“The enemy’s position was a strong one; there was no cover of any kind in the desert lying between my camp at Kassasin and the enemy’s works north of the Canal. These works extended from a point on the Canal 1½ miles east of the railway station at Tel-el-Kebir for a distance almost due north of about 3½ miles. The general character of the ground which forms the northern boundary of the valley through which the Ismailia[245] Canal and railway run is that of gently undulating and rounded slopes, which rise gradually to a fine open plateau from 90 to 100 feet above the valley. The southern extremity of this plateau is about a mile from the railway and is nearly parallel to it. To have marched over this plateau upon the enemy’s position by daylight our troops would have had to advance over a glacis-like slope in full view of the enemy and under the fire of his well-served artillery for about five miles. Such an operation would have entailed enormous losses from an enemy with men and guns well-protected by entrenchments from any artillery fire we could have brought to bear upon them. To have turned the enemy’s position either by the right or left was an operation that would have entailed a very wide turning movement, and therefore a long, difficult and fatiguing march, and what is of more importance, it would not have accomplished the object I had in view, namely to grapple with the enemy at such close quarters that he should not be able to shake himself free from our clutches except by a general fight of all his army. I wished to make the battle a final one; whereas a wide turning movement would probably have only forced him to retreat, and would have left him free to have moved his troops in good order to some other position farther back. My desire was to fight him decisively where he was, in the open desert, before he could take up fresh positions more difficult of access in the cultivated country in his rear. That cultivated country is practically impassable to a regular army, being irrigated and cut up in every direction by deep canals. I had ascertained by frequent reconnaissance that the enemy did not push his outposts far beyond his works at night, and I had good reasons for believing that he then kept a very bad look-out. These circumstances, and the very great reliance I had in the steadiness of our splendid infantry, determined me to resort to the extremely difficult operation of a night march, to be followed by an attack before daybreak on the enemy’s position.”
The field-works at Tel-el-Kebir were not of uniform strength, for Arabi, believing that the British would advance along the Sweet-water canal, had devoted himself to the fortification of the right of his line, where for more than two miles stretched an unbroken series of breastworks, with parapets five or six feet high, and ditches varying from eight to twelve feet in width, and from five to nine feet in depth. Behind these defences about two miles of interior works had been thrown up, connected with those in front by rifle-pits and trenches, and from redoubts built at numerous salients, cross-fire could be poured in every direction. Towards the left the works dwindled in size, and at the extreme northern end of the line, that which, as we shall see, was attacked by the Royal Irish, they were but a mere collection of shelter trenches. Arabi had twenty-five thousand soldiers, six thousand Bedouin irregulars, and about sixty guns with which to defend these fortifications against the eleven thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and sixty-one guns that the British Commander-in-Chief could bring against him. The remainder of Wolseley’s command was absorbed by the garrisons of Alexandria, Port Said, Ismailia, Suez, and other points on the Suez canal, and the posts on the line of communication between Kassasin and the base at Ismailia.
Though the British advance was to be astride the Sweet-water canal, the main attack was to be delivered on the works to the north of it, where the first division was to assault the left, the second division the right of the entrenchments. The cavalry division, with its batteries of Royal Horse artillery, was to circle round the left of the Egyptian position, threaten its defenders from the rear, and pursue them when the infantry had driven them from their entrenchments. On the south of the canal the Indian brigade and the naval contingent were to clear the country, capture the villages which had been placed in a state of defence, and seize the important railway junction of Zag-a-zig. To the field batteries an interesting rôle was assigned. It was obvious that in a night march they could not discharge the ordinary duty of artillery, that of keeping in check the enemy’s fire so as to render it possible for the attacking infantry to advance. But it was almost equally obvious that, if the forty-two field-guns could be brought up to the entrenchments of Tel-el-Kebir by early dawn, they would be able to pour a crushing short-range fire upon the defenders: if either division required support the guns would be at hand to give assistance, and should either of the infantry attacks fail, the artillery would be ready to beat the enemy down behind his works until the attackers were able to renew the assault. The seven field batteries therefore were ordered to march in the interval between the infantry divisions, keeping level with them.
