"You shall have your chance. But first we will take Wilson. And I dare say he will not keep us long. For you will hardly maintain, I suppose," I continued, turning to him, "that Knowledge, as you define it, could be identified with Good?"
"I don't know," he said; "to tell the truth, I don't much believe in Good, in any absolute sense. But that Knowledge, as I define it, is a good thing, I have no doubt whatever."
"Neither have I," I replied; "but good, as it seems to me, mainly as a means, in so far as it enables us to master Nature."
"Well," he said, "and what greater Good could there be?"
"I don't dispute the greatness of such a Good. I merely wish to point out that if we look at it so, it is in the mastery of Nature that the Good in question consists, and not in the Knowledge itself. Or should you say that there is Good in the scientific activity itself, quite apart from any practical results to which it may lead?"
"Certainly," he replied, "and the former, in my opinion, is the higher and more ideal Good."
"This activity itself of inventing brief formulæ to resume the routine of our perceptions?"
"Yes."
"Well, but what is the Good of it? That is what it is so hard for a layman to get hold of. Does it consist in the discovery of Reality? For that, I could understand, would be good."
"No," he said, "for we do not profess to touch Reality. We deal merely with our perceptions."