The losses at Sharpsburg may be here recorded.
| JONES’ DIVISION—1,800 | ||
| The Stonewall Brigade, 250 strong Taliaferro’s Brigade Starke’s Brigade Jones’ Brigade | 88 173 287 152 —— 700 | (38 p.c.) |
| EWELL’S (LAWTON) DIVISION—8,600 | ||
| Lawton’s Brigade, 1,150 strong Early’s Brigade, 1,200 strong Trimble’s Brigade, 700 strong Hays’ Brigade, 650 strong | 567 194 237 336 ——— 1,334 | (47 p.c.) |
| THE LIGHT DIVISION—3,000 | ||
| Branch’s Brigade Gregg’s Brigade Archer’s Brigade Pender’s Brigade Field’s Brigade (not engaged) Thomas’ Brigade (at Harper’s Ferry) Artillery (estimated) Total (209 officers) | 104 165 105 30 — — —— 404 50 2,488 | |
| D. H. HILL’S DIVISION—3,500 | ||
| Rodes’ Brigade Garland’s Brigade (estimated) Anderson’s Brigade Ripley’s Brigade (estimated) Colquitt’s Brigade (estimated) | 203 300 302 300 300 ——— 1,405 | |
| MCLAWS’ DIVISION—4,500 | ||
| Kershaw’s Brigade Cobb’s Brigade Semmes’ Brigade Barksdale’s Brigade | 355 156 314 294 ——— 1,119 | [[27]] |
| D. R. JONES’ DIVISION—3,500 | ||
| Toombs’ Brigade (estimated) Drayton’s Brigade (estimated) Anderson’s Brigade Garnett’s Brigade Jenkins’ Brigade Kemper’s Brigade (estimated) | 125 400 87 99 210 120 ——— 1,041 | |
| WALKER’S DIVISION—3,500 | ||
| Walker’s Brigade Ransom’s Brigade | 825 187 ——— 1,012 | |
| HOOD’S DIVISION—2,000 | ||
| Laws’ Brigade Hood’s Brigade | 454 548 ——— 1,022 | |
| Evans’ Brigade, 260 strong | 200 | |
| R. H. ANDERSON’S DIVISION—3,500 | ||
| Featherston’s Brigade Mahone’s Brigade Pryor’s Brigade Armistead’s Brigade Wright’s Brigade Wilcox’ Brigade | 304 76 182 35 203 221 ——— 1,021 | |
| ARTILLERY | ||
| Colonel S. D. Lee’s Battalion Washington Artillery Cavalry, etc. etc. (estimated) | 85 34 143 —— 262 | |
| Grand total | 9,550 | |
| ARMY OF THE POTOMAC | ||
| First Corps—Hooker Second Corps—Sumner Fifth Corps—Porter Sixth Corps—Franklin Ninth Corps—Burnside Twelfth Corps—Mansfield Cavalry Division, etc. (2,108 killed) | 2,590 5,188 109 439 2,349 1,746 39 ——— 12,410 | [[28]] |
With Porter’s repulse the summer campaign of 1862 was closed. Begun on the Chickahominy, within thirty miles of Richmond, it ended on the Potomac, within seventy miles of Washington; and six months of continuous fighting had brought both belligerents to the last stage of exhaustion. Falling apart like two great battleships of the older wars,
The smoke of battle drifting slow a-lee.
hulls rent by roundshot, and scuppers awash with blood, but with the colours still flying over shattered spars and tangled shrouds, the armies drew off from the tremendous struggle. Neither Confederates nor Federals were capable of further effort. Lee, gathering in his stragglers, left Stuart to cover his front, and fell back towards Winchester. McClellan was content with seizing the Maryland Heights at Harper’s Ferry, and except the cavalry patrols, not a single Federal soldier was sent across the river.