The first and second divisions and the field artillery were assembled after dark on September 12, on the rising ground known to the Staff as Ninth Hill, which lay about four miles to the east of Arabi’s position. To give the enemy’s scouts and spies no clue to the intended movements the tents were not struck till sunset, when all bugle calls ceased. Then the troops were set in motion, the men marching light with a hundred rounds of ammunition, rations, and water-bottles.[246] As soon as the sun went down the Royal Engineers began to set up on Ninth Hill long lines of posts, running many hundred yards into the desert, to serve as guides towards the enemy’s entrenchments. The night was unusually dark, the posts were hard to find, and it was not till eleven P.M. that all the units had reached their proper places. Graham’s brigade was on the right of the line, with its battalions standing in the following order from the right, Royal Irish, York and Lancaster, Royal Marine Light Infantry, Royal Irish Fusiliers: in the centre were the field-guns: on the left was Alison’s brigade. H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught’s brigade of Guards supported Graham, while in rear of Alison was a small brigade of two battalions under Colonel Ashburnham, King’s Royal Rifle Corps.
At 1 A.M. on the 13th of September, Graham called together the officers commanding the battalions of his brigade and in a low voice gave them instructions, briefly and to the point: the works of Tel-el-Kebir were to be surprised; the troops were to close upon them at earliest dawn, and carry them at the point of the bayonet. The soldiers were then roused; the orders were explained to them, and in half an hour the greater part of the army was on the march to attack an enemy of nearly double its numbers, and holding fortifications about which, except their strength, little definite was known. The Indian brigade did not leave its resting-place, south of the Canal, until 2.30 A.M., as to have moved earlier would have run the risk of giving the alarm to the inhabitants of the belt of cultivated land through which Macpherson had to march. Throughout the night telegraphic communication was kept up between the Indian brigade and a detachment of Royal Marine artillery, who followed behind the second division. It was many years since a British general had attempted operations at night upon so large a scale. In the Peninsula Wellington’s troops had been thoroughly accustomed to marching and manœuvring in darkness, but the art was now almost a lost one, and Wolseley wisely gave great latitude to his divisional generals in the choice of the formations in which their commands were to advance; he wished the brigades to be so marshalled that no manœuvring would be necessary to pass them from the order in which they marched into that in which they were to attack, and he suggested, though without positively commanding, that each brigade should move in line of columns of half battalions at deploying intervals. Neither Alison nor Graham adopted the suggestion in its entirety. Alison drew up his men in line of half battalion columns of double companies, and not only marched but attacked in this formation; Graham first moved in columns of half battalions at deploying intervals, but found it necessary to make several changes in formation before he finally closed with the enemy. Nothing but the perfect discipline of the troops enabled Lord Wolseley and his generals to move this great mass of men and guns at dead of night, across nearly four miles of ground which it had not been possible thoroughly to reconnoitre, and to bring it to within a few hundred yards of the fortifications before it was detected by the enemy. No smoking was allowed; the men were as silent as the grave; the few orders issued were passed along the ranks in a whisper. In the blackness of the night Staff officers riding from flank to flank found it impossible to see a column, when two hundred yards away from it; yet when their ears had grown attuned to the silence, which at first appeared crushing and unnatural, they became aware of a low dull noise, that sound of human feet, of horses’ hoofs, of jingling harness, which no forethought could prevent. Fortunately throughout the night a little breeze blew from west to east, and thus Arabi’s men, being up-wind, would have heard nothing if their watch had been vigilant, instead of extremely negligent.
In the 2nd brigade the precaution of extending a chain of connecting links between the half battalions did not ensure perfect leading by the guides. Sometimes the half battalions would open out, and at others close unduly upon each other. These mistakes had to be corrected, and each correction took time. At an hour variously estimated between 3 and 4 A.M.[247] General Willis considered that the 2nd brigade had come within range of the Egyptian works. He wished to rest his men for a moment, and accordingly, after forming line, ordered a short halt. With the priceless trust of British soldiers in their officers, the men immediately dropped on the sand and fell fast asleep during the few minutes’ repose which they were allowed. About the same time the Highland brigade was halted to refresh the men. As all orders were passed in a low tone from company to company and from battalion to battalion, this order was not at once received by the troops on the outer flanks; they continued to advance, but as they remained in touch with the centre they lost direction and by the time the command reached them they had wheeled inwards, though quite unconsciously. Thus the brigade halted not in line, but in a crescent-shaped formation. When the order was given to resume the march the flank battalions, quite unaware that they had lost direction, moved straight to their front, and soon almost crashed into each other. Each thought the other was the enemy, but by a triumph of discipline, every man waited for orders to fire, and thus gave time for the officers to discover the mistake. The brigade was halted, the companies of direction placed on the true line of advance, and the remainder of the Highlanders, gradually and successively drawing back, re-formed upon the proper alignment. This mistake, which took about twenty-five minutes to correct, is a good example of the difficulty of night operations and the necessity of implicit obedience to orders.
