to march as rapidly as possible to the Chickahominy. But his pleadings were disregarded. Lincoln and Stanton had not yet discovered that the best defence is generally a vigorous attack. They had learned nothing from the Valley campaign, and they were infected with the fears of Banks and Frémont. Jackson was well on his way to Richmond before Shields and Ricketts were permitted to cross the Blue Ridge; and it was not till the 25th that McDowell’s corps was once more concentrated at Fredericksburg. The Confederates had gained a start of five marches, and the Northern Government was still ignorant that they had left the Valley.

McClellan was equally in the dark. Faint rumours had preceded the march of Jackson’s army, but he had given them scant credit. On the morning of the 26th, however, he was rudely enlightened. It was but too clear that Jackson, strongly reinforced from Richmond, was bearing down upon his most vulnerable point—his right wing, which, in anticipation of McDowell’s advance, remained exposed on the north bank of the Chickahominy.

Nor was this the sum of his troubles. On this same day, when his outposts were falling back before superior numbers, and the Valley regiments were closing round their flank, he received a telegram from Stanton, informing him that the forces commanded by McDowell, Banks, and Frémont were to form one army under Major-General Pope; and that this army was “to attack and overcome the rebel forces under Jackson and Ewell, and threaten the enemy in the direction of Charlottesville!” All hope of succour passed away, and the “Young Napoleon” was left to extricate himself as best he could, from his many difficulties; difficulties which were due in part to his own political blindness, in part to the ignorance of Lincoln, but, in a far larger degree, to the consummate strategy of Lee and Jackson.

NOTE
The Marches in the Valley Campaign, March 22 to June 25, 1862

Miles
March 22Mount Jackson–Strasburg28
March 23Strasburg–Kernstown–Newtown18Battle of Kernstown
March 24–26Newtown–Mt. Jackson35
April 17–19Mt. Jackson–Elk Run Valley50
April 30–
May 8		Elk Run Valley–Mechum’s River Station60
May 7–8Staunton–Shenandoah Mt.32Battle of M’Dowell
May 9–11Bull Pasture Mount–Franklin30Skirmishes
May 12–15Franklin–Lebanon Springs40
May 17Lebanon Springs–Bridgewater18
May 19–20Bridgewater–New Market24
May 1New Market–Luray12
May 22Luray–Milford12
May 23Milford–Front Royal–Cedarville22Action at Front Royal
May 24Cedarville–Abraham’s Creek22Action at Middletown and Newtown
May 25Abraham’s Creek–Stevenson’s 7Battle of Winchester
May 28Stevenson’s–Charlestown15Skirmish
May 29Charlestown–Halltown 5Skirmish
May 30Halltown–Winchester25
May 31Winchester–Strasburg18
June 1Strasburg–Woodstock12Skirmish
June 2Woodstock–Mount Jackson12
June 3Mount Jackson–New Market 7
June 4–5New Market–Port Republic30
June 8 Battle of Cross Keys
June 9Cross Keys–Brown’s Gap16Battle of Port Republic
June 12Brown’s Gap–Mount Meridian10
June 17–25Mount Meridian–Ashland Station
(one rest day)		120
——
676 miles in 48 marching days
Average 14 miles per diem

[1] O.R., vol. xii, part iii, pp. 220, 229 (letter of S. P. Chase).