“The unknown quantity on the side of Belgium,” says Lt.-Col. de Thomasson, “condemned us at the outset to a waiting strategy. The idea of at once taking the offensive madly overpassed the boldest conceptions of Napoleon” (p. 54). “A well-advised command would have understood that it was folly to launch at once all its army to attack troops of the value of the Germans; that the offensive should have been made only on certain points of the front, with a sufficient numerical superiority, and for this purpose the forces must be economised; that, in brief, the beginning of hostilities could only be favourable to us on condition of a superior strategy such as was shown in the preparation for the battle of the Marne, but not in the initial plan or in the first three weeks of the war” (177–8).
[17] See Hanotaux, Histoire Generale de la Guerre; Engerand, “Lorraine–Ardennes” (Le Correspondant, April 25, 1918); Paul H. Courrière, “La Bataille de Sarre-et-Seille” (La Revue, Jan. 1, 1917); Gerald Campbell, Verdun to the Vosges (London: Arnold)—the author was correspondent of The Times on the Eastern frontier; Thomasson, loc. cit.
[18] See Hanotaux, “La Bataille des Ardennes, Etude Tactique et Strategique” (Revue des Deux Mondes, Feb. 15, 1917); Engerand, as above; Ernest Renauld, “Charleroi–Dinant–Neufchâteau–Virton” (La Revue, Oct. 1916—inaccurate as regards the British Army); Malleterre, Un Peu de Lumière sur les Batailles d’Août—Septembre 1914 (Paris: Tallandier).
[19] See L’Illustration, March 16, 1918: La Défense de Longwy, by P. Nicou.
THE ABANDONMENT OF LILLE
[20] The military history of Lille, is curious. See Lille, by General Percin (Paris: Grasset). M. Engerand, in his chapter on “The Abandonment of Lille,” says that a third of the cannon had been removed earlier in the year, but that on August 21, when General Herment took command, there remained 446 pieces with enough ammunition and 25,000 men, not counting the neighbouring Territorial divisions of General d’Amade. Though Lille had been virtually declassed on the eve of the war, General Percin, the Governor (afterwards cruelly traduced on the subject) and General Herment were anxious, and had begun preparations, to defend it. The municipal and other local authorities protested to the Government against any such effort being made; and at the last moment, on the afternoon of August 24, when the retreat from the Sambre had begun, the Minister of War ordered the abandonment of the town and the evacuation of the region. German patrols entered the city two days later, but it was only occupied at the beginning of October. It has been argued that, with Lille and Maubeuge held on their flanks, and the Scarpe, Scheldt, and Rhonelle valleys flooded, the Allied forces might have delayed the enemy long enough to permit of a definite stand on the line Amiens–La Fère–Laon–Rheims. General Berthaut rejects any such idea, and says that inundations would have required forty days.
[21] French’s 1914.
[22] See La Grande Guerre sur le Front Occidental, especially vol. iv., by General Palat (Paris: Chapelot, 1918–19).