On November 7 the situation was as follows:—
ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
| First Corps Second Corps Third Corps Fifth Corps Ninth Corps Eleventh Corps Cavalry Division Line of Supply Twelfth Corps | Warrenton. Rectortown. Between Manassas Junction and Warrenton. White Plains. Waterloo. New Baltimore. Rappahannock Station and Sperryville. Orange and Alexandria and Manassas Railways. Harper’s Ferry and Sharpsburg. |
ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA.
| First Corps Second Corps Cavalry Division Lines of Supply | Culpeper Court House. Headquarters, Millwood. Hampton’s and Fitzhugh Lee’s Brigades on the Rappahannock. Munford’s Brigade with Jackson. Staunton—Strasburg. Staunton—Culpeper Court House. Richmond—Gordonsville. |
Nov. 7 On this date the six corps of the Army of the Potomac which were assembled between the Bull Run Mountains and the Blue Ridge numbered 125,000 officers and men present for duty, together with 320 guns.
The returns of the Army of Northern Virginia give the following strength:—
| Guns | |||
| First Army Corps Second Army Corps Cavalry Division Reserve Artillery | 31,939 31,794 7,176 900 ——— 71,809 | 112 123 4 36 —— 275 | (54 short-range smooth-bores) (53 short-range smooth-bores) (20 short-range smooth-bores) |
The Confederates were not only heavily outnumbered by the force immediately before them, but along the Potomac, from Washington westward, was a second hostile army, not indeed so large as that commanded by McClellan, but larger by several thousands than that commanded by Lee. The Northern capital held a garrison of 80,000; at Harper’s Ferry were 10,000; in the neighbourhood of Sharpsburg over 4,000; along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad 8,000. Thus the total strength of the Federals exceeded 225,000 men. Yet in face of this enormous host, and with Richmond only weakly garrisoned behind him, Lee had actually separated his two wings by an interval of sixty miles. He was evidently playing his old game, dividing his army with a view to a junction on the field of battle.
Lincoln, in a letter of advice with which he had favoured McClellan a few days previously, had urged the importance of making Lee’s line of supply the first objective of the invading army. “An advance east of the Blue Ridge,” he said, “would at once menace the enemy’s line of communications, and compel him to keep his forces together; and if Lee, disregarding this menace, were to cut in between the Army of the Potomac and Washington, McClellan would have nothing to do but to attack him in rear.” He suggested, moreover, that by hard marching it might be possible for McClellan to reach Richmond first.