[27] Longstreet, on page 124 of his From Manassas to Appomattox, declares that “Jackson marched by the fight without giving attention, and went into camp at Hundley’s Corner, half a mile in rear of the enemy’s position. A reference to the map is sufficient to expose the inaccuracy of this statement.
[28] Jackson’s division—so-called in Lee’s order—really consisted of three divisions:—
| Whiting’s Division | Hood’s Brigade Law’s Brigade |
| Jackson’s [Winder] Division | Stonewall Brigade Cunningham’s Brigade Fulkerson’s Brigade Lawton’s Brigade |
| Ewell’s Division | B. T. Johnson’s Elzey’s Brigade Trimble’s Brigade Taylor’s Brigade |
[29] The remainder of the guns were in reserve.
[30] Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. ii, p. 337.
[31] This order was verbal; no record of it is to be found, and Jackson never mentioned, either at the time or afterwards, what its purport was. His surviving staff officers, however, are unanimous in declaring that he must have received direct instructions from General Lee. “Is it possible,” writes Dr. McGuire, “that Jackson, who knew nothing of the country, and little of the exact situation of affairs, would have taken the responsibility of stopping at Old Cold Harbour for an hour or more, unless he had had the authority of General Lee to do so? I saw him that morning talking to General Lee. General Lee was sitting on a log, and Jackson standing up. General Lee was evidently giving him instructions for the day.” In his report (O.R., vol. ii, part i, p. 492) Lee says: “The arrival of Jackson on our left was momentarily expected; it was supposed that his approach would cause the enemy’s extension in that direction.”
[32] The Army of the Potomac numbered 105,000 men, and 25,000 animals. 600 tons of ammunition, food, forage, medical and other supplies had to be forwarded each day from White House to the front; and at one time during the operations from fifty to sixty days’ rations for the entire army, amounting probably to 25,000 tons, were accumulated at the depot. 5 tons daily per 1,000 men is a fair estimate for an army operating in a barren country.
[33] The instructions, according to Dr. Dabney, ran as follows:—
“The troops are standing at ease along our line of march. Ride back rapidly along the line and tell the commanders to advance instantly en échelon from the left. Each brigade is to follow as a guide the right regiment of the brigade on the left, and to keep within supporting distance. Tell the commanders that if this formation fails at any point, to form line of battle and move to the front, pressing to the sound of the heaviest firing and attack the enemy vigorously wherever found. As to artillery, each commander must use his discretion. If the ground will at all permit tell them to take in their field batteries and use them. If not, post them in the rear.” Letter to the author.
[34] It may be noted that Jackson’s command had now been increased by two divisions, Whiting’s and D. H. Hill’s, but there had been no increase in the very small staff which had sufficed for the Valley army. The mistakes which occurred at Gaines’ Mill, and Jackson’s ignorance of the movements and progress of his troops, were in great part due to his lack of staff officers. A most important message, writes Dr. Dabney, involving tactical knowledge, was carried by a non-combatant.
[35] Dabney, vol. ii, p. 194.