“T.J.J.

“General B. E. Lee.”

25,000 men were now deploying in the forest within a mile of the Federal works, overlapping them both to north and south, and not a single general in the Northern army appears to have suspected their presence. The day had passed quietly at Chancellorsville. At a very early hour in the morning Hooker, anticipating a vigorous attack, had ordered the First Army Corps, which had hitherto been acting with Sedgwick below Fredericksburg, to recross the Rappahannock and march to Chancellorsville. Averell’s division of cavalry, also, which had been engaged near Orange Court House with W. H. F. Lee’s two regiments, was instructed about the same time to rejoin the army as soon as possible, and was now marching by the left bank of the Rapidan to Ely’s Ford. Anticipating, therefore, that he would soon be strongly reinforced, Hooker betrayed no uneasiness. Shortly after dawn he had ridden round his lines. Expecting at that time to be attacked in front only, he had no fault to find with their location or construction. “As he looked over the barricades,” says General Howard, “while receiving the cheers and salutes of the men, he said to me, ‘How strong! how strong!’ When the news came that a Confederate column was marching westward past Catherine Furnace, his attention, for the moment, was attracted to his right. At 10 a.m. he was still uncertain as to the meaning of Jackson’s movement. As the hours went by, however, and Jackson’s column disappeared in the forest, he again grew confident; the generals were informed that Lee was in full retreat towards Gordonsville, and a little later Sedgwick received the following:

“Chancellorsville, May 2, 1863, 4.10 p.m.

“General Butterfield,—The Major-General Commanding directs that General Sedgwick cross the river (sic) as soon as indications will permit,[[4]] capture Fredericksburg with everything in it, and vigorously pursue the enemy. We know that the enemy is fleeing, trying to save his trains. Two of Sickles’ divisions are among them.

“J. H. VAN ALEN,

“Brigadier-General and Aide-de-Camp.”

“(Copy from Butterfield, at Falmouth, to Sedgwick, 5.50 p.m.).”

At 4 o’clock, therefore, the moment Jackson’s vanguard reached the old turnpike near Luckett’s Farm, Hooker believed that all danger of a flank attack had passed away. His left wing was under orders to advance, as soon as a swamp to the front could be “corduroyed,” and strike Lee in flank; while to reinforce Sickles, “among the enemy’s trains,” Williams’ division of the Twelfth Corps was sent forward from the centre, Howard’s reserve brigade (Barlow’s) from the right, and Pleasonton’s cavalry brigade from Hazel Grove.

The officers in charge of the Federal right appear to have been as unsuspicious as their commander. During the morning some slight preparations were made to defend the turnpike from the westward; a shallow line of rifle-pits, with a few epaulements for artillery, had been constructed on a low ridge, commanding open fields, which runs north from Dowdall’s Tavern, and the wood beyond had been partially entangled. But this was all, and even when the only reserve of the Eleventh Army Corps, Barlow’s brigade, was sent to Sickles, it was not considered necessary to make any change in the disposition of the troops. The belief that Lee and Jackson were retreating had taken firm hold of every mind. The pickets on the flank had indeed reported, from time to time, that infantry was massing in the thickets; and the Confederate cavalry, keeping just outside effective range, occupied every road and every clearing. Yet no attempt was made, by a strong reconnaissance in force, to ascertain what was actually going on within the forest; and the reports of the scouts were held to be exaggerated.