[16] O.R., vol. xii, part i, p. 381. The staff appears to have been at fault. It was certainly of the first importance, whether battle was intended or not, to select a halting-place concealed from the enemy’s observation.
[17] 140 sabres.
[18] No hidden line of approach was available. Movement to the south was limited by the course of the Opequon. Fulkerson’s brigade, with Carpenter’s two guns, marched nearest to the enemy; the Stonewall Brigade was on Fulkerson’s left.
[19] The Confederate advance was made in the following order:—
| __________ 23rd Va. | __________ 37th Va. __________ 4th Va. | __________ 33rd Va. | __________ 27th Va. __________ 2nd Va. | __________ 21st Va. __________ Irish Battn. |
[20] O.R., vol. xii, part i, p. 341.
[21] Colonel E. H. C. Cavins, 14th Indiana. Battles and Leaders, vol. ii, p. 307.
[22] Jackson’s Valley Campaign, Colonel William Allan, C.S.A., p. 54.
[23] O.R., vol. xii, part i, p. 341.
[24] Abercrombie’s, 4,500 men and a battery. The brigade marched to Warrenton, where it remained until it was transferred to McDowell’s command.