The organisation was absolutely imperative. The Army of the Potomac was in no condition to undertake the invasion of Virginia. Not only had the losses in battle been very large, but the supply train, hurriedly got together after Pope’s defeat, had broken down; in every arm there was great deficiency of horses; the troops, especially those who had been engaged in the Peninsula, were half-clad and badly shod; and, above all, the army was very far from sharing McClellan’s conviction that Sharpsburg was a brilliant victory. The men in the ranks were not so easily deceived as their commander. McClellan, relying on a return drawn up by General Banks, now in command at Washington, estimated the Confederate army at 97,000 men, and his official reports made frequent mention of Lee’s overwhelming strength.[[29]] The soldiers knew better. They had been close enough to the enemy’s lines to learn for themselves how thin was the force which manned them. They were perfectly well aware that they had been held in check by inferior numbers, and that the battle on the Antietam, tactically speaking, was no more of a victory for the North than Malvern Hill had been for the South. From dawn to dark on September 18 they had seen the tattered colours and bright bayonets of the Confederates still covering the Sharpsburg ridge; they had seen the grey line, immovable and defiant, in undisputed possession of the battle-ground, while their own guns were silent and their own generals reluctant to renew the fight. Both the Government and the people expected McClellan to complete his success by attacking Lee in Virginia. The Confederates, it was said—and men based their opinions on McClellan’s reports—had been heavily defeated, not only at Antietam, but also at South Mountain; and although the Army of the Potomac might be unfit for protracted operations, the condition of the enemy must necessarily be far worse.
Such arguments, however, were entirely inapplicable to the situation. The Confederates had not been defeated at all, either at South Mountain or Sharpsburg; and although they had eventually abandoned their positions they had suffered less than their opponents. The retreat, however, across the Potomac had undoubtedly shaken their moral. “In a military point of view,” wrote Lee to Davis on September 25, “the best move, in my opinion, the army could make would be to advance upon Hagerstown and endeavour to defeat the enemy at that point. I would not hesitate to make it even with our diminished numbers did the army exhibit its former temper and condition, but, as far as I am able to judge, the hazard would be great and reverse disastrous.”[[30]] But McClellan was not more cheerful. “The army,” he said on the 27th, “is not now in a condition to undertake another campaign nor to bring on another battle, unless great advantages are offered by some mistake of the enemy, or pressing military exigencies render it necessary.” So far from thinking of pursuit, he thought only of the defence of the Potomac, apprehending a renewed attempt to enter Maryland, and by no means over-confident that the two army corps which he had at last sent to Harper’s Ferry would be able to maintain their position if attacked.[[31]] Nor were the soldiers more eager than their commander to cross swords with their formidable enemy. “It would be useless,” says General G. H. Gordon, who now commanded a Federal division, “to deny that at this period there was a despondent feeling in the army,” and the Special Correspondents of the New York newspapers, the “World” and “Tribune,” confirm the truth of this statement. But the clearest evidence as to the condition of the troops is furnished in the numerous reports which deal with straggling. The vice had reached a pitch which is almost inconceivable. Thousands and tens of thousands, Federals as well as Confederates, were absent from their commands.
“The States of the North,” wrote McClellan, “are flooded with deserters and absentees. One corps of this army has 13,000 men present and 15,000 absent; of this 15,000, 8,000 probably are at work at home.”[[32]] On September 28, General Meade, who had succeeded to the command of Hooker’s corps, reported that over 8,000 men, including 250 officers, had quitted the ranks either before or during the battle of Antietam; adding that “this terrible and serious evil seems to pervade the whole body.”[[33]] The Confederates, although the privations of the troops during the forced marches, their indifferent equipment, and the deficiencies of the commissariat were contributory causes, had almost as much reason to complain. It is said that in the vicinity of Leesburg alone over 10,000 men were living on the citizens. Jackson’s own division, which took into action 1,600 effectives on September 17 and lost 700, had 3,900 present for duty on September 30; Lawton’s division rose from 2,500 to 4,450 during the same period; and the returns show that the strength of Longstreet’s and Jackson’s corps was only 37,992 on September 22, but 52,019 on October 1.[[34]] It is thus evident that in eight days the army was increased by more than 14,000 men, yet only a few conscripts had been enrolled. Lee’s official reports and correspondence allude in the strongest terms to the indiscipline of his army. “The absent,” he wrote on September 23, “are scattered broadcast over the land;” and in the dispatches of his subordinates are to be found many references to the vagrant tendencies of their commands.[[35]] A strong provost guard was established at Winchester for the purpose of collecting stragglers. Parties of cavalry were sent out to protect the farms from pillage, and to bring in the marauders as prisoners. The most stringent regulations were issued as to the preservation of order on the march, the security of private property, and the proper performance of their duties by regimental and commissariat officers. On September 23, General Jones reported from Winchester that the country was full of stragglers, that be had already sent back 5,000 or 6,000, and that the numbers of officers amongst them was astonishing.[[36]] The most earnest representations were made to the President, suggesting trial of the offenders by drumhead court-martial, and ordinary police duties became the engrossing occupation of every general officer.