Reports of Trials for Murder by Poisoning; / by Prussic Acid, Strychnia, Antimony, Arsenic, and Aconita. Including the trials of Tawell, W. Palmer, Dove, Madeline Smith, Dr. Pritchard, Smethurst, and Dr. Lamson, with chemical introduction and notes on the poisons used

by G. Lathom Browne; active 19th century C. G. Stewart

[85] “That would be moral insanity.”—Judge’s Notes—Stephen.

[86] I cannot find in the reports to what particular act this question refers.

[87] “The suggestion of Dr. Williams,” says Judge Stephen, “that Dove had allowed his mind to dwell on his wife’s death till at last he became the victim of an uncontrollable propensity to kill her, if correct, would not prove that his act was not voluntary. It is setting and keeping the mind in motion towards an object plainly conceived that constitutes the mental part of an act. Every act becomes irrevocable before it is consummated. If a man, for example, strikes another, he may repent while his arm is falling; but there is a point at which he can no more deprive his arm of the impetus with which he has animated it, than he can divert from its course a bullet which has been fired from a rifle. Suppose he deals with his mind in this manner at an earlier stage of the proceeding, and so fills himself with a passionate, intense longing for the forbidden object or result, that he becomes, as it were, a mere machine in his own hands. Is not the case precisely similar, and does not the action continue to be voluntary and wilful, although the act of volition which made it irrevocable preceded its completion by a longer interval than usual?

“It must, however, be remembered, that the proof that Dove’s propensity was uncontrollable was very defective. An uncontrollable propensity, which accidental difficulties or the fear of detection constantly control and divert for a time, is an inconceivable state of mind. Is there the smallest reason to suppose that, if Mrs. Dove had met with a fatal accident, and had been lying in bed dying before her husband gave her any poison, his uncontrollable propensity to kill her would have induced him to give her poison nevertheless? If not, the propensity was like any other wicked feeling. It was certainly uncontrolled, and it may probably have been strong, but that is different to uncontrollable.”—History of the Criminal Law of England, by Mr. Justice Stephen. Vol. III., p. 435-6.

[88] Baron Bramwell especially called attention to the letter of the prisoner to his mother of the 25th of February, describing his wife’s first attack (see ante, note p. 237), and that to the Witchman, Harrison, asking him, in replying about his nativity, to “write in milk, or lemon, or anything else that would not show till put to the fire.”

[89] This was proved at the trial by the Fishers.

[90] Mr. Morley’s pupil had shown it to him; proved at the trial.

[91] That would be February the 23rd, when Fisher’s mother come to Dove’s to take her daughter’s place, and the first attack was when Mrs. Dove fell whilst helping to make the beds on the following Monday. Throughout his statement Dove is very confused as to dates. The tasting by Mrs. Witham was several days after this.

[92] Mrs. Witham states (see her evidence) that she gave her medicine at 3.30 P.M., and she seemed better for it.

[93] In his comments on this extraordinary case, Mr. Justice Stephen—after noting Dove’s predisposition to madness in his infancy; the fact that the symptoms of the disease exhibited themselves at frequent intervals, yet never reached such a pitch as to induce his friends to treat him as a madman; the prurience with which he dwelt on the prospect of his wife’s death; the forming of the design of putting her to death, and the deliberate contrivance and precaution with which he carried it out—says:—“In this state of things can he be said to have known, in the wider sense of the words, that his act was wrong? He obviously knew that it was wrong in the sense that people generally consider it so; but was he capable of thinking, like an ordinary man, of the reasons why murder is wrong, and of applying these reasons to his conduct? There was evidence both ways. His irrationality, however, was occasional, and he appears to have acted rationally enough as a rule, and to have transacted all the common affairs of life. Did, then, this act belong to the rational or irrational part of his conduct? Every circumstance connected with it referred it to the former. It was a continued series of deliberate and repeated attempts, fully completed at last.”—History of the Criminal Law. Vol. III., pp. 435-6.