After a short rest Graham’s brigade again advanced, this time in line, but the formation was found unsuitable, and was changed to an advance by fours from the right of companies. To keep in the proper direction was no easy matter, especially as the mass of artillery on the left was steering a few degrees too far to the northward, and thus continually elbowed the 2nd brigade off the right path: to correct this pressure frequent turns half-left and half-right had to be made. Suddenly, at about 4.45 A.M., “far away to the left was heard a tremendous rattle of musketry, mingled with the firing of big guns, succeeded by ringing and sustained cheers, and”—to quote the special correspondent who, as already mentioned, had attached himself to the Royal Irish—“we felt sure that the Highland brigade had found its quest and run into it.” At this moment it became necessary again to correct a mistake in direction, and “a halt and change of front a quarter circle to the left were at once ordered.... A rattling fire of small arms now opened on us from the works, distant about 600 yards.[248] It was still dusk, but the blackness of night had given place to a pale darkness, through which the flashes of fire sparkled with ceaseless rapidity.”
By this time, owing to the difficulty of marching at night over the featureless desert with nothing to steer by but the stars, Lord Wolseley’s force was no longer in line but in echelon from the left, and when the Highlanders struck the enemy’s works the head of Graham’s brigade was probably more than 800 yards from the Egyptians’ entrenchments. As soon as the brigade had formed line the Royal Irish pushed forward, and were rapidly nearing the position when the brigade-major, suddenly appearing on the scene, told Colonel Gregorie it was General Graham’s wish that he should form the Royal Irish for attack. Though it was obvious that the battalion was too close to the trenches for the evolution to be carried out accurately, the necessary orders were given, and C and D companies extended, with B and E in support, and the remainder in reserve. Then the leading companies swept onwards under a heavy but fortunately ill-directed fusilade; the supports and reserves closed upon the firing-line, and with wild yells and almost without firing a shot, the Royal Irish swarmed over the shelter trenches at the extreme end of Arabi’s line, driving before them at the point of the bayonet the Egyptians, who slowly and in good order fell back to a second line of works in rear. The Royal Irish were now enfiladed by a redoubt on their left flank, but taking no notice of its fire they pressed onwards until, after driving the Egyptians from the second line of entrenchments, they were peremptorily halted and ordered to re-form their ranks. While this second charge was being delivered, Lieutenant Chichester made a gallant effort to storm the redoubt with a few men; but he and two or three of his followers fell wounded, and it remained in the hands of the enemy until the York and Lancaster carried it with a rush. The Marines and the Royal Irish Fusiliers gradually made themselves masters of the works in front of them, and the Egyptians, falling into confusion, and to a large extent abandoned by their officers who were among the first to fly, retired in disorder. When they discovered that the British cavalry had swung round the left of their position and were directly threatening them from the rear, their retreat became a rout. Yet there were many among the rank and file, especially in the regiments composed of Nubians, who had shown bravery in the battle, and at the time it was thought that had these men been well led they would have been formidable enemies. The justice of this, opinion has been proved by the services of the modern Egyptian troops in the Soudan, where regiments of Egyptian peasants and Soudanese blacks, trained and officered by men of the regular British army, have on many occasions acquitted themselves excellently.
Some interesting episodes have been recorded of the part played by the Royal Irish in this phase of the engagement. The special correspondent relates that as the battalion was advancing towards the first line of trenches two men, mad with excitement, dashed out of the ranks and rushed towards the enemy. For a moment they disappeared, but