[3] The blacks, however, appear to have been as unreliable as regards numbers as McClellan’s detectives. “If a negro were asked how many Confederates he had seen at a certain point, his answer was very likely to be: ‘I dunno, Massa, but I guess about a million.’”—McClellan’s Own Story, p. 254.
[4] “In consequence of the excessive growth of armies tactics have lost in weight, and the strategical design, rather than the detail of the movements, has become the decisive factor in the issue at a campaign. The strategical design depends, as a rule, upon the decision of cabinets, and upon the resources placed at the disposal of the commander. Consequently, either the leading statesmen should have correct views of the science of war, or should make up for their ignorance by giving their entire confidence to the man to whom the supreme command of the army is entrusted. Otherwise, the germs of defeat and national ruin may be contained in the first preparations for war.”—The Archduke Charles of Austria.
[5] “An operation which stamps him as a military genius of the highest order.”—Lord Wolseley, North American Review, vol. 149, No. 2, p. 166.
[6] “These brilliant successes appear to me models of their kind, both in conception and execution. They should be closely studied by all officers who wish to learn the art and science of war.”—Ibid.
[7] Dabney, vol. i, p. 76.
[8] Letter to the author.
[9] “In six weeks, Wellington marched with 100,000 men six hundred miles, passed six great rivers, gained one decisive battle, invested two fortresses, and drove 120,000 veteran troops from Spain.”—The War in the Peninsula, Napier, vol. v, p. 132.
[10] Battles and Leaders, vol. ii, p. 297.
[11] North American Review, vol. 149, p. 168.
[12] O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 